Atheism

@book{cohen1921theism1,
    author = "Cohen, C",
    title = "Theism or Atheism",
    year = "1921",
    publisher = "London, The Pioneer Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Cohen, C., 1921, Theism or Atheism: London, The Pioneer Press.}"
}

@misc{smith1979atheism2,
    author = "Smith, G. H",
    title = "Atheism",
    year = "1979",
    howpublished = "The Case Against God: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Smith, G. H., 1979, Atheism: The Case Against God: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books.}"
}

@book{openalexw1013930821,
    author = "Mackie, J. L.",
    title = "The Miracle of Theism",
    year = "1982",
    openalex = "W1013930821"
}

@book{openalexw560146420,
    author = "Jüngel, Eberhard",
    title = "God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute Between Theism and Atheism",
    year = "1983",
    journal = "Medical Entomology and Zoology",
    url = "https://openalex.org/W560146420",
    openalex = "W560146420"
}

The rise of atheism in the modern world is a religious phenomenon unprecedented in history, both in the number of its adherents and in the security of its cultural establishment. How did so revolutionary a conviction as this arise? What can theological reflection learn from this massive shift in religious consciousness? In this book, Michael J. Buckley investigates the origins and development of modern atheism and argues convincingly that its impetus lies paradoxically in the very attempts to counter it. Although modern atheism finds its initial exponents in Denis Diderot and Paul d’Holbach in the eighteenth century, their works bring to completion a dialectical process that reaches back to the theologians and philosophers of an earlier period. During the seventeenth century, theologians such as Leonard Lessius and Marin Mersenne determined that in order to defend the existence of god, religious apologetics must become philosophy, surrendering as its primary warrant any intrinsically religious experience or evidence. The most influential philosophers of the period, René Descartes and Isaac Newton, and the theologians who followed them accepted this settlement, and the new sciences were enlisted to provide the foundation for religion. Almost no one suspected the profound contradictions that this process entailed and that would eventually resolve themselves through the negation of god. In transferring to other areas of human experience and inquiry its fundamental responsibility to deal with the existence of god, religion dialectically generated its own denial. The origins and extraordinary power of modern atheism lie with this progressive self-alienation of religion itself.

@book{openalexw2160282762,
    author = "Buckley, Michael",
    title = "At the Origins of Modern Atheism",
    year = "1987",
    booktitle = "Scholar Commons (Santa Clara University)",
    abstract = "The rise of atheism in the modern world is a religious phenomenon unprecedented in history, both in the number of its adherents and in the security of its cultural establishment. How did so revolutionary a conviction as this arise? What can theological reflection learn from this massive shift in religious consciousness? In this book, Michael J. Buckley investigates the origins and development of modern atheism and argues convincingly that its impetus lies paradoxically in the very attempts to counter it. Although modern atheism finds its initial exponents in Denis Diderot and Paul d’Holbach in the eighteenth century, their works bring to completion a dialectical process that reaches back to the theologians and philosophers of an earlier period. During the seventeenth century, theologians such as Leonard Lessius and Marin Mersenne determined that in order to defend the existence of god, religious apologetics must become philosophy, surrendering as its primary warrant any intrinsically religious experience or evidence. The most influential philosophers of the period, René Descartes and Isaac Newton, and the theologians who followed them accepted this settlement, and the new sciences were enlisted to provide the foundation for religion. Almost no one suspected the profound contradictions that this process entailed and that would eventually resolve themselves through the negation of god. In transferring to other areas of human experience and inquiry its fundamental responsibility to deal with the existence of god, religion dialectically generated its own denial. The origins and extraordinary power of modern atheism lie with this progressive self-alienation of religion itself.",
    openalex = "W2160282762"
}

@article{doi105860choice282080,
    title = "Atheism: a philosophical justification",
    year = "1990",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.28-2080",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.28-2080",
    openalex = "W4214501397"
}

@article{doi10108000048409112344511,
    author = "Smith, Quentin",
    title = "Atheism, theism and big bang cosmology",
    year = "1991",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409112344511",
    doi = "10.1080/00048409112344511",
    openalex = "W2065806739"
}

(1991). Theism and Big Bang cosmology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 492-503.

@article{doi10108000048409112344901,
    author = "Craig, William Lane",
    title = "Theism and Big Bang cosmology",
    year = "1991",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "(1991). Theism and Big Bang cosmology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 492-503.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409112344901",
    doi = "10.1080/00048409112344901",
    openalex = "W1996787292",
    references = "doi10108000048409112344511"
}

The anthropic principle or the associated anthropic coincidences have been used by philosophers such as John Leslie (1989), William Lane Craig (1988) and Richard Swinburne (1990) to support the thesis that God exists. In this paper I shall examine Swinburne's argument from the anthropic coincidences. I will show that Swinburne's premises, coupled with his principle of credulity and the failure of his theodicy in The Existence of God, disconfirms theism and confirms instead the hypothesis that there exists a malevolent creator of the universe.

@article{doi101017s0034412500021703,
    author = "Smith, Quentin",
    title = "The Anthropic Coincidences, Evil and The Disconfirmation of Theism",
    year = "1992",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "The anthropic principle or the associated anthropic coincidences have been used by philosophers such as John Leslie (1989), William Lane Craig (1988) and Richard Swinburne (1990) to support the thesis that God exists. In this paper I shall examine Swinburne's argument from the anthropic coincidences. I will show that Swinburne's premises, coupled with his principle of credulity and the failure of his theodicy in The Existence of God, disconfirms theism and confirms instead the hypothesis that there exists a malevolent creator of the universe.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500021703",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412500021703",
    openalex = "W2057701275",
    references = "doi10108000048409112344511"
}

Recent scientific research into the cosmological origins of the universe has prompted a flood of philosophical speculations about the consequences of that research for views which invoke supernatural causes for the existence of the universe.Much of this speculation has come from people whose primary training is not philosophical; in particular, much of it has come from the same physicists who are engaged in the scientific research in question.Moreover, much of the scientific research in question is inseparably bound up with certain kinds of speculations which not-too-distant previous generations would have considered to be solely the province of philosophers.

@article{doi105860choice316009,
    author = "Craig, William Lane and Smith, Quentin",
    title = "Theism, atheism, and big bang cosmology",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "Recent scientific research into the cosmological origins of the universe has prompted a flood of philosophical speculations about the consequences of that research for views which invoke supernatural causes for the existence of the universe.Much of this speculation has come from people whose primary training is not philosophical; in particular, much of it has come from the same physicists who are engaged in the scientific research in question.Moreover, much of the scientific research in question is inseparably bound up with certain kinds of speculations which not-too-distant previous generations would have considered to be solely the province of philosophers.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.31-6009",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.31-6009",
    openalex = "W2101114664"
}

Abstract This chapter begins a debate on the relevance of Big Bang cosmology to the philosophy of religion. It deals with William Lane Craig's theistic cosmological argument that Big Bang cosmology and considerations about finitude and the past warrant the belief that God exists. This chapter provides an atheistic cosmological argument that the classical Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism because of the unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity.

@incollection{doi101093acprofoso97801982638380030007,
    author = "Smith, Quentin R.",
    title = "Atheism, Theism, and Big Bang Cosmology",
    year = "1995",
    abstract = "Abstract This chapter begins a debate on the relevance of Big Bang cosmology to the philosophy of religion. It deals with William Lane Craig's theistic cosmological argument that Big Bang cosmology and considerations about finitude and the past warrant the belief that God exists. This chapter provides an atheistic cosmological argument that the classical Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism because of the unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0007",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0007",
    openalex = "W4241855050"
}

@article{doi1011110029462400297,
    author = "Bergmann, Michael",
    title = "Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "Noûs",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00297",
    doi = "10.1111/0029-4624.00297",
    openalex = "W2102509209"
}

@article{doi1011110029462400298,
    author = "Rowe, William L.",
    title = "Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "Noûs",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00298",
    doi = "10.1111/0029-4624.00298",
    openalex = "W2102970786"
}

@book{doi1010029780470756225,
    title = "Atheism and Theism",
    year = "2003",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470756225",
    doi = "10.1002/9780470756225",
    openalex = "W4205470872"
}

Atheism is often considered to be a negative, dark, and pessimistic belief that is characterized by a rejection of values and purpose and a fierce opposition to religion. Atheism: A Very Short Introduction sets out to dispel the myths that surround atheism and show how a life without religious belief can be positive, meaningful, and moral. The book presents an intellectual case for atheism that rests as much upon positive arguments for its truth as on negative arguments against religion. It also confronts the failure of officially atheist states in the twentieth century.

@book{doi101093actrade97801928042420010001,
    author = "Baggini, Julián",
    title = "Atheism",
    year = "2003",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Atheism is often considered to be a negative, dark, and pessimistic belief that is characterized by a rejection of values and purpose and a fierce opposition to religion. Atheism: A Very Short Introduction sets out to dispel the myths that surround atheism and show how a life without religious belief can be positive, meaningful, and moral. The book presents an intellectual case for atheism that rests as much upon positive arguments for its truth as on negative arguments against religion. It also confronts the failure of officially atheist states in the twentieth century.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192804242.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/actrade/9780192804242.001.0001",
    openalex = "W4231344348"
}

@article{openalexw3138800843,
    author = "Buckley, S J and Michael, J",
    title = "Denying and Disclosing God: The Ambiguous Progress of Modern Atheism",
    year = "2004",
    openalex = "W3138800843"
}

In In particular, we argued that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine noseeum inferences in evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine noseeum inferences that play a crucial role in the justification of ordinary moral reasoning. They claim, first, that our argument fails to show that 'sceptical theism as such undermines ordinary moral practice', and, second, that our argument fails even to show that 'in the absence of various background beliefs that theists are very likely to possess, [sceptical theism] undermines ordinary moral practice'.

@article{doi105840philo2005822,
    author = "Almeida, Michael J. and Oppy, Graham",
    title = "Evidential Arguments from Evil and Skeptical Theism",
    year = "2005",
    journal = "Philo",
    abstract = "In In particular, we argued that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine noseeum inferences in evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine noseeum inferences that play a crucial role in the justification of ordinary moral reasoning. They claim, first, that our argument fails to show that 'sceptical theism as such undermines ordinary moral practice', and, second, that our argument fails even to show that 'in the absence of various background beliefs that theists are very likely to possess, [sceptical theism] undermines ordinary moral practice'.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/philo2005822",
    doi = "10.5840/philo2005822",
    openalex = "W1982679451"
}

@article{doi101007s1115300561786,
    author = "Rowe, William L.",
    title = "Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil",
    year = "2006",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-005-6178-6",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-005-6178-6",
    openalex = "W2027073010"
}

This paper suggests that biological factors ought to be considered in attempting to explain distributions of theism and atheism across populations. In advancing our argument, we consider two recent efforts to explain atheism. The first, entered by William S. Bainbridge, is in the tradition of sociological theorizing. The second, proffered by Justin L. Barrett, is an example of theorizing within the framework of the recently developed cognitive science of religion. While these two approaches are different in important respects, they both opt for environmental explanations of atheism. We give reasons for regarding purely environmental explanations as unsatisfactory both with regard to atheism and with regard to some (but not all) expressions of religiosity. We offer, moreover, a suggested modification of Barrett's approach that introduces a hypothesized heritable biological argument so that it accounts for more of what we know about atheism.

