@article{crossref1950weighing,
    title = "Weighing the Odds",
    year = "1950",
    journal = "Postgraduate Medical Journal",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1136/pgmj.26.295.249-a",
    doi = "10.1136/pgmj.26.295.249-a",
    number = "295",
    openalex = "W4210504903",
    pages = "249-251",
    volume = "26"
}

@misc{monod1971chance2,
    author = "Monod, J",
    title = "Chance and Necessity",
    year = "1971",
    howpublished = "New York, A.A. Knopf; Translated by A. Wainhouse",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Monod, J., 1971, Chance and Necessity: New York, A.A. Knopf; Translated by A. Wainhouse.}"
}

@incollection{haken1978chance,
    author = "Haken, Hermann",
    title = "Chance and Necessity",
    year = "1978",
    booktitle = "Springer Series in Synergetics",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96469-5\_6",
    doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-96469-5\_6",
    openalex = "W4249654744",
    pages = "147-189",
    references = "doi101007bf01008729, doi101016004155537090203x, doi1010160370157374900234, doi1010160891391958902006, doi101049sqj19660063, doi101103physrev911505, doi101103revmodphys17323, doi101103revmodphys39395, doi101103revmodphys4767, doi10111911986710"
}

@incollection{crossref1980chance,
    title = "Chance",
    year = "1980",
    booktitle = "Conrad’s Later Novels",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1515/9780773592872-004",
    doi = "10.1515/9780773592872-004",
    pages = "11-40"
}

@article{berry1983chance,
    author = "Berry, Michael",
    title = "Chance and necessity",
    year = "1983",
    journal = "Nature",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1038/305456a0",
    doi = "10.1038/305456a0",
    number = "5933",
    openalex = "W1964047732",
    pages = "456-456",
    volume = "305"
}

@misc{lightman1983weighing1,
    author = "Lightman, A. P",
    title = "Weighing the odds",
    year = "1983",
    howpublished = "Science 83, v. 4, no. 10, p. 21-22",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Lightman, A. P., 1983, Weighing the odds: Science 83, v. 4, no. 10, p. 21-22.}"
}

@article{doi101093mind103412473,
    author = "Lewis, David",
    title = "Symposium: Chance and Credence",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Mind",
    abstract = "Journal Article Symposium: Chance and Credence: Humean Supervenience Debugged Get access DAVID LEWIS DAVID LEWIS Department of Philosophy, Princeton UniversityPrinceton, New Jersey, 08544, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume 103, Issue 412, October 1994, Pages 473–490, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/103.412.473 Published: 01 October 1994",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/103.412.473",
    doi = "10.1093/mind/103.412.473",
    openalex = "W2062751490",
    references = "doi101086289518, doi101093bjps443443, doi105860choice262085"
}

@article{doi101093mind103412505,
    author = "Hall, Ned",
    title = "Correcting The Guide to Objective Chance",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Mind",
    abstract = "Journal Article Correcting The Guide to Objective Chance Get access NED HALL NED HALL Department of Linguistics \& Philosophy, Massachussetts Institute of TechnologyCambridge, MA 2139, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume 103, Issue 412, October 1994, Pages 505–518, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/103.412.505 Published: 01 October 1994",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/103.412.505",
    doi = "10.1093/mind/103.412.505",
    openalex = "W2109366671"
}

@misc{williams2001weighing,
    author = "Williams, David",
    title = "Weighing the Odds",
    year = "2001",
    abstract = "Statistics do not lie, nor is probability paradoxical. You just have to have the right intuition. In this lively look at both subjects, David Williams convinces mathematics students of the intrinsic interest of statistics and probability, and statistics students that the language of mathematics can bring real insight and clarity to their subject. He helps students build the intuition needed, in a presentation enriched with examples drawn from all manner of applications, e.g., genetics, filtering, the Black–Scholes option-pricing formula, quantum probability and computing, and classical and modern statistical models. Statistics chapters present both the Frequentist and Bayesian approaches, emphasising Confidence Intervals rather than Hypothesis Test, and include Gibbs-sampling techniques for the practical implementation of Bayesian methods. A central chapter gives the theory of Linear Regression and ANOVA, and explains how MCMC methods allow greater flexibility in modelling. C or WinBUGS code is provided for computational examples and simulations. Many exercises are included; hints or solutions are often provided.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139164795",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9781139164795",
    openalex = "W2095348470"
}

