Claim CB801:
Complaints about creationists not defining "kind" are unfair since
evolutionists can't define "species" consistently.
Response:
-  Species are expected often to have fuzzy and imprecise boundaries
   because evolution is ongoing.  Some species are in the process of
   forming; others are recently formed and still difficult to interpret.
   The complexities of biology add further complications.  Many pairs of
   species remain distinct despite a small amount of hybridization between
   them.  Some groups are asexual or frequently produce asexual strains,
   so how many species to split them into becomes problematical.
 
 Creation, defining things as kinds that were created once and for all,
   implies that all species should be clearly demarcated and that there
   should be a clear and universal definition of kind or species.  Since
   there is not, creationism, not evolutionary theory, has something to
   explain.
 
 
-  Different definitions of species serve different purposes.  Species
   concepts are used both as taxonomic units, for identification and
   classification, and as theoretical concepts, for modeling and
   explaining.  There is a great deal of overlap between the two purposes,
   but a definition that serves one is not necessarily the best for the
   other.  Furthermore, there are practical considerations that call for
   different species criteria as well.  Species definitions applied to
   fossils, for example, cannot be based on genetics or behavior because
   those traits do not fossilize.
Further Reading:
Schilthuizen, Menno., 2001.  Frogs, Flies, and Dandelions: the Making of
 Species, Oxford Univ. Press.  See especially chap. 1.
 Cracraft, Joel, 1987. Species concepts and the ontology of evolution.
 Biology and Philosophy 2: 329-346.
 Cracraft, Joel, 2000.  Species concepts in theoretical and applied
 biology: A systematic debate with consequences. In Species concepts and
 phylogenetic theory: A debate, edited by Q. D. Wheeler and R. Meier. New
 York: Columbia University Press, 3-14.
 Hull, David L., 1997. The ideal species concept -- and why we can't get
 it. In: Species: The units of biodiversity, M. Claridge, H. Dawah
 and M. Wilson, eds., London: Chapman and Hall, 357-380.
 Kottler, Malcolm J., 1978.  Charles Darwin's biological species concept
 and theory of geographic speciation: the Transmutation Notebooks.
 Annals of Science 35: 275-297.
 Mayden, R. L., 1997.  A hierarchy of species concepts: the denoument in
 the saga of the species problem.  In: Species: The units of
 biodiversity, M. F. Claridge, H. A. Dawah and M. R. Wilson eds., London:
 Chapman and Hall, 381-424.
 Mayden, R. L., 1999.  Consilience and a hierarchy of species concepts:
 advances toward closure on the species puzzle.  Journal of Nematology
 31(2): 95-116.
 Wilkins, John S., 2003.  How to be a chaste species pluralist-realist: The
 origins of species modes and the Synapomorphic Species Concept.  Biology
 and Philosophy 18:621-638.
created  2003-7-22, modified  2004-2-19