@article{doi1033356temenos4628,
    author = "Saler, Benson and Ziegler, Charles A.",
    title = "Atheism and the Apotheosis of Agency",
    year = "2006",
    journal = "Temenos - Nordic Journal for the Study of Religion",
    abstract = "This paper suggests that biological factors ought to be considered in attempting to explain distributions of theism and atheism across populations. In advancing our argument, we consider two recent efforts to explain atheism. The first, entered by William S. Bainbridge, is in the tradition of sociological theorizing. The second, proffered by Justin L. Barrett, is an example of theorizing within the framework of the recently developed cognitive science of religion. While these two approaches are different in important respects, they both opt for environmental explanations of atheism. We give reasons for regarding purely environmental explanations as unsatisfactory both with regard to atheism and with regard to some (but not all) expressions of religiosity. We offer, moreover, a suggested modification of Barrett's approach that introduces a hypothesized heritable biological argument so that it accounts for more of what we know about atheism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.33356/temenos.4628",
    doi = "10.33356/temenos.4628",
    openalex = "W2098584948",
    references = "doi101093actrade97801988567950010001"
}

@misc{crossref2007atheism,
    title = "Atheism",
    year = "2007",
    booktitle = "Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608712427.s22",
    doi = "10.4135/9781608712427.s22"
}

Counseling professionals have begun to realize that, in order to be as effective as possible, counselors must explore and understand the spiritual and religious beliefs of their clients. The literature on client belief systems and diversity, however, does not include discussion of individuals without religious or spiritual beliefs. The purpose of this article is to (a) suggest that atheism and nonspirituality should be included in the multiculturalism conversation and (b) offer ways that counselors might effectively help and nurture such clients.

@article{doi101002j2161007x2007tb00072x,
    author = "D’Andrea, Livia M. and Sprenger, Johann",
    title = "Atheism and Nonspirituality as Diversity Issues in Counseling",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Counseling and Values",
    abstract = "Counseling professionals have begun to realize that, in order to be as effective as possible, counselors must explore and understand the spiritual and religious beliefs of their clients. The literature on client belief systems and diversity, however, does not include discussion of individuals without religious or spiritual beliefs. The purpose of this article is to (a) suggest that atheism and nonspirituality should be included in the multiculturalism conversation and (b) offer ways that counselors might effectively help and nurture such clients.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2161-007x.2007.tb00072.x",
    doi = "10.1002/j.2161-007x.2007.tb00072.x",
    openalex = "W2037819287",
    references = "doi101093actrade97801928042420010001"
}

The cosmic singularity provides negligible evidence for creation in the finite past, and hence theism. A physical theory might have no metric or multiple metrics, so a ‘beginning’ must involve a first moment, not just finite age. Whether one dismisses singularities or takes them seriously, physics licenses no first moment. The analogy between the Big Bang and stellar gravitational collapse indicates that a Creator is required in the first case only if a Destroyer is needed in the second. The need for and progress in quantum gravity and the underdetermination of theories by data make it difficult to take singularities seriously. The singularity exemplifies the sort of gap that is likely to be closed by scientific progress, obviating special divine action. The apparent irrelevance of cardinality to practices of counting infinite sets in classical field theory and Fourier analysis is noted.1. Introduction2. The Doctrine of Creation and Its Warrant3. Cardinality and Sizes of Infinity4. Modern Cosmology and Creation5. Tolerance or Intolerance toward Singularities?6. Leibniz against Incompetent Watchmaker?7. Induction from Earlier Theories' Breakdown?8. Stellar Collapse Implies Theistic Destroyer9. Stacking the Deck for GTR10. Quantum Gravity Tends to Resolve Singularities11. Vicious God-of-the-Gaps Character12. Fluctuating or Inaccessible Warrant13. Big Bang Cosmology Not Especially Congenial to Faith

@article{doi101093bjpsaxn032,
    author = "Pitts, J. Brian",
    title = "Why the Big Bang Singularity Does Not Help the Kalām Cosmological Argument for Theism",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "The cosmic singularity provides negligible evidence for creation in the finite past, and hence theism. A physical theory might have no metric or multiple metrics, so a ‘beginning’ must involve a first moment, not just finite age. Whether one dismisses singularities or takes them seriously, physics licenses no first moment. The analogy between the Big Bang and stellar gravitational collapse indicates that a Creator is required in the first case only if a Destroyer is needed in the second. The need for and progress in quantum gravity and the underdetermination of theories by data make it difficult to take singularities seriously. The singularity exemplifies the sort of gap that is likely to be closed by scientific progress, obviating special divine action. The apparent irrelevance of cardinality to practices of counting infinite sets in classical field theory and Fourier analysis is noted.1. Introduction2. The Doctrine of Creation and Its Warrant3. Cardinality and Sizes of Infinity4. Modern Cosmology and Creation5. Tolerance or Intolerance toward Singularities?6. Leibniz against Incompetent Watchmaker?7. Induction from Earlier Theories' Breakdown?8. Stellar Collapse Implies Theistic Destroyer9. Stacking the Deck for GTR10. Quantum Gravity Tends to Resolve Singularities11. Vicious God-of-the-Gaps Character12. Fluctuating or Inaccessible Warrant13. Big Bang Cosmology Not Especially Congenial to Faith",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn032",
    doi = "10.1093/bjps/axn032",
    openalex = "W2136401729",
    references = "doi105860choice316009"
}

Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil. Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each. This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical. I seek to establish a new defence which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once. In developing this defence, I consider the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.

@article{doi101111j146792132008578x,
    author = "Nagasawa, Yujin",
    title = "A NEW DEFENCE OF ANSELMIAN THEISM",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
    abstract = "Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil. Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each. This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical. I seek to establish a new defence which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once. In developing this defence, I consider the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.578.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.578.x",
    openalex = "W2117172145"
}

@article{doi105840soctheorpract200834216,
    author = "Maitzen, Stephen",
    title = "The Cambridge Companion to Atheism",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "Social Theory and Practice",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200834216",
    doi = "10.5840/soctheorpract200834216",
    openalex = "W2007575024"
}

@book{openalexw2798694261,
    author = "Murray, Michael J.",
    title = "Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering",
    year = "2008",
    openalex = "W2798694261"
}

Abstract This chapter describes atheism in higher education and provides suggestions for student affairs practitioners interested in understanding and responding to the needs of atheist students.

@article{doi101002ss308,
    author = "Goodman, Kathleen M. and Mueller, John A.",
    title = "Invisible, marginalized, and stigmatized: Understanding and addressing the needs of atheist students",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "New Directions for Student Services",
    abstract = "Abstract This chapter describes atheism in higher education and provides suggestions for student affairs practitioners interested in understanding and responding to the needs of atheist students.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/ss.308",
    doi = "10.1002/ss.308",
    openalex = "W1980014867",
    references = "doi101093actrade97801928042420010001, doi101093actrade97801988567950010001"
}

@article{doi101007s1184100901307,
    author = "Bishop, John",
    title = "Towards a Religiously Adequate Alternative to OmniGod Theism",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "Sophia",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0130-7",
    doi = "10.1007/s11841-009-0130-7",
    openalex = "W2055844068",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511499012"
}

@book{doi101093oxfordhb97801995965390130018,
    author = "Bergmann, Michael",
    title = "Skeptical Theism and The Problem of Evil",
    year = "2009",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199596539.013.0018",
    doi = "10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199596539.013.0018",
    openalex = "W2373519636",
    references = "openalexw2799177124"
}

Abstract What do we currently know about atheists and secular people? In what ways are atheism and secularity correlated with positive societal outcomes? This article offers a thorough presentation and discussion of the latest social scientific research concerning the identities, values, and behaviors of people who don’t believe in God or are non‐religious, and addresses the ways in which atheism and secularity are positively correlated with societal well‐being.

@article{doi101111j17519020200900247x,
    author = "Zuckerman, Phil",
    title = "Atheism, Secularity, and Well‐Being: How the Findings of Social Science Counter Negative Stereotypes and Assumptions",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "Sociology Compass",
    abstract = "Abstract What do we currently know about atheists and secular people? In what ways are atheism and secularity correlated with positive societal outcomes? This article offers a thorough presentation and discussion of the latest social scientific research concerning the identities, values, and behaviors of people who don’t believe in God or are non‐religious, and addresses the ways in which atheism and secularity are positively correlated with societal well‐being.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2009.00247.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1751-9020.2009.00247.x",
    openalex = "W2075129474",
    references = "doi101038386435a0, doi101093actrade97801928042420010001, doi101093actrade97801988567950010001"
}

@article{doi105840faithphil20092614,
    author = "Wilks, Ian and of Christian Philosophers, The Society",
    title = "SKEPTICAL THEISM AND EMPIRICAL UNFALSIFIABILITY",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "Faith and Philosophy",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20092614",
    doi = "10.5840/faithphil20092614",
    openalex = "W1988253334"
}

@article{doi101007s1115301092527,
    author = "Hasker, William",
    title = "All too skeptical theism",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9252-7",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-010-9252-7",
    openalex = "W2056306524",
    references = "doi101093oso97801995754420030002"
}

Abstract In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil fails. An implication of (a) is that sceptical theism is at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true. This result will render conceding (a) unattractive to many sceptical theists.

@article{doi101017s0034412510000247,
    author = "Wielenberg, Erik J.",
    title = "Sceptical theism and divine lies",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Abstract In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil fails. An implication of (a) is that sceptical theism is at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true. This result will render conceding (a) unattractive to many sceptical theists.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000247",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412510000247",
    openalex = "W2083568014",
    references = "doi101007bf00136567, doi101007s1115300561786, doi101017s0028688500013394, doi1011110029462400297, doi10432497813152340215, doi105840faithphil20092614, doi105840philo2005822"
}

Atheists are America’s least trusted group, and stereotypes about them abound: Atheists are non-conformist, sceptical, cynical, and joyless, rarely experiencing awe. Atheists (N = 42) were recruited from the American atheist website and compared to Christians (N = 22) and Buddhists (N = 18). Groups were highly similar in their reported well-being, empathy, and other personality scales, but differed strongly on scales assessing Spirituality and Magical Ideation, where atheists rejected the concepts of spirituality and magical beliefs. Responding to the question, “Have you ever felt wonderment or felt as if you were part of something greater than yourself?,” 71% said “yes,” citing Nature (54%), Science, (30%), Music/Art (12%), and Human cooperation (8%). Respondents explained their lack of belief as deriving from a preference for logic and rationality, suggesting an intellectual component to atheism. Findings thus support the stereotype of atheists as logical, sceptical, and non-conformist, but not as cynical and joyless.