@article{doi101093bjps542171,
    author = "Arntzenius, Frank and Hall, Ned",
    title = "On What We Know About Chance",
    year = "2003",
    journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "The ‘Principal Principle’ states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii) that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence (iii) that nothing perfectly deserves the name ‘chance’, although something can come close enough by playing the role picked out by the amended principle. We show that in fact there must be ‘chances’ that perfectly play what Lewis takes to be the defining role. But this is not the happy conclusion it might seem, since these ‘chances’ behave too strangely to deserve the name. The lesson is simple: much more than the Principal Principle—more to the point, much more than the connection between chance and credence—informs our understanding of objective chance. 1Introduction 2Preliminaries 3Undermining futures and the New Principle 4The Old Principle rescued? 5The New Bug 6Conclusion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.2.171",
    doi = "10.1093/bjps/54.2.171",
    openalex = "W2050567047"
}

@article{roback2003weighing,
    author = "Roback, Paul",
    title = "Weighing the Odds",
    year = "2003",
    journal = "The American Statistician",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1198/tas.2003.s219",
    doi = "10.1198/tas.2003.s219",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2057308807",
    pages = "144-145",
    volume = "57"
}

@article{doi101086428015,
    author = "Loewer, Barry",
    title = "David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance” he described a framework for representing single case objective chances, showed how they are connected to subjective credences, and sketched a novel account what they are within his Humean account of scientific laws. Here I will describe these contributions and add a little to them.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1086/428015",
    doi = "10.1086/428015",
    openalex = "W2126513944"
}

@misc{crossref2007chance,
    title = "Chance",
    year = "2007",
    booktitle = "Encyclopedia of Measurement and Statistics",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412952644.n77",
    doi = "10.4135/9781412952644.n77"
}

@article{doi101093mindfzm549,
    author = "Hoefer, Carl",
    title = "The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Mind",
    abstract = "The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or 'theory' of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is 'Humean' in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the Principal Principle (PP) to be the key to understanding objective chance. After describing the main features of Humean objective chance (HOC), I deduce the validity of PP for Humean chances, and end by exploring the limitations of Humean chance.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm549",
    doi = "10.1093/mind/fzm549",
    openalex = "W2118025689"
}

@incollection{makinson2008weighing,
    author = "Makinson, David",
    title = "Weighing the Odds: Probability",
    year = "2008",
    booktitle = "Undergraduate Topics in Computer Science",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-845-6\_6",
    doi = "10.1007/978-1-84628-845-6\_6",
    openalex = "W4235200486",
    pages = "153-187"
}

@article{doi101093bjpsaxp020,
    author = "Glynn, L. E.",
    title = "Deterministic Chance",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances. 1. Introduction 2. Schaffer's Incompatibilist Argument 2.1. Chance and credence 2.2. Chance and possibility 2.3. Chance and laws 3. Special Scientific Laws 3.1. Probabilistic special scientific laws in deterministic worlds 3.2. Lewis's Humean analysis of laws 3.3. Special scientific laws and the law role 4. Deterministic Chance 4.1. Chance and laws again 4.2. Chance and credence again 4.3. Chance and possibility again 5. Chance and Causation 6. Conclusion Appendix: Times, Levels, and Chance Setups",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp020",
    doi = "10.1093/bjps/axp020",
    openalex = "W4248739672",
    references = "doi101007s1122900691385, doi101016s1355219801000284, doi101017cbo9780511570667, doi101023bsynt00000049049111216, doi10108000048408312341131, doi101086288797, doi101093bjpsxi44305, doi101093mind103412473, doi1023072284742, doi107551mitpress17520010001"
}

@incollection{makinson2012weighing,
    author = "Makinson, David",
    title = "Weighing the Odds: Probability",
    year = "2012",
    booktitle = "Undergraduate Topics in Computer Science",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2500-6\_6",
    doi = "10.1007/978-1-4471-2500-6\_6",
    openalex = "W2097944392",
    pages = "137-164",
    references = "doi10100797814471250067, doi101093oso97801953678980010001, doi101201chdismthapp, makinson2012weighing, openalexw2182585891"
}

@article{doi101093bjpsaxt041,
    author = "Emery, Nina",
    title = "Chance, Possibility, and Explanation",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. I suggest an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies. 1 Introduction 2 A Paradigm Case 3 The Incompatibilist’s Criterion 4 Against the Incompatibilist’s Criterion 5 The Explanatory Criterion 6 Conclusion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt041",
    doi = "10.1093/bjps/axt041",
    openalex = "W2160819503",
    references = "doi101093acprofoso97801996734210010001, doi101093bjpsaxp020"
}

