@article{doi1023072016355,
    author = "N., E. and Carnap, Rudolf",
    title = "Philosophy and Logical Syntax.",
    year = "1935",
    journal = "The Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "PREFACE.This book gives the content of three lectures delivered at the University of London in October, 1934. The first chapter has already been printed in Psyche (1934); and the present publication has been aided by a grant from the Publication Fund of the University of London, for which I desire to express my thanks.My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophising which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and, by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language. Only the method itself is here directly dealt with; our special views, resulting from its use, appear rather in the form of examples (for instance our empiricist and anti-metaphysical position in the first chapter, our physicalist position in the last).The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who are not yet acquainted with them. Therefore the form of presentation aims more at general lucidity that at scientific precision. Formulations which are more exact and therefore more suitable as a basis for argument, may be found in my book Logische Syntax der Sprache.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2016355",
    doi = "10.2307/2016355",
    openalex = "W1507131792"
}

@article{doi1023072181906,
    author = "Quine, W. V.",
    title = "Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism",
    year = "1951",
    journal = "The Philosophical Review",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2181906",
    doi = "10.2307/2181906",
    openalex = "W2063029295"
}

@book{quine1952two1,
    author = "Quine, W. V. O",
    title = "Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in From a Logical Point of View",
    year = "1952",
    publisher = "Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Quine, W. V. O., 1952, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in From a Logical Point of View: Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.}"
}

@article{doi1023072268894,
    author = "Kemeny, John G.",
    title = "Willard Van Orman Quine. On what there is. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 1–19. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 20–46. - Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem of meaning in linguistics. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 47–64. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 65–79. (Reprinted from The journal of philosophy, vol. 47 (1950), pp. 621–633.) - Willard Van Orman Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 80–101.",
    year = "1954",
    journal = "Journal of Symbolic Logic",
    abstract = "Willard Van Orman Quine. On what there is. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 1–19. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 20–46. - Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem of meaning in linguistics. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 47–64. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 65–79. (Reprinted from The journal of philosophy, vol. 47 (1950), pp. 621–633.) - Willard Van Orman Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. Front a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 80–101. - Volume 19 Issue 2",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2268894",
    doi = "10.2307/2268894",
    openalex = "W4250678515"
}

@article{doi1023072182828,
    author = "Grice, H. P. and Strawson, P. F.",
    title = "In Defense of a Dogma",
    year = "1956",
    journal = "The Philosophical Review",
    abstract = "TN HIS article Two Dogmas of Empiricism,' Professor [Quine advances a number of criticisms of the supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and of other associated notions. It is, he says, a distinction which he rejects.2 We wish to show that his criticisms of the distinction do not justify his rejection of it. There are many ways in which a distinction can be criticized, and more than one in which it can be rejected. It can be criticized for not being a sharp distinction (for admitting of cases which do not fall clearly on either side of it); or on the ground that the terms in which it is customarily drawn are ambiguous (have more than one meaning); or on the ground that it is confused (the different meanings being habitually conflated). Such criticisms alone would scarcely amount to a rejection of the distinction. They would, rather, be a prelude to clarification. It is not this sort of criticism which Quine makes. Again, a distinction can be criticized on the ground that it is not useful. It can be said to be useless for certain purposes, or useless altogether, and, perhaps, pedantic. One who criticizes in this way may indeed be said to reject a distinction, but in a sense which also requires him to acknowledge its existence. He simply declares he can get on without it. But Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction appears to be more radical than this. He would certainly say he could get on without the distinction, but not in a sense which would commit him to acknowledging its existence. Or again, one could criticize the way or ways in which a distinction is customarily expounded or explained on the ground that these explanations did not make it really clear. And Quine certainly makes such criticisms in the case of the analyticsynthetic distinction.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2182828",
    doi = "10.2307/2182828",
    openalex = "W2032096736"
}