@article{doi101080136746762010509847,
    author = "Caldwell‐Harris, Catherine L. and Wilson, Angela L. and LoTempio, Elizabeth and Beit‐Hallahmi, Benjamin",
    title = "Exploring the atheist personality: well-being, awe, and magical thinking in atheists, Buddhists, and Christians",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "Mental Health Religion \& Culture",
    abstract = "Atheists are America’s least trusted group, and stereotypes about them abound: Atheists are non-conformist, sceptical, cynical, and joyless, rarely experiencing awe. Atheists (N = 42) were recruited from the American atheist website and compared to Christians (N = 22) and Buddhists (N = 18). Groups were highly similar in their reported well-being, empathy, and other personality scales, but differed strongly on scales assessing Spirituality and Magical Ideation, where atheists rejected the concepts of spirituality and magical beliefs. Responding to the question, “Have you ever felt wonderment or felt as if you were part of something greater than yourself?,” 71\% said “yes,” citing Nature (54\%), Science, (30\%), Music/Art (12\%), and Human cooperation (8\%). Respondents explained their lack of belief as deriving from a preference for logic and rationality, suggesting an intellectual component to atheism. Findings thus support the stereotype of atheists as logical, sceptical, and non-conformist, but not as cynical and joyless.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/13674676.2010.509847",
    doi = "10.1080/13674676.2010.509847",
    openalex = "W2074135711",
    references = "doi1011770898010105276180"
}

Abstract Most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God take the following form: If God exists, the world would not be like this (where ‘this’ picks out some feature of the world like the existence of evil, etc.) But the world is like this. Therefore, God does not exist. Skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical of our ability to make judgments of the sort expressed by premise (1). According to skeptical theism, if there were a God, it is likely that he would have reasons for acting that are beyond our ken, and thus we are not justified in making all‐things‐considered judgments about what the world would be like if there were a God. In particular, the fact that we don’t see a good reason for X does not justify the conclusion that there is no good reason for X. Thus, skeptical theism purports to undercut most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God. What follows is an account of the nature of skeptical theism, an application of skeptical theism to both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness, and a review of the cases for and against skeptical theism.

@article{doi101111j17479991201000306x,
    author = "McBrayer, Justin P.",
    title = "Skeptical Theism",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "Philosophy Compass",
    abstract = "Abstract Most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God take the following form: If God exists, the world would not be like this (where ‘this’ picks out some feature of the world like the existence of evil, etc.) But the world is like this. Therefore, God does not exist. Skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical of our ability to make judgments of the sort expressed by premise (1). According to skeptical theism, if there were a God, it is likely that he would have reasons for acting that are beyond our ken, and thus we are not justified in making all‐things‐considered judgments about what the world would be like if there were a God. In particular, the fact that we don’t see a good reason for X does not justify the conclusion that there is no good reason for X. Thus, skeptical theism purports to undercut most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God. What follows is an account of the nature of skeptical theism, an application of skeptical theism to both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness, and a review of the cases for and against skeptical theism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00306.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00306.x",
    openalex = "W2046173585",
    references = "doi101093oso97801995754420030002"
}

The term “new atheism” has been given to the recent barrage of bestselling books written by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and others. These books and their authors have had a significant media presence and have only grown in popularity over the years. This book brings together scholars from religious studies, science, sociology of religion, sociology of science, philosophy, and theology to engage the new atheism and place it in the context of broader scholarly discourses. This volume will serve to contextualize and critically examine the claims, arguments and goals of the new atheism so that readers can become more informed of some of the debates with which the new atheists inevitably and, at times unknowingly, engage. Contributors include Richard Harries, Reza Aslan, Amarnath Amarasingam, Robert Platzner, Jeffrey Robbins, Christopher Rodkey, Rory Dickson, Steve Fuller, William Sims Bainbridge, William A. Stahl, Stephen Bullivant, Michael Borer, Richard Cimino, Christopher Smith, Gregory R. Peterson, Jeff Nall, Ryan Falcioni, and Mark Vernon. Studies in Critical Research on Religion, vol. 1

@book{doi101163ej9789004185579i253,
    author = "Amarasingam, Amarnath and Fuller, Steve and Rodkey, Christopher D. and Robbins, Jeffrey W. and Bullivant, Stephen and Bainbridge, William Sims and Aslan, Reza and Nall, Jeff and Stahl, William A. and Borer, Michael Ian and Falcioni, Ryan C. and Vernon, Mark and Peterson, Gregory M. and Platzner, Robert and Cimino, Richard and Smith, Chris and Dickson, Rory and Harries, Richard",
    title = "Religion and the New Atheism",
    year = "2010",
    abstract = "The term “new atheism” has been given to the recent barrage of bestselling books written by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and others. These books and their authors have had a significant media presence and have only grown in popularity over the years. This book brings together scholars from religious studies, science, sociology of religion, sociology of science, philosophy, and theology to engage the new atheism and place it in the context of broader scholarly discourses. This volume will serve to contextualize and critically examine the claims, arguments and goals of the new atheism so that readers can become more informed of some of the debates with which the new atheists inevitably and, at times unknowingly, engage. Contributors include Richard Harries, Reza Aslan, Amarnath Amarasingam, Robert Platzner, Jeffrey Robbins, Christopher Rodkey, Rory Dickson, Steve Fuller, William Sims Bainbridge, William A. Stahl, Stephen Bullivant, Michael Borer, Richard Cimino, Christopher Smith, Gregory R. Peterson, Jeff Nall, Ryan Falcioni, and Mark Vernon. Studies in Critical Research on Religion, vol. 1",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004185579.i-253",
    doi = "10.1163/ej.9789004185579.i-253",
    openalex = "W2499543615",
    references = "doi101093actrade97801988567950010001"
}

Abstract Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.

@article{doi101017s0034412510000478,
    author = "Segal, Aaron",
    title = "Sceptical theism and divine truths",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Abstract Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000478",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412510000478",
    openalex = "W2099223593",
    references = "doi101017s0034412510000247"
}

This article explores atheist meaning-making by employing a multidimensional model of meaning operationalized by the Sources of Meaning and Meaning in Life Questionnaire (SoMe). When compared to a representative sample of “religionists” (N = 390) and “nones” (N = 178), atheists (N = 102) show lower degrees of meaningfulness, but they do not suffer from crises of meaning more frequently. However, subsequent cluster analysis reveals that heterogeneity within atheism has to be taken into account. Three types of atheists are identified. ‘Low-commitment’ atheists are characterised by generally low commitment; they report very low meaningfulness and a high frequency of crises of meaning. ‘Broad-commitment’ atheists exhibit considerably higher levels of meaningfulness and rare crises of meaning. They evidence, in particular, high scores on the dimension of well-being and relatedness. The third type, primarily committed to “selfactualization,” exhibits moderate levels of meaningfulness, with crises of meaning being literally absent. Common to most atheists is a particular commitment to self-knowledge, freedom, knowledge, individualism, and comfort. In comparing male and female atheists, gendered patterns of commitment are discovered.

@article{doi101163157361211x564611,
    author = "Schnell, Tatjana and Keenan, William",
    title = "Meaning-Making in an Atheist World",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Archive for the Psychology of Religion",
    abstract = "This article explores atheist meaning-making by employing a multidimensional model of meaning operationalized by the Sources of Meaning and Meaning in Life Questionnaire (SoMe). When compared to a representative sample of “religionists” (N = 390) and “nones” (N = 178), atheists (N = 102) show lower degrees of meaningfulness, but they do not suffer from crises of meaning more frequently. However, subsequent cluster analysis reveals that heterogeneity within atheism has to be taken into account. Three types of atheists are identified. ‘Low-commitment’ atheists are characterised by generally low commitment; they report very low meaningfulness and a high frequency of crises of meaning. ‘Broad-commitment’ atheists exhibit considerably higher levels of meaningfulness and rare crises of meaning. They evidence, in particular, high scores on the dimension of well-being and relatedness. The third type, primarily committed to “selfactualization,” exhibits moderate levels of meaningfulness, with crises of meaning being literally absent. Common to most atheists is a particular commitment to self-knowledge, freedom, knowledge, individualism, and comfort. In comparing male and female atheists, gendered patterns of commitment are discovered.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1163/157361211x564611",
    doi = "10.1163/157361211x564611",
    openalex = "W2060962332",
    references = "doi105840soctheorpract200834216"
}

@misc{crossref2012atheism,
    title = "Atheism",
    year = "2012",
    booktitle = "Encyclopedia of Global Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412997898.n45",
    doi = "10.4135/9781412997898.n45"
}

In the scientific study of religion in general and the psychology of religion in particular, atheists and agnostics have received limited attention, while believers and converts have stood in the center of interest. More recently, however, more attention has been given to atheists and agnostics, and several researchers have recommended studying atheists and agnostics in their own right (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Keysar, 2007; Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). This new interest may in part be due to indications of a considerable increase in the probability of religious nonaffiliation in the U.S. According to one recent study, this probability has risen “from between.06 and.08 in the 1970s and 1980s to almost.16 in 2006” (Schwadel, 2010, p. 318). Although the question of who are the “nones” (cf., Pasquale, 2007) should be approached with care, these groups of unaffiliates and disaffiliates likely include a number of atheists and agnostics. \nMost of the research in this area takes a static and synchronic approach, contrasting belief vs. unbelief or religiosity vs. atheism/agnosticism. We believe that a more dynamic approach is called for, one that views atheism and agnosticism as processes. From the perspective of a dynamic approach, it is also necessary to include apostasy in this discussion, because people who leave their faith are in the process of a developmental change, a migration in the religious field which may eventually lead to exiting the religious domain altogether. Therefore, the three terms in the title are interrelated and need to be studied in tandem.\nFor a deeper understanding of atheists, agnostics, and people who deconvert eventually to atheist and agnostic beliefs, it is imperative to know their motivations, the predictors of their stance toward religion, and the effects of their religious approach on various outcomes. There are a number of particularly interesting questions about outcomes: Are the shifts to atheism, agnosticism and apostasy associated with an increase or a decrease in psychological well-being? How do these religious positions affect physical health? Do they lead to differences in preferences in the ways of coping with major life stressors? In this chapter, we address these questions, discuss the results from extant research, and suggest directions for future research. But we begin with a discussion of concepts and models, because some important questions have also been raised or re-opened on the theoretical level – questions that relate to the conceptualization of religion and spirituality in general.