@book{doi101093acprofoso97801996734210010001,
    author = "Wilson, Alastair",
    title = "Chance and Temporal Asymmetry",
    year = "2014",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "This volume presents twelve original essays on the metaphysics of science, with particular focus on the physics of chance and time. Experts in the field subject familiar approaches to searching critiques, and make bold new proposals in a number of key areas. Together, they set the agenda for future work on the subject.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001",
    openalex = "W2213535626",
    references = "doi101007s1109800993893, doi101086428015, doi101093mind103412505, doi101093mindfzm549, doi101098rspa19990443, doi1023072184843, doi1023072215225, doi1043249780203875353, doi105860choice503911, openalexw1548573677"
}

@incollection{doi101093acprofoso97801996734210030001,
    author = "Handfield, Toby and Wilson, Alastair",
    title = "Chance and Context",
    year = "2014",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances.This conception -associated in particular with the work of David Lewis -is not a good fit with our use of the word 'chance' and its cognates in ordinary discourse.In this paper we show how a generalized framework for chance can reconcile determinism with non-trivial chances, and provide for a more charitable interpretation of ordinary chance-talk.According to our proposal, variation in an admissible 'evidence base' generates a spectrum of different chance functions.Successive coarse-grainings of the evidence base generates a partial ordering of chance functions, with finer trumping coarser if known.We suggest that chance-attributions in ordinary discourse express different chance functions in different contexts, and we sketch a potential contextual mechanism for making particular chance functions salient.The mechanism involves the idea that admissible evidence is available evidence: propositions that could be known.A consequence is that attributions of objective chances inherit the relatively familiar context-sensitivity associated with the modal 'could'.We show how this contextdependency undermines certain arguments for the incompatibility of chance with determinism.1.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0001",
    openalex = "W2107490517",
    references = "doi101093bjpsaxp044"
}

@article{doi101215003181082812670,
    author = "List, Christian and Pivato, Marcus",
    title = "Emergent Chance",
    year = "2015",
    journal = "The Philosophical Review",
    abstract = "This article offers a new argument for the claim that there can be nondegenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, the article shows how objective chance at a higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones. The article demonstrates that the distinction between objective chance and epistemic probability can be drawn, and operationalized, at every level of description. There is, therefore, not a single distinction between objective and epistemic probability but a family of such distinctions.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2812670",
    doi = "10.1215/00318108-2812670",
    openalex = "W2784527921",
    references = "doi101007bf00485230, doi101023bsynt00000049049111216, doi101093acprofoso97801992332120010001, doi101093analys502107, doi101093oso97801951387880010001, doi1011111468006800448, doi101215003181082009025, doi1023073182612, doi105840jphil2009106936, openalexw1525770870"
}

@incollection{crossref2016necessity,
    title = "Necessity and Chance",
    year = "2016",
    booktitle = "Thinking About Ordinary Things",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8305909.22",
    doi = "10.2307/jj.8305909.22",
    openalex = "W4388332860",
    pages = "135-139"
}

@article{doi1022201iifs18704905e2016234,
    author = "Casó, Ramiro",
    title = "Vindicating Chance: On The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate",
    year = "2016",
    journal = "Crítica (México D F En línea)",
    abstract = "The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance is presented, and the dialectical burdens acquired by each side of the debate are identified: the motivation problem and the explanation problem. It is argued that, whilethe motivation problem presents no challenge to non-reductionists, reductionists are unable successfully to answer it. Contrary to what has been suggested, both sides share the burden of the explanation problem. It is argued that non- eductionists can successfully answer it, whereas reductionists are unable to make the corresponding claim. Hence, the non-reductionist side has an important dialectical advantage.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.234",
    doi = "10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.234",
    openalex = "W2189115823"
}

@article{nolan2016chance,
    author = "Nolan, Daniel",
    title = "Chance and Necessity",
    year = "2016",
    journal = "Philosophical Perspectives",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12076",
    doi = "10.1111/phpe.12076",
    number = "1",
    openalex = "W2603413503",
    pages = "294-308",
    volume = "30",
    references = "doi101007s1109801302512, doi10109301950364680010001, doi101093acprofoso97801992875120030007, doi101093acprofoso97801996734210010001, doi101093bjpsaxp020, doi101093bjpsaxp044, doi101093mind103412473, doi101093mindfzr046, doi101215003181082812670, doi105840monist200588321"
}