@book{openalexw1536078838,
    author = "Quine, W. V.",
    title = "From a logical point of view: 9 logico-philosophical essays",
    year = "1961",
    abstract = "I. On what there is II. Two dogmas of empiricism III. The problem of meaning in linguistics IV. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis V. New foundations for mathematical logic VI. Logic and the reification of universals VII. Notes on the theory of reference VIII. Reference and modality IX. Meaning and existential inference Origins of the essays Bibliographical references Index",
    openalex = "W1536078838"
}

@article{doi1023072270125,
    author = "Fitch, Frederic B.",
    title = "Willard Van Orman Quine. On what there is. A reprint of XIX 134(1). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 1–19. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. A reprint of XIX 134(2). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 20–46. - Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem of meaning in linguistics. A reprint of XIX 134(3). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 47–64. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. A reprint of XIX 134(4). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 65–79. - Willard Van Orman Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. A reprint of XIX 134(5). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 80–101. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Logic and the reification of universals. A revised reprint of XIX 135. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 102–129. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Notes on the theory of reference. A reprint of XIX 136. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 130–138. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Reference and modality. A revised reprint of XIX 137. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 139–159. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Meaning and existential inference. A reprint of XIX 138. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 160–167.",
    year = "1968",
    journal = "Journal of Symbolic Logic",
    abstract = "Willard Van Orman Quine. On what there is. A reprint of XIX 134(1). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 1–19. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. A reprint of XIX 134(2). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 20–46. - Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem of meaning in linguistics. A reprint of XIX 134(3). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 47–64. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. A reprint of XIX 134(4). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 65–79. - Willard Van Orman Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. A reprint of XIX 134(5). From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 80–101. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Logic and the reification of universals. A revised reprint of XIX 135. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 102–129. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Notes on the theory of reference. A reprint of XIX 136. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 130–138. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Reference and modality. A revised reprint of XIX 137. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 139–159. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Meaning and existential inference. A reprint of XIX 138. From a logical point of view, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Harper Torchbooks, The Science Library, Harper \& Row, New York and Evanston 1963, pp. 160–167. - Volume 33 Issue 1",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2270125",
    doi = "10.2307/2270125",
    openalex = "W4240619866"
}

@book{doi10100797894010186302,
    author = "Quine, W. V.",
    title = "Two Dogmas of Empiricism",
    year = "1976",
    journal = "Sententiae",
    abstract = "The first Ukrainian translation of the most famous Quine’s article (1951), which became one of the classic texts of Analytical Philosophy.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0\_2",
    doi = "10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0\_2",
    openalex = "W1751175273"
}

@book{doi102307jctv1c5cx5c,
    author = "Quine, W. V.",
    title = "From a Logical Point of View",
    year = "1980",
    booktitle = "Harvard University Press eBooks",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1c5cx5c",
    doi = "10.2307/j.ctv1c5cx5c",
    openalex = "W2025705313"
}

@incollection{doi102307jctv1c5cx5c7,
    title = "TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM",
    year = "1980",
    booktitle = "Harvard University Press eBooks",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1c5cx5c.7",
    doi = "10.2307/j.ctv1c5cx5c.7",
    openalex = "W4252266666"
}

@article{doi1023072273406,
    author = "Fitch, Frederic B.",
    title = "Willard van Orman Quine. Foreword, 1980. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. vii–ix. - Willard Van Orman Quine. On what there is. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 1–19. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 20–46. - Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem of meaning in linguistics. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 47–64. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 65–79. - Willard Van Orman Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 80–101. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Logic and the reification of universals. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 102–129. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Notes on the theory of reference. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 130–138. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Reference and modality. A revised reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 139–159. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Meaning and existential inference. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 160–167.",
    year = "1982",
    journal = "Journal of Symbolic Logic",
    abstract = "Willard van Orman Quine. Foreword, 1980. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. vii–ix. - Willard Van Orman Quine. On what there is. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 1–19. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Two dogmas of empiricism. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 20–46. - Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem of meaning in linguistics. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 47–64. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 65–79. - Willard Van Orman Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 80–101. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Logic and