@incollection{doi10103714045040,
    author = "Streib, Heinz and Klein, Constantin",
    title = "Atheists, agnostics, and apostates.",
    year = "2012",
    booktitle = "American Psychological Association eBooks",
    abstract = "In the scientific study of religion in general and the psychology of religion in particular, atheists and agnostics have received limited attention, while believers and converts have stood in the center of interest. More recently, however, more attention has been given to atheists and agnostics, and several researchers have recommended studying atheists and agnostics in their own right (Hood, Hill, \& Spilka, 2009; Hunsberger \& Altemeyer, 2006; Keysar, 2007; Kosmin \& Keysar, 2007). This new interest may in part be due to indications of a considerable increase in the probability of religious nonaffiliation in the U.S. According to one recent study, this probability has risen “from between.06 and.08 in the 1970s and 1980s to almost.16 in 2006” (Schwadel, 2010, p. 318). Although the question of who are the “nones” (cf., Pasquale, 2007) should be approached with care, these groups of unaffiliates and disaffiliates likely include a number of atheists and agnostics. \nMost of the research in this area takes a static and synchronic approach, contrasting belief vs. unbelief or religiosity vs. atheism/agnosticism. We believe that a more dynamic approach is called for, one that views atheism and agnosticism as processes. From the perspective of a dynamic approach, it is also necessary to include apostasy in this discussion, because people who leave their faith are in the process of a developmental change, a migration in the religious field which may eventually lead to exiting the religious domain altogether. Therefore, the three terms in the title are interrelated and need to be studied in tandem.\nFor a deeper understanding of atheists, agnostics, and people who deconvert eventually to atheist and agnostic beliefs, it is imperative to know their motivations, the predictors of their stance toward religion, and the effects of their religious approach on various outcomes. There are a number of particularly interesting questions about outcomes: Are the shifts to atheism, agnosticism and apostasy associated with an increase or a decrease in psychological well-being? How do these religious positions affect physical health? Do they lead to differences in preferences in the ways of coping with major life stressors? In this chapter, we address these questions, discuss the results from extant research, and suggest directions for future research. But we begin with a discussion of concepts and models, because some important questions have also been raised or re-opened on the theoretical level – questions that relate to the conceptualization of religion and spirituality in general.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1037/14045-040",
    doi = "10.1037/14045-040",
    openalex = "W2264180450",
    references = "doi101093actrade97801988567950010001"
}

Recent books by, among others, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens have thrust atheism firmly into the popular, media, and academic spotlight. This so-called New Atheism is arguably the most striking development in western socio-religious culture of the past decade or more. As such, it has spurred fertile (and often heated) discussions both within, and between, a diverse range of disciplines. Yet atheism, and the New Atheism, are by no means co-extensive. Interesting though it indeed is, the New Atheism is a single, historically and culturally specific manifestation of positive atheism (the belief that there is/are no God/s), which is itself but one form of a far deeper, broader, and more significant global phenomenon. The Oxford Handbook of Atheism is a pioneering edited volume, exploring atheism - understood in the broad sense of 'an absence of belief in the existence of a God or gods' - in all the richness and diversity of its historical and contemporary expressions. Bringing together an international team of established and emerging scholars, it probes the varied manifestations and implications of unbelief from an array of disciplinary perspectives (philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, demography, psychology, natural sciences, gender and sexuality studies, literary criticism, film studies, musicology) and in a range of global contexts (Western Europe, North America, post-communist Europe, the Islamic world, Japan, India). Both surveying and synthesizing previous work, and presenting the major fruits of innovative recent research, the handbook is set to be a landmark text for the study of atheism.

@book{doi101093oxfordhb97801996446500010001,
    author = "Bullivant, Stephen and Ruse, Michael",
    title = "The Oxford Handbook of Atheism",
    year = "2013",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Recent books by, among others, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens have thrust atheism firmly into the popular, media, and academic spotlight. This so-called New Atheism is arguably the most striking development in western socio-religious culture of the past decade or more. As such, it has spurred fertile (and often heated) discussions both within, and between, a diverse range of disciplines. Yet atheism, and the New Atheism, are by no means co-extensive. Interesting though it indeed is, the New Atheism is a single, historically and culturally specific manifestation of positive atheism (the belief that there is/are no God/s), which is itself but one form of a far deeper, broader, and more significant global phenomenon. The Oxford Handbook of Atheism is a pioneering edited volume, exploring atheism - understood in the broad sense of 'an absence of belief in the existence of a God or gods' - in all the richness and diversity of its historical and contemporary expressions. Bringing together an international team of established and emerging scholars, it probes the varied manifestations and implications of unbelief from an array of disciplinary perspectives (philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, demography, psychology, natural sciences, gender and sexuality studies, literary criticism, film studies, musicology) and in a range of global contexts (Western Europe, North America, post-communist Europe, the Islamic world, Japan, India). Both surveying and synthesizing previous work, and presenting the major fruits of innovative recent research, the handbook is set to be a landmark text for the study of atheism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199644650.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199644650.001.0001",
    openalex = "W36154875"
}

Based on 45 in‐depth interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation with seven different atheist organizations, this article investigates the collective identity work of atheists in the United States. It explores the social psychological and interactional dynamics of atheist organizations as well as how they contribute to the construction and maintenance of atheist identities. I discuss the various strategies atheists employ as they collectively manage a stigmatized identity and negotiate the meaning of their atheism with one another and with the nonatheist public. This is accomplished in part through an analysis of the identity politics and minority discourse contemporary atheists currently engage. In addition, and more broadly, this study explores the relationship between collective identity and social action through an analysis and description of contemporary atheist activism.

@article{doi101111jssr12009,
    author = "Smith, Jesse M.",
    title = "Creating a Godless Community: The Collective Identity Work of Contemporary American Atheists",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion",
    abstract = "Based on 45 in‐depth interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation with seven different atheist organizations, this article investigates the collective identity work of atheists in the United States. It explores the social psychological and interactional dynamics of atheist organizations as well as how they contribute to the construction and maintenance of atheist identities. I discuss the various strategies atheists employ as they collectively manage a stigmatized identity and negotiate the meaning of their atheism with one another and with the nonatheist public. This is accomplished in part through an analysis of the identity politics and minority discourse contemporary atheists currently engage. In addition, and more broadly, this study explores the relationship between collective identity and social action through an analysis and description of contemporary atheist activism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12009",
    doi = "10.1111/jssr.12009",
    openalex = "W1919295809",
    references = "doi101093oxfordhb97801996446500010001"
}

What is called “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later, more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. The chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, this chapter suggests that a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology.

@incollection{doi101093acprofoso97801996611830030011,
    author = "Perrine, Timothy and Wykstra, Stephen J.",
    title = "Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning*",
    year = "2014",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "What is called “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later, more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. The chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, this chapter suggests that a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0011",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0011",
    openalex = "W198134193",
    references = "doi101007s1115301293590"
}

This chapter argues that skeptical theism not only lacks the reach claimed for it by theistic philosophers but suggests ways of extending the reach of atheism. Atheistic arguments, as it turns out, are not prevented by skeptical theism from providing justification for the atheist to be an atheist. Moreover, skeptical theism suggests a new way for the atheist to question the theist’s support for her own belief—in particular when the latter is experientially based. Finally, this chapter shows how an investigative atheism may be embedded in a wider skepticism and, using a form of reasoning similar to that employed by skeptical theists, promotes both new doubts about theism for those left unconvinced by atheistic arguments and new investigation into non-theistic understandings of the divine.

@incollection{doi101093acprofoso97801996611830030014,
    author = "Schellenberg, J. L.",
    title = "Skeptical Theism and Skeptical Atheism",
    year = "2014",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "This chapter argues that skeptical theism not only lacks the reach claimed for it by theistic philosophers but suggests ways of extending the reach of atheism. Atheistic arguments, as it turns out, are not prevented by skeptical theism from providing justification for the atheist to be an atheist. Moreover, skeptical theism suggests a new way for the atheist to question the theist’s support for her own belief—in particular when the latter is experientially based. Finally, this chapter shows how an investigative atheism may be embedded in a wider skepticism and, using a form of reasoning similar to that employed by skeptical theists, promotes both new doubts about theism for those left unconvinced by atheistic arguments and new investigation into non-theistic understandings of the divine.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0014",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0014",
    openalex = "W2486199586",
    references = "doi10109301951319320010001, doi10109301951380900030009, doi101093oxfordhb97801995965390130018, doi1011110029462400297, doi10432497813152340215, doi105860choice392732a, doi105860choice423375a, doi105860choice473757, doi105860choice502034, openalexw1586514812"
}

Skeptical theism insists that a general inability to scrutinize a God-justifying reason does not provide good evidence that there is no reason. The core motivation for skeptical theism is that the cognitive and moral distance between a perfect being and creatures is so great one shouldn’t expect that creatures grasp all the relevant considerations pertaining to a God-justifying reason. The goal in this chapter is to defend skeptical theism within a context that allows for an inverse probability argument for theism. These arguments are crucial for an evidentialist approach to the justification of theism. This chapter also aims to show that there is a natural way of motivating a skeptical theist position that does not undermine our knowledge of some values.

@incollection{doi101093acprofoso97801996611830030022,
    author = "Poston, Ted",
    title = "Skeptical Theism within Reason*",
    year = "2014",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Skeptical theism insists that a general inability to scrutinize a God-justifying reason does not provide good evidence that there is no reason. The core motivation for skeptical theism is that the cognitive and moral distance between a perfect being and creatures is so great one shouldn’t expect that creatures grasp all the relevant considerations pertaining to a God-justifying reason. The goal in this chapter is to defend skeptical theism within a context that allows for an inverse probability argument for theism. These arguments are crucial for an evidentialist approach to the justification of theism. This chapter also aims to show that there is a natural way of motivating a skeptical theist position that does not undermine our knowledge of some values.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0022",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0022",
    openalex = "W2480298060",
    references = "doi101093oso97801995754420030002"
}

@article{doi101007s1115301595332,
    author = "Wielenberg, Erik J.",
    title = "The parent–child analogy and the limits of skeptical theism",
    year = "2015",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9533-2",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-015-9533-2",
    openalex = "W1202325395",
    references = "doi101007s1115301293590, doi101017s0034412510000247, doi101093acprofoso97801996611830030014, doi101093oso97801995754420030002"
}

@article{doi101007s1115301595501,
    author = "Diller, Jeanine",
    title = "Global and local atheisms",
    year = "2015",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9550-1",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-015-9550-1",
    openalex = "W2285651798",
    references = "doi1010079789400752191, doi101093acprofoso97801992055470010001, doi101093mindlxiv254200, doi101111j146792132008578x, doi105840schoolman19452314, doi105860choice265040, doi105860choice443244, doi105860choice473757, openalexw3139934447, openalexw599752336"
}

@article{doi101007s1115301695670,
    author = "Rutledge, Jonathan C.",
    title = "Skeptical theism, moral skepticism, and epistemic propriety",
    year = "2016",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9567-0",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-016-9567-0",
    openalex = "W2345773048",
    references = "doi101007s1115301293590"
}

@incollection{doi101007978331954964411,
    author = "Quillen, Ethan G.",
    title = "The Satirical Sacred: New Atheism, Parody Religion, and the Argument from Fictionalization",
    year = "2017",
    booktitle = "Sophia studies in cross-cultural philosophy of traditions and cultures",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54964-4\_11",
    doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-54964-4\_11",
    openalex = "W2623631794",
    references = "doi101093actrade97801928042420010001, doi101093actrade97801988567950010001"
}

@article{doi101007s1115301796154,
    author = "DePoe, John M.",
    title = "Positive skeptical theism and the problem of divine deception",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9615-4",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-017-9615-4",
    openalex = "W2580325740",
    references = "doi101007s1115301293590"
}

A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

@incollection{doi1010179781107295278006,
    author = "Perrine, Timothy and Wykstra, Stephen J.",
    title = "Skeptical Theism",
    year = "2017",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107295278.006",
    doi = "10.1017/9781107295278.006",
    openalex = "W4234324116",
    references = "doi101017s0034412510000247, doi101093oso97801995754420030002"
}

Abstract In this article, I classify Richard Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism, and raise eight structural problems with regard to his Bayesian approach. For example, is theism really a meaningful theory? Does it have any predictive power? If so, isn't theism a degenerating research programme? Furthermore, is it legitimate to immunize theism against empirical refutations? Is Swinburne's tactic of doing so successful?