@article{doi101093bjpsaxy069,
    author = "Cusbert, John",
    title = "How Stable Is Objective Chance?",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "This article examines the stability of objective chance. I defend the stable chance thesis (SCT): that in any given possible world, any pair of intrinsic duplicate physical setups with the same chances of being subject to the same external influences must yield the same chances. I argue that SCT compares favourably to rivals in the literature. I then consider a challenge to SCT involving time travel and causal loops. I argue that SCT survives this challenge, but that such cases expose chance as less stable than we might unreflectively have thought. In particular, the chances associated with a physical setup are sensitive to the way in which that setup is embedded in a wider causal structure.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy069",
    doi = "10.1093/bjps/axy069",
    openalex = "W2896067243",
    references = "doi105840monist200588321"
}

@book{doi101093oso97801909074190010001,
    author = "Hoefer, Carl",
    title = "Chance in the World",
    year = "2019",
    abstract = "Abstract This book argues that objective chance, or probability, should not be understood as a metaphysical primitive, nor as a dispositional property of certain systems (“propensity”). Given that traditional accounts of objective probability in terms of frequencies are widely agreed to be also untenable, there is a clear need for a new account that can overcome the problems of older views. A Humean, reductive analysis of objective chance is offered, one partially based on the work of David Lewis, but diverging from Lewis’ approach in many respects. It is shown that “Humean objective chances” (HOCs) can fulfill the role that chances are supposed to play of being a guide to one’s subjective expectations. In a chapter coauthored by Roman Frigg, HOC is shown to make sense of physics’ uses of objective probabilities, both in statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. And in the final chapter, the relationship between chance and causation is analyzed; it is argued that there is no direct connection between causation and objective chance, but that, instead, causation is related to subjective probability.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907419.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780190907419.001.0001",
    openalex = "W4249877301",
    references = "doi101093bjpsaxp044"
}

@article{doi101111papq12325,
    author = "Harr, Quinn",
    title = "Context Sensitivity and Chance",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Pacific philosophical quarterly",
    abstract = "Abstract ‘ Chance’ is arguably a context‐sensitive expression, a fact that some have thought bears upon the debate about the compatibility of determinism with objective, non‐trivial chances (chances with values other than 0 or 1). In this paper, I argue that this attempted move from context sensitivity to compatibilism is misguided, for a number of reasons. First, it relies on a theory of context sensitivity that we have independent reason to reject. Second, the resulting compatibilist position leaves unanswered precisely the sorts of questions we reasonably expect a metaphysical account of chance to answer.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12325",
    doi = "10.1111/papq.12325",
    openalex = "W3102876127"
}

@incollection{makinson2020weighing,
    author = "Makinson, David",
    title = "Weighing the Odds: Probability",
    year = "2020",
    booktitle = "Undergraduate Topics in Computer Science",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42218-9\_6",
    doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-42218-9\_6",
    openalex = "W4229641376",
    pages = "185-221"
}

@article{doi1010800004840220232169945,
    author = "Gallow, J. Dmitri",
    title = "Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "Standard principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles those problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2169945",
    doi = "10.1080/00048402.2023.2169945",
    openalex = "W4376876135",
    references = "doi101007bf00354523, doi101007bf00996309, doi101023bphil000001954617135e0, doi101093mind103412473, doi101093mind103412505, doi1011111467828400215, doi1015259780520318328009, doi1023072026388, doi1023072184843, nolan2016chance, openalexw2921411937"
}

@misc{doi1052843cassynihmmy1t,
    title = "Can Formal Logic Make Pure Chance Intelligible? Ladrière on the Eschatological Horizon of Reason",
    year = "2025",
    abstract = "Can formal logic make pure chance intelligible? This paper examines how pure chance, understood as what lies beyond probability and determination, both disrupts and extends formal reasoning. Drawing on Jean Ladrière, we explore how logic, despite its reliance on determinate structures, must engage with an irreducible indeterminacy that conditions its very operation. Pure chance serves as both the origin of logical structures-providing the space for determinations-and their unattainable horizon, toward which reason asymptotically moves. Through Ladrière’s concept of reducing purification, we analyze how logic progressively abstracts from determinations to approach pure existence. Examining five modes of abstraction, from individual objects to logic as a discipline, we show that this movement is inherently eschatological: logic strives toward totalization while never achieving full closure. Parallels with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Kant’s self-expanding reason reinforce that logic’s engagement with chance reflects a deeper structure of intelligibility, not a failure of formalization. Ultimately, we argue that hope (espérance) is inscribed in the structure of reason itself. Rather than resolving indeterminacy, logic participates in an intelligibility that always exceeds its grasp, revealing that reason’s fulfillment is always beyond reach, yet always already at work.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.52843/cassyni.hmmy1t",
    doi = "10.52843/cassyni.hmmy1t",
    openalex = "W4411730727",
    references = "doi101007s11787025003684"
}