@article{doi101017s0034412517000245,
    author = "Philipse, Herman",
    title = "Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism evaluated",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Abstract In this article, I classify Richard Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism, and raise eight structural problems with regard to his Bayesian approach. For example, is theism really a meaningful theory? Does it have any predictive power? If so, isn't theism a degenerating research programme? Furthermore, is it legitimate to immunize theism against empirical refutations? Is Swinburne's tactic of doing so successful?",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412517000245",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412517000245",
    openalex = "W2744895449",
    references = "doi105860choice476192"
}

Abstract Two familiar worldviews dominate Western philosophy: materialist atheism and Abrahamic theism. One exciting development in recent philosophy of religion is the exploration of alternatives to both theism and atheism. This paper explores two alternatives: axiarchism and ananthropocentrism. Drawing on the long tradition of Platonism, axiarchists such as John Leslie, Derek Parfit and Nicholas Rescher posit a direct link between goodness and existence. The goodness of a possible world is what makes it actual. Ananthropocentric Purposivism (AP) holds that the universe has a purpose and that humans are irrelevant to that purpose. If there is a God, then God cares about what matters, but we do not matter to God.

@article{doi101111phc312420,
    author = "Mulgan, Tim",
    title = "Beyond Theism and Atheism: Axiarchism and Ananthropocentric Purposivism",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Philosophy Compass",
    abstract = "Abstract Two familiar worldviews dominate Western philosophy: materialist atheism and Abrahamic theism. One exciting development in recent philosophy of religion is the exploration of alternatives to both theism and atheism. This paper explores two alternatives: axiarchism and ananthropocentrism. Drawing on the long tradition of Platonism, axiarchists such as John Leslie, Derek Parfit and Nicholas Rescher posit a direct link between goodness and existence. The goodness of a possible world is what makes it actual. Ananthropocentric Purposivism (AP) holds that the universe has a purpose and that humans are irrelevant to that purpose. If there is a God, then God cares about what matters, but we do not matter to God.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12420",
    doi = "10.1111/phc3.12420",
    openalex = "W2622547614",
    references = "doi1010160191659986900197, doi101017cbo9780511498992, doi101017s0034412503006796, doi10109301982379870010001, doi101093acprofoso97801996461420010001, doi101093acprofoso97801999197580010001, doi101093oso97801982504560010001, doi101093oso97801987786080010001, doi1011110029462400095, doi1023072184329"
}

One crucible for theories of religion is their ability to predict and explain the patterns of belief and disbelief. Yet, religious nonbelief is often heavily stigmatized, potentially leading many atheists to refrain from outing themselves even in anonymous polls. We used the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation to indirectly estimate atheist prevalence in two nationally representative samples of 2,000 U.S. adults apiece. Widely cited telephone polls (e.g., Gallup, Pew) suggest U.S. atheist prevalence of only 3–11%. In contrast, our most credible indirect estimate is 26% (albeit with considerable estimate and method uncertainty). Our data and model predict that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% with greater than.99 probability and exceeds 20% with roughly.8 probability. Prevalence estimates of 11% were even less credible than estimates of 40%, and all intermediate estimates were more credible. Some popular theoretical approaches to religious cognition may require heavy revision to accommodate actual levels of religious disbelief.

@article{doi1011771948550617707015,
    author = "Gervais, Will M. and Najle, Maxine B.",
    title = "How Many Atheists Are There?",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Social Psychological and Personality Science",
    abstract = "One crucible for theories of religion is their ability to predict and explain the patterns of belief and disbelief. Yet, religious nonbelief is often heavily stigmatized, potentially leading many atheists to refrain from outing themselves even in anonymous polls. We used the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation to indirectly estimate atheist prevalence in two nationally representative samples of 2,000 U.S. adults apiece. Widely cited telephone polls (e.g., Gallup, Pew) suggest U.S. atheist prevalence of only 3–11\%. In contrast, our most credible indirect estimate is 26\% (albeit with considerable estimate and method uncertainty). Our data and model predict that atheist prevalence exceeds 11\% with greater than.99 probability and exceeds 20\% with roughly.8 probability. Prevalence estimates of 11\% were even less credible than estimates of 40\%, and all intermediate estimates were more credible. Some popular theoretical approaches to religious cognition may require heavy revision to accommodate actual levels of religious disbelief.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617707015",
    doi = "10.1177/1948550617707015",
    openalex = "W2615018224",
    references = "doi105840soctheorpract200834216"
}

THIS paper is concerned with three interrelated questions. The first is: Is there an argument for atheism based on the existence of evil that may rationally justify someone in being an atheist? To this first question I give an affirmative answer and try to support that answer by setting forth a strong argument for atheism based on the existence of evil.1 The second question is: How can the best defend his position against the argument for atheism based on the existence of evil? In response to this question I try to describe what may be an adequate rational defense for theism against any argument for atheism based on the existence of evil. The final question is: What position should the informed take concerning the rationality of theistic belief? Three different answers an may give to this question serve to distinguish three varieties of atheism: unfriendly indifferent and friendly atheism. In the final part of the paper I discuss and defend the position of friendly atheism. Before we consider the argument from evil, we need to distinguish a narrow and a broad sense of the terms theist, atheist, and agnostic. By a theist in the narrow sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omnis? cient, eternal, supremely good being who created the world. By a theist in the broad sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of some sort of divine being or divine reality. To be a in the narrow sense is also to be a in the broad sense, but one may be a in the broad sense?as was Paul Tillich?without believing that there is a supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal being who created the world. Similar distinctions must be made between a narrow and a broad sense of the terms atheist and agnostic. To be an in the broad sense is to deny the existence of any sort of divine being or divine reality. Tillich was not an in the broad sense. But he was an in the narrow sense, for he denied that there exists a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly good. In this paper I will be using the terms theism, theist, atheism, atheist, agnos? ticism, and agnostic in the narrow sense, not in the broad sense.

@incollection{doi10432497813152340215,
    author = "Rowe, William L.",
    title = "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism",
    year = "2017",
    abstract = "THIS paper is concerned with three interrelated questions. The first is: Is there an argument for atheism based on the existence of evil that may rationally justify someone in being an atheist? To this first question I give an affirmative answer and try to support that answer by setting forth a strong argument for atheism based on the existence of evil.1 The second question is: How can the best defend his position against the argument for atheism based on the existence of evil? In response to this question I try to describe what may be an adequate rational defense for theism against any argument for atheism based on the existence of evil. The final question is: What position should the informed take concerning the rationality of theistic belief? Three different answers an may give to this question serve to distinguish three varieties of atheism: unfriendly indifferent and friendly atheism. In the final part of the paper I discuss and defend the position of friendly atheism. Before we consider the argument from evil, we need to distinguish a narrow and a broad sense of the terms theist, atheist, and agnostic. By a theist in the narrow sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omnis? cient, eternal, supremely good being who created the world. By a theist in the broad sense I mean someone who believes in the existence of some sort of divine being or divine reality. To be a in the narrow sense is also to be a in the broad sense, but one may be a in the broad sense?as was Paul Tillich?without believing that there is a supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal being who created the world. Similar distinctions must be made between a narrow and a broad sense of the terms atheist and agnostic. To be an in the broad sense is to deny the existence of any sort of divine being or divine reality. Tillich was not an in the broad sense. But he was an in the narrow sense, for he denied that there exists a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly good. In this paper I will be using the terms theism, theist, atheism, atheist, agnos? ticism, and agnostic in the narrow sense, not in the broad sense.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315234021-5",
    doi = "10.4324/9781315234021-5",
    openalex = "W164756770"
}

@article{doi101007s1184101806567,
    author = "Perrine, Timothy",
    title = "Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Sophia",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0656-7",
    doi = "10.1007/s11841-018-0656-7",
    openalex = "W2799362584",
    references = "doi101007s1115301293590"
}

Abstract In this paper I demonstrate how certain contemporary atheists have problematically conflated atheism with agnosticism (knowingly or unknowingly). The first type of conflation is semantic fusion, where the lack of belief in God is combined with the outright denial of God, under the single label of ‘atheism’. The second is morphological fission which involves the separation of atheism into two subcategories where lack of belief in God is labelled as negative atheism and outright denial of God as positive atheism – and while here they are more explicitly demarcated, they are still positioned under the broad notion of atheism. I argue in this paper that atheism should be better used as the propositional denial of God and that uncertainty and unknowability about God should be reserved to characterise agnosticism. Conflating these positions under the single term ‘atheism’ mischaracterises agnostics and inflates the territory of atheists. In clarifying these terms, I review how the nuances in the prefix a- in atheism have potentially contributed towards these misnomers. I also suggest the use of the categories ‘local atheism’ and ‘global atheism’ to clarify on whom the burden of proof lies within the discourse.

@article{doi101017s0031819118000074,
    author = "Malik, Shoaib Ahmed",
    title = "Defining Atheism and the Burden of Proof",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Philosophy",
    abstract = "Abstract In this paper I demonstrate how certain contemporary atheists have problematically conflated atheism with agnosticism (knowingly or unknowingly). The first type of conflation is semantic fusion, where the lack of belief in God is combined with the outright denial of God, under the single label of ‘atheism’. The second is morphological fission which involves the separation of atheism into two subcategories where lack of belief in God is labelled as negative atheism and outright denial of God as positive atheism – and while here they are more explicitly demarcated, they are still positioned under the broad notion of atheism. I argue in this paper that atheism should be better used as the propositional denial of God and that uncertainty and unknowability about God should be reserved to characterise agnosticism. Conflating these positions under the single term ‘atheism’ mischaracterises agnostics and inflates the territory of atheists. In clarifying these terms, I review how the nuances in the prefix a- in atheism have potentially contributed towards these misnomers. I also suggest the use of the categories ‘local atheism’ and ‘global atheism’ to clarify on whom the burden of proof lies within the discourse.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819118000074",
    doi = "10.1017/s0031819118000074",
    openalex = "W2802425843",
    references = "doi101007s1115301595501"
}

While the percentage of religiously unaffiliated women is growing in the West, little is known about the relationship between atheism and feminism. This article redresses the gap by exploring women’s identification with atheism and feminism. The central argument draws on qualitative interview data from the UK, Australia, the US and Poland and emphasizes the role of atheism as a background identity marker through which female subjectivity is enacted in everyday life. The findings are two-fold: first, atheism and feminism are both devalued identities when embraced by women; and second, identifying as an atheist affords the participants an impetus to invent a new vocabulary to account for their identity. In conclusion, I argue that atheism provides a catalyst for the post-feminist discourse of independence, empowerment and freedom of choice as the participants construct narratives of ‘reasonable feminism’.

@article{doi1010800958923620181523053,
    author = "Trzebiatowska, Marta",
    title = "‘Atheism is not the problem. The problem is being a woman’. Atheist women and reasonable feminism",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Journal of Gender Studies",
    abstract = "While the percentage of religiously unaffiliated women is growing in the West, little is known about the relationship between atheism and feminism. This article redresses the gap by exploring women’s identification with atheism and feminism. The central argument draws on qualitative interview data from the UK, Australia, the US and Poland and emphasizes the role of atheism as a background identity marker through which female subjectivity is enacted in everyday life. The findings are two-fold: first, atheism and feminism are both devalued identities when embraced by women; and second, identifying as an atheist affords the participants an impetus to invent a new vocabulary to account for their identity. In conclusion, I argue that atheism provides a catalyst for the post-feminist discourse of independence, empowerment and freedom of choice as the participants construct narratives of ‘reasonable feminism’.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2018.1523053",
    doi = "10.1080/09589236.2018.1523053",
    openalex = "W2895349478",
    references = "doi101093oxfordhb97801996446500010001"
}

This chapter contends that the problem of evil arises not only for theists but also for atheists. To demonstrate this, focus is placed on ‘the problem of systemic evil’, where this is the problem of accounting for the violent, cruel, and unfair system of natural selection, a system which guarantees pain and suffering for uncountably many sentient beings. Unlike the traditional problem of evil, which concentrates on specific events, the more challenging problem of systemic evil emphasizes that the entire biological system is evil. Despite the systemic nature of evil, both theists and atheists typically uphold ‘existential optimism’, the thesis that the world is overall a good place and that we should be grateful for our existence in it. The combination of systemic evil and existential optimism gives rise to the ‘existential problem of systemic evil’, and this is a problem that theists have greater resources in answering than do atheists.

@book{doi101093oso97801988216250030007,
    author = "Nagasawa, Yujin",
    title = "The Problem of Evil for Atheists",
    year = "2018",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "This chapter contends that the problem of evil arises not only for theists but also for atheists. To demonstrate this, focus is placed on ‘the problem of systemic evil’, where this is the problem of accounting for the violent, cruel, and unfair system of natural selection, a system which guarantees pain and suffering for uncountably many sentient beings. Unlike the traditional problem of evil, which concentrates on specific events, the more challenging problem of systemic evil emphasizes that the entire biological system is evil. Despite the systemic nature of evil, both theists and atheists typically uphold ‘existential optimism’, the thesis that the world is overall a good place and that we should be grateful for our existence in it. The combination of systemic evil and existential optimism gives rise to the ‘existential problem of systemic evil’, and this is a problem that theists have greater resources in answering than do atheists.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821625.003.0007",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198821625.003.0007",
    openalex = "W2789475003"
}

This anthropologically informed study explores descriptions of communication with invisible, superhuman agents in high functioning young adults on the autism spectrum. Based on material from interviews, two hypotheses are formulated. First, autistic individuals may experience communication with bodiless agents (e.g., gods, angels, and spirits) as less complex than interaction with peers, since it is unrestricted by multisensory input, such as body language, facial expressions, and intonation. Second, descriptions of how participants absorb into “imaginary realities” suggest that such mental states are desirable due to qualities that facilitate social cognition: While the empirical world comes through as fragmented and incoherent, imaginary worlds offer predictability, emotional coherence, and benevolent minds. These results do not conform to popular expectations that autistic minds are less adapted to experience supernatural agents, and it is instead argued that imaginative, autistic individuals may embrace religious and fictive agents in search for socially and emotionally comprehensible interaction.

@article{doi1011631573612112341348,
    author = "Visuri, Ingela",
    title = "Rethinking Autism, Theism, and Atheism",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Archive for the Psychology of Religion",
    abstract = "This anthropologically informed study explores descriptions of communication with invisible, superhuman agents in high functioning young adults on the autism spectrum. Based on material from interviews, two hypotheses are formulated. First, autistic individuals may experience communication with bodiless agents (e.g., gods, angels, and spirits) as less complex than interaction with peers, since it is unrestricted by multisensory input, such as body language, facial expressions, and intonation. Second, descriptions of how participants absorb into “imaginary realities” suggest that such mental states are desirable due to qualities that facilitate social cognition: While the empirical world comes through as fragmented and incoherent, imaginary worlds offer predictability, emotional coherence, and benevolent minds. These results do not conform to popular expectations that autistic minds are less adapted to experience supernatural agents, and it is instead argued that imaginative, autistic individuals may embrace religious and fictive agents in search for socially and emotionally comprehensible interaction.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1163/15736121-12341348",
    doi = "10.1163/15736121-12341348",
    openalex = "W2795485400",
    references = "doi101007bf01531288, doi101098rstb20021218, doi101111j146786241995tb00909x, doi101176appibooks9780890425596, doi1023071131954, doi1041359781446217870n14, doi105860choice423375a, doi105860choice513189, openalexw1516534262, openalexw85091029"
}

@misc{doi1010029781119119302ch31,
    author = "Cruz, Helen De",
    title = "Evidential Objections to Atheism",
    year = "2019",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119119302.ch31",
    doi = "10.1002/9781119119302.ch31",
    openalex = "W2936976187",
    references = "doi101007s1115301595501"
}

@article{doi101007s11153019097025,
    author = "Milem, Bruce",
    title = "Defining atheism, theism, and god",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09702-5",
    doi = "10.1007/s11153-019-09702-5",
    openalex = "W2911656398",
    references = "doi101007s1115301595501, doi1010579780230283961, doi101093acprofoso97801987141250010001, doi101093actrade97801928042420010001, doi101093actrade97801988567950010001, doi101093oxfordhb97801996446500010001, doi102307jctvxrpz54, doi105840soctheorpract200834216, openalexw1985377974"
}

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is evidence against God, then seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil must be evidence for its truly being pointless. I think that this dialectic is mistaken. In this paper, after drawing a lesson about fallibility and induction from the preface paradox, I argue that the force of the evidential problem of evil is compatible with sceptical theism’s being true. More exactly, I argue that the collection of apparently pointless evil in the world provides strong evidence for there being truly pointless evil, despite the fact that seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil is no evidence whatsoever for its truly being pointless. I call this result the paradox of evil.

@article{doi1010800004840220191619088,
    author = "Oliveira, Luis R. G.",
    title = "Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is evidence against God, then seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil must be evidence for its truly being pointless. I think that this dialectic is mistaken. In this paper, after drawing a lesson about fallibility and induction from the preface paradox, I argue that the force of the evidential problem of evil is compatible with sceptical theism’s being true. More exactly, I argue that the collection of apparently pointless evil in the world provides strong evidence for there being truly pointless evil, despite the fact that seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil is no evidence whatsoever for its truly being pointless. I call this result the paradox of evil.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1619088",
    doi = "10.1080/00048402.2019.1619088",
    openalex = "W2963598892",
    references = "doi101007s1115301293590"
}

Abstract Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.

@article{doi101111papq12293,
    author = "Hendricks, Perry",
    title = "Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "Pacific philosophical quarterly",
    abstract = "Abstract Arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil makes it (at least) probable that God does not exist. Skeptical theism is held to undermine many versions of the argument from evil: it is thought to undermine a crucial inference that such arguments often rely on. Skeptical objections to skeptical theism claim that it (skeptical theism) entails an excessive amount of skepticism and therefore should be rejected. In this article, I show that skeptical objections to skeptical theism have a very limited scope: only those who reject certain (apparently) popular epistemological theories will be threatened by them.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12293",
    doi = "10.1111/papq.12293",
    openalex = "W2981943539",
    references = "doi101017s0034412510000247, doi101093oso97801995754420030002"
}

This article examines discussions on the reddit.com forum r/atheism in comparison with rhetoric found in contemporary atheist organizations and among leading figures within the atheist movement. We demonstrate how the culture of r/atheism converges with that of formal atheist cultures, most importantly regarding understandings of rationality and how religious people deviate from it, while highlighting areas of tension regarding how to relate to religion and religious people. We conclude that the social experience of community and belonging appears to be as important as other more instrumental goals commonly adopted by secular activists, and that tensions regarding the practice of atheism and the purpose of the forum correspond to tensions found in formal institutional contexts. We thus argue that while r/atheism is not directly or explicitly affiliated with atheist activism, overlap in the nature of discussion and debates is sufficient to consider the forum another window into the development of a general atheist culture practiced in institutional contexts and at the everyday level of ‘lived’ atheism.

@article{doi1011770037768618816096,
    author = "Lundmark, Evelina and LeDrew, Stephen",
    title = "Unorganized atheism and the secular movement: reddit as a site for studying ‘lived atheism’",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "Social Compass",
    abstract = "This article examines discussions on the reddit.com forum r/atheism in comparison with rhetoric found in contemporary atheist organizations and among leading figures within the atheist movement. We demonstrate how the culture of r/atheism converges with that of formal atheist cultures, most importantly regarding understandings of rationality and how religious people deviate from it, while highlighting areas of tension regarding how to relate to religion and religious people. We conclude that the social experience of community and belonging appears to be as important as other more instrumental goals commonly adopted by secular activists, and that tensions regarding the practice of atheism and the purpose of the forum correspond to tensions found in formal institutional contexts. We thus argue that while r/atheism is not directly or explicitly affiliated with atheist activism, overlap in the nature of discussion and debates is sufficient to consider the forum another window into the development of a general atheist culture practiced in institutional contexts and at the everyday level of ‘lived’ atheism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768618816096",
    doi = "10.1177/0037768618816096",
    openalex = "W2913790069",
    references = "doi101093acprofoso97801987368440010001, doi101093oxfordhb97801996446500010001"
}

Abstract Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many hold that it undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However, the case for skeptical theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered an explicit argument for the truth of skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous argument for the truth of skeptical theism.

@article{doi101017apa201945,
    author = "Hendricks, Perry",
    title = "Skeptical Theism Proved",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Journal of the American Philosophical Association",
    abstract = "Abstract Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many hold that it undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However, the case for skeptical theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered an explicit argument for the truth of skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous argument for the truth of skeptical theism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.45",
    doi = "10.1017/apa.2019.45",
    openalex = "W3038084921",
    references = "doi101017s0034412510000247"
}

Turning to the novels, Les Misérables, The Brothers Karamazov, and The Plague, this article focuses on theist–atheist encounters within fiction as guides and challenges to contemporary atheist–theist dialogue. It first provides a discussion of definitions pertinent to our topic and a reflection on the value and limitations of turning to fiction for the study and development of theist–atheist dialogue specifically, and interreligious dialogue more broadly. In examining each of the novels, I will first provide a very brief historical context of when each novel was written, the time and place the covered scenes transpire in the novel, and the authors’ positions toward religion(s) when writing their books. I will close the article on some lessons to glean from these fictional dialogues for contemporary theist–atheist dialogue.

@article{doi103390rel12010012,
    author = "Admirand, Peter",
    title = "Theist–Atheist Encounters in Les Misérables, The Brothers Karamazov, and The Plague",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Religions",
    abstract = "Turning to the novels, Les Misérables, The Brothers Karamazov, and The Plague, this article focuses on theist–atheist encounters within fiction as guides and challenges to contemporary atheist–theist dialogue. It first provides a discussion of definitions pertinent to our topic and a reflection on the value and limitations of turning to fiction for the study and development of theist–atheist dialogue specifically, and interreligious dialogue more broadly. In examining each of the novels, I will first provide a very brief historical context of when each novel was written, the time and place the covered scenes transpire in the novel, and the authors’ positions toward religion(s) when writing their books. I will close the article on some lessons to glean from these fictional dialogues for contemporary theist–atheist dialogue.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12010012",
    doi = "10.3390/rel12010012",
    openalex = "W3117584965",
    references = "doi101007s1115301595501"
}

Accepting Diller’s challenge to justify “global atheism,” despite its supposed crushing burden of knowledge, this paper argues that the global atheist bears no extraordinary burden. In fact, all atheism is global atheism, as an atheist lacks any and all god-beliefs; while a local theist, who accepts one of the myriad god-beliefs over all others, has a special burden to account for that choice. Surveying the diversity of god-concepts across religions and how atheists dismiss and discard them, this paper provides an inductive and philosophical foundation of global atheism—as well as illustrating that local theisms are more prone to blending and overlapping than allowed in Diller’s scheme.

@article{doi1033929sherm2020vol2no205,
    author = "Eller, Jack David",
    title = "Atheism is Global Atheism",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry",
    abstract = "Accepting Diller’s challenge to justify “global atheism,” despite its supposed crushing burden of knowledge, this paper argues that the global atheist bears no extraordinary burden. In fact, all atheism is global atheism, as an atheist lacks any and all god-beliefs; while a local theist, who accepts one of the myriad god-beliefs over all others, has a special burden to account for that choice. Surveying the diversity of god-concepts across religions and how atheists dismiss and discard them, this paper provides an inductive and philosophical foundation of global atheism—as well as illustrating that local theisms are more prone to blending and overlapping than allowed in Diller’s scheme.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2020.vol2.no2.05",
    doi = "10.33929/sherm.2020.vol2.no2.05",
    openalex = "W3091293112",
    references = "doi101007s1115301595501, doi101007s11153019097025"
}

@misc{crossref2021atheism,
    title = "Atheism.",
    year = "2021",
    booktitle = "Historical Dictionary of Catholicism",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5040/9798881822224.art51",
    doi = "10.5040/9798881822224.art51",
    pages = "54-55"
}

@article{doi101007s11841021008464,
    author = "Perrine, Timothy",
    title = "On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Sophia",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00846-4",
    doi = "10.1007/s11841-021-00846-4",
    openalex = "W3163311494",
    references = "doi105840faithphil201592347"
}

Abstract I argue that classical theism has a significant advantage as a theory of the First Cause over Graham Oppy's naturalistic account. This is because classical theism not only gives us a clear answer to the question of how many first causes there are but also because it explains why there is that number and not another. In comparison, Oppy's ‘initial physical state’ account seemingly leaves these questions hopelessly open, and so does his ‘metaphysical simples’ proposal for a foundational layer of reality. I end by exploring two arguments from omnipotence and perfection that could be of use also to non-classical theists.

@article{doi101017s0034412521000482,
    author = "Gel, Enric Fernández",
    title = "How many and why? A question for Graham Oppy that classical theism can answer",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Abstract I argue that classical theism has a significant advantage as a theory of the First Cause over Graham Oppy's naturalistic account. This is because classical theism not only gives us a clear answer to the question of how many first causes there are but also because it explains why there is that number and not another. In comparison, Oppy's ‘initial physical state’ account seemingly leaves these questions hopelessly open, and so does his ‘metaphysical simples’ proposal for a foundational layer of reality. I end by exploring two arguments from omnipotence and perfection that could be of use also to non-classical theists.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412521000482",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412521000482",
    openalex = "W4200104472",
    references = "doi101017s0034412520000384"
}

Abstract Atheism: A Very Short Introduction discusses the case for atheism. Atheism is often seen as simply a rejection of theism, but it encompasses so much more. Atheists are typically naturalists, who believe that meaning and morality are possible in a finite, natural world. ‘New Atheism’, a powerful new movement in atheism in the early 21st century, driven by books from authors such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, has left a legacy. There is an important question to consider: whether East Asia has been historically atheist or not. Atheism can be located in recent European history. What is the position of atheists around the world today?

@book{doi101093actrade97801988567950010001,
    author = "Baggini, Julián",
    title = "Atheism: A Very Short Introduction",
    year = "2021",
    abstract = "Abstract Atheism: A Very Short Introduction discusses the case for atheism. Atheism is often seen as simply a rejection of theism, but it encompasses so much more. Atheists are typically naturalists, who believe that meaning and morality are possible in a finite, natural world. ‘New Atheism’, a powerful new movement in atheism in the early 21st century, driven by books from authors such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, has left a legacy. There is an important question to consider: whether East Asia has been historically atheist or not. Atheism can be located in recent European history. What is the position of atheists around the world today?",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198856795.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/actrade/9780198856795.001.0001",
    openalex = "W627107870"
}

In this paper, I consider Sterba’s recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba’s criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due to his focus on causal connections and his neglect of logical connections. Because of this, his argument remains vulnerable to skeptical theism.

@article{doi103390rel13070668,
    author = "Hendricks, Perry",
    title = "Causal Connections, Logical Connections, and Skeptical Theism: There Is No Logical Problem of Evil",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "Religions",
    abstract = "In this paper, I consider Sterba’s recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba’s criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due to his focus on causal connections and his neglect of logical connections. Because of this, his argument remains vulnerable to skeptical theism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13070668",
    doi = "10.3390/rel13070668",
    openalex = "W4286433401",
    references = "doi105840faithphil201592347"
}

Little is known about the background of atheism in Malaysia and how Muslims respond to the phenomenon, although provocations by Malaysian atheists often take place on social media. This study addressed the gap by exploring the atheism phenomenon in Malaysia’s ethnoreligious-oriented society. Data were collected from in-depth interviews and content analysis using the qualitative method. All data were analysed thematically using the software for qualitative analysis, ATLAS.ti. The resulting superordinate themes that emerged from the analysis include the phenomenon of Malaysian atheism, the factors for becoming atheists and the theme of arguments. The study’s findings are three-fold. Firstly, atheism started in Malaysia after globalisation began. Secondly, most Malaysian atheists were influenced by internal factors based on emotional–psychological elements rather than being scientifically oriented. Last but not least, the main themes of Malaysian atheist arguments are ‘God’s justice’, ‘the problem of evil’ and ‘science rationalism’. As a response, Muslims counter the atheism phenomenon by providing an effective approach to preserving social cohesion and harmony in an ethnoreligious society.Contribution: This article suggests that although atheism is regarded as a challenge to society since Malaysia is an ethnoreligious-oriented society, atheism needs to be countered through proper education as early prevention, besides encouraging healthy discussions.

@article{doi104102htsv78i17640,
    author = "Ramli, Ahmad Faizuddin and Sarifin, Muhammad Ridhwan and Yaacob, Norazlan Hadi and Zin, Siti Aisyah Mohamad",
    title = "Understanding the atheism phenomenon through the lived experiences of Muslims: An overview of Malaysian atheists",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies",
    abstract = "Little is known about the background of atheism in Malaysia and how Muslims respond to the phenomenon, although provocations by Malaysian atheists often take place on social media. This study addressed the gap by exploring the atheism phenomenon in Malaysia’s ethnoreligious-oriented society. Data were collected from in-depth interviews and content analysis using the qualitative method. All data were analysed thematically using the software for qualitative analysis, ATLAS.ti. The resulting superordinate themes that emerged from the analysis include the phenomenon of Malaysian atheism, the factors for becoming atheists and the theme of arguments. The study’s findings are three-fold. Firstly, atheism started in Malaysia after globalisation began. Secondly, most Malaysian atheists were influenced by internal factors based on emotional–psychological elements rather than being scientifically oriented. Last but not least, the main themes of Malaysian atheist arguments are ‘God’s justice’, ‘the problem of evil’ and ‘science rationalism’. As a response, Muslims counter the atheism phenomenon by providing an effective approach to preserving social cohesion and harmony in an ethnoreligious society.Contribution: This article suggests that although atheism is regarded as a challenge to society since Malaysia is an ethnoreligious-oriented society, atheism needs to be countered through proper education as early prevention, besides encouraging healthy discussions.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v78i1.7640",
    doi = "10.4102/hts.v78i1.7640",
    openalex = "W4296757691",
    references = "doi1010029781118608005, doi101007s11153019097025, doi101016jbushor200909003, doi101080136746762010509847, doi1010801475939x20191695657, doi101080154568702015972282, doi101093oxfordhb97801996446500010001, doi10110817590831011026204, doi1013559789812306517, doi1043249780203878170, openalexw2183848531"
}

@article{doi1010800048721x20242423715,
    author = "Friedman, Tammar and Guzmen-Carmeli, Shlomo and Werczberger, Rachel",
    title = "Faithful atheists: the paradox of Jewish nonbelievers in Israel",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Religion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721x.2024.2423715",
    doi = "10.1080/0048721x.2024.2423715",
    openalex = "W4404044563",
    references = "doi104102htsv78i17640"
}

Abstract The problem of evil has long perplexed traditional theists: why do terrible events, such as crimes, wars, and natural disasters, occur in a world believed to be created by an omnipotent and wholly good God? The Problem of Evil for Atheists offers a fresh perspective that seeks to transform the perennial philosophical debate on this matter. This book contends that the problem of evil surpasses its conventional understanding, not only impacting traditional theists but also posing a challenge for atheists and other ‘non-theists’, including pantheists, axiarchists, and followers of Eastern religious traditions. Moreover, the book posits that traditional theists, who typically embrace some form of supernaturalism, are better equipped to address the problem than naturalist atheists/non-theists because the only potentially successful response requires supernaturalism. Conversely, the book suggests that if atheists/non-theists can develop a successful naturalist response, traditional theists can also adopt it. Thus, it concludes that traditional theists are better positioned than atheists/non-theists to grapple with the problem—an unexpected assertion, given that the problem of evil is normally viewed as an argument against traditional theism and in favour of atheism/non-theism. The Problem of Evil for Atheists presents a comprehensive defence of a fundamentally new approach to tackling the age-old philosophical conundrum. By challenging the conventional perspective, it endeavours to reshape our understanding and interpretation of evil in a profound manner.

@book{doi101093oso97801989018840010001,
    author = "Nagasawa, Yujin",
    title = "The Problem of Evil for Atheists",
    year = "2024",
    abstract = "Abstract The problem of evil has long perplexed traditional theists: why do terrible events, such as crimes, wars, and natural disasters, occur in a world believed to be created by an omnipotent and wholly good God? The Problem of Evil for Atheists offers a fresh perspective that seeks to transform the perennial philosophical debate on this matter. This book contends that the problem of evil surpasses its conventional understanding, not only impacting traditional theists but also posing a challenge for atheists and other ‘non-theists’, including pantheists, axiarchists, and followers of Eastern religious traditions. Moreover, the book posits that traditional theists, who typically embrace some form of supernaturalism, are better equipped to address the problem than naturalist atheists/non-theists because the only potentially successful response requires supernaturalism. Conversely, the book suggests that if atheists/non-theists can develop a successful naturalist response, traditional theists can also adopt it. Thus, it concludes that traditional theists are better positioned than atheists/non-theists to grapple with the problem—an unexpected assertion, given that the problem of evil is normally viewed as an argument against traditional theism and in favour of atheism/non-theism. The Problem of Evil for Atheists presents a comprehensive defence of a fundamentally new approach to tackling the age-old philosophical conundrum. By challenging the conventional perspective, it endeavours to reshape our understanding and interpretation of evil in a profound manner.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198901884.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198901884.001.0001",
    openalex = "W4398247194",
    references = "doi101111phc312420, doi101515opth20200151, doi1056315pscf321schneider"
}

Abstract This chapter utilizes the two key theses that have been established in previous chapters: (i) the problem of systemic evil raises a more forceful challenge for traditional theists than other versions of the problem of evil and (ii) there are good reasons to think that most people, including most traditional theists and most atheists/non-theists, are modest optimists. By combining these theses, this chapter argues that there is a version of the problem of systemic evil which poses a challenge for all modest optimists. This is a significant finding because it effectively suggests that there is a version of the problem of evil that should trouble many atheists/non-theists, who are normally considered immune to the problem of evil. The chapter explains the strength of the problem by addressing the concept of gratitude and contrasting the problem of systemic evil with Janna Thompson’s ‘apology paradox’.

@incollection{doi101093oso97801989018840030008,
    author = "Nagasawa, Yujin",
    title = "The Problem of Systemic Evil for Atheists/Non-Theists",
    year = "2024",
    abstract = "Abstract This chapter utilizes the two key theses that have been established in previous chapters: (i) the problem of systemic evil raises a more forceful challenge for traditional theists than other versions of the problem of evil and (ii) there are good reasons to think that most people, including most traditional theists and most atheists/non-theists, are modest optimists. By combining these theses, this chapter argues that there is a version of the problem of systemic evil which poses a challenge for all modest optimists. This is a significant finding because it effectively suggests that there is a version of the problem of evil that should trouble many atheists/non-theists, who are normally considered immune to the problem of evil. The chapter explains the strength of the problem by addressing the concept of gratitude and contrasting the problem of systemic evil with Janna Thompson’s ‘apology paradox’.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198901884.003.0008",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198901884.003.0008",
    openalex = "W4398247405",
    references = "doi101515opth20200151"
}

Atheism is an ideology that rejects the existence of God and has gained increasing prominence in societies globally, including Malaysia. Atheism significantly challenges the religious orientation of Malaysian society. Specifically, atheism challenges spiritual and ethical foundations, unity, and cultural heritage linked to religious beliefs. Understanding these challenges is vital to formulate proactive measures, education, and informed dialogue to mitigate the negative impact of atheism on Malaysian society. This study explored the effects of atheism on Malaysian religious society via library research analysis. Scholarly articles, books, and reputable online resources on religious and atheism underwent content analysis, which yielded five key findings. Firstly, atheism leads to the loss of spiritual guidance and morality. Secondly, atheism potentially erodes ethical values and societal norms, and subsequently reduces social trust and cohesion. Thirdly, atheism contributes to moral relativism and ethical ambiguity, which potentially undermines established moral frameworks and social norms. Fourthly, atheism can weaken community cohesion. Lastly, atheism threatens religious institutions and practices. Additionally, the absence of the role of God might undermine the cultural and heritage importance of religion. This study presented critical insights on the negative societal effects of atheism. By exploring the potential consequences of atheism on social cohesion, moral foundations, and existential perspectives, this study highlighted the need for religious education as part of atheism prevention and rehabilitation.

@article{doi1017576islamiyyat2024460108,
    author = "Ramli, Ahmad Faizuddin",
    title = "Exploring the Challenges and Implications of Atheism for Religious Society in Malaysia",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Islamiyyat",
    abstract = "Atheism is an ideology that rejects the existence of God and has gained increasing prominence in societies globally, including Malaysia. Atheism significantly challenges the religious orientation of Malaysian society. Specifically, atheism challenges spiritual and ethical foundations, unity, and cultural heritage linked to religious beliefs. Understanding these challenges is vital to formulate proactive measures, education, and informed dialogue to mitigate the negative impact of atheism on Malaysian society. This study explored the effects of atheism on Malaysian religious society via library research analysis. Scholarly articles, books, and reputable online resources on religious and atheism underwent content analysis, which yielded five key findings. Firstly, atheism leads to the loss of spiritual guidance and morality. Secondly, atheism potentially erodes ethical values and societal norms, and subsequently reduces social trust and cohesion. Thirdly, atheism contributes to moral relativism and ethical ambiguity, which potentially undermines established moral frameworks and social norms. Fourthly, atheism can weaken community cohesion. Lastly, atheism threatens religious institutions and practices. Additionally, the absence of the role of God might undermine the cultural and heritage importance of religion. This study presented critical insights on the negative societal effects of atheism. By exploring the potential consequences of atheism on social cohesion, moral foundations, and existential perspectives, this study highlighted the need for religious education as part of atheism prevention and rehabilitation.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.17576/islamiyyat-2024-4601-08",
    doi = "10.17576/islamiyyat-2024-4601-08",
    openalex = "W4399549813",
    references = "doi1010079783319096025, doi101007s11153019097025, doi101016jreligion200911003, doi101017ccol0521842700003, doi10108014755610701424024, doi1010801749697720191642582, doi101207s15327582ijpr120405, doi101353hrq20160038, doi1020495tak444444, doi104102htsv78i17640, openalexw3138800843, openalexw3215965484"
}

The notion of plural societies has often been used to refer to a common feature of many Southeast Asian societies, namely their fragmented diversity under a single political unit. Despite the criticism this concept has received, we argue that it is still relevant for many Southeast Asian societies today. Through nation-building processes, the plural societies from the late colonial era have dialectically been sublated. What ensures social cohesion and national identity within these post-plural societies, this article argues, is the notion of the religious, while, at the same time, distinct religions contribute to the ongoing fragmentation of these societies. In order to understand these processes and the social cohesion deriving from religions and the religious, we analyze how the negation of the religious, namely atheism as non-belief, is referred to in these societies and what discourses on atheism have emerged. We thus demonstrate that different societies in Southeast Asia have found different ways to relate to atheism, but in all of them, atheism depicts limits of the post-plural societies. We demonstrate how atheism challenges the harmony ideologies in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and how atheism emerges there in different discourses.

@article{doi105334snr173,
    author = "Duile, Timo and Aldama, Prince Kennex",
    title = "Seeing Through the Lens of Atheism: Plural Societies, Religion, and Harmony Ideology in Southeast Asia",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Secularism and Nonreligion",
    abstract = "The notion of plural societies has often been used to refer to a common feature of many Southeast Asian societies, namely their fragmented diversity under a single political unit. Despite the criticism this concept has received, we argue that it is still relevant for many Southeast Asian societies today. Through nation-building processes, the plural societies from the late colonial era have dialectically been sublated. What ensures social cohesion and national identity within these post-plural societies, this article argues, is the notion of the religious, while, at the same time, distinct religions contribute to the ongoing fragmentation of these societies. In order to understand these processes and the social cohesion deriving from religions and the religious, we analyze how the negation of the religious, namely atheism as non-belief, is referred to in these societies and what discourses on atheism have emerged. We thus demonstrate that different societies in Southeast Asia have found different ways to relate to atheism, but in all of them, atheism depicts limits of the post-plural societies. We demonstrate how atheism challenges the harmony ideologies in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and how atheism emerges there in different discourses.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5334/snr.173",
    doi = "10.5334/snr.173",
    openalex = "W4402582920",
    references = "doi104102htsv78i17640"
}

Religion, especially Islam, plays a crucial role in Malaysia’s post-plural society and ethnic Malay identity. Atheism, as a conviction that challenges religious beliefs, is therefore highly controversial in Malaysia: it not only conflicts with the Rukun Negara (national principles) state ideology, which holds the belief in God as its first principle, but also challenges the notion of ethnic Malay identity, which is framed as Islamic and occupies a special place in Malaysian society. This article explores the potential of atheism to challenge Malaysia’s religious pluralism by analysing cases of public atheism and responses to it. Rather than simply concluding that atheism is not acceptable to Malaysians, the article demonstrates the circumstances under which public atheism is possible. It also argues that atheism, although seldom discussed in public, represents a ‘social symptom’ for Malaysian society: atheists are regarded as ‘malfunctioning’ citizens, but they tell us much about how Malaysia’s post-plural religious society functions as it simultaneously rejects and tolerates atheism. This paradoxical social context, we argue, stabilises and challenges the idea of Malaysia’s religious society as the essence of the Malaysian people.

@article{doi1010801035782320252450039,
    author = "Duile, Timo and Ramli, Ahmad Faizuddin and Lik, Willie Poh Kaw and Fatah, Muhammad Aiman Abdul",
    title = "The (Im-)possibilities of Public Atheism in Malaysia",
    year = "2025",
    journal = "Asian Studies Review",
    abstract = "Religion, especially Islam, plays a crucial role in Malaysia’s post-plural society and ethnic Malay identity. Atheism, as a conviction that challenges religious beliefs, is therefore highly controversial in Malaysia: it not only conflicts with the Rukun Negara (national principles) state ideology, which holds the belief in God as its first principle, but also challenges the notion of ethnic Malay identity, which is framed as Islamic and occupies a special place in Malaysian society. This article explores the potential of atheism to challenge Malaysia’s religious pluralism by analysing cases of public atheism and responses to it. Rather than simply concluding that atheism is not acceptable to Malaysians, the article demonstrates the circumstances under which public atheism is possible. It also argues that atheism, although seldom discussed in public, represents a ‘social symptom’ for Malaysian society: atheists are regarded as ‘malfunctioning’ citizens, but they tell us much about how Malaysia’s post-plural religious society functions as it simultaneously rejects and tolerates atheism. This paradoxical social context, we argue, stabilises and challenges the idea of Malaysia’s religious society as the essence of the Malaysian people.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2025.2450039",
    doi = "10.1080/10357823.2025.2450039",
    openalex = "W4407167918",
    references = "doi104102htsv78i17640"
}

@article{doi1010801529886820252485459,
    author = "Lambert, Joshua T. and Kinrade, Charlotte and Witt, Danielle E. and Hall, Braden T. and Hart, William",
    title = "Tell me you’re religious without saying you’re religious: An identity-signaling account of prejudice against atheists",
    year = "2025",
    journal = "Self and Identity",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2025.2485459",
    doi = "10.1080/15298868.2025.2485459",
    openalex = "W4409410029",
    references = "doi101007s11153019097025"
}

This essay is a response to James Sterba’s “An Ethics without God That Is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution.” As an atheist philosopher I show that atheist morality is essentially and thoroughly a secular morality, and that the most reasonable ethics are secular systems in that they do not require a God, gods, or goddesses. I go on to defend an atheist morality based on polls showing that countries with atheist populations are healthier than religious ones. Then I point out the sources of human morality, arguing that there is a common neighborly morality that matters, based on facts about who we are as a species, which includes the pre-human sources in the animal world. Finally, I mention how that Sterbaian Ethics, as it should henceforth be called, can succeed.

@article{doi103390rel16111444,
    author = "Loftus, John",
    title = "Atheist Morality Without God",
    year = "2025",
    journal = "Religions",
    abstract = "This essay is a response to James Sterba’s “An Ethics without God That Is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution.” As an atheist philosopher I show that atheist morality is essentially and thoroughly a secular morality, and that the most reasonable ethics are secular systems in that they do not require a God, gods, or goddesses. I go on to defend an atheist morality based on polls showing that countries with atheist populations are healthier than religious ones. Then I point out the sources of human morality, arguing that there is a common neighborly morality that matters, based on facts about who we are as a species, which includes the pre-human sources in the animal world. Finally, I mention how that Sterbaian Ethics, as it should henceforth be called, can succeed.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16111444",
    doi = "10.3390/rel16111444",
    openalex = "W4416192485",
    references = "doi1033929gcrrpress202401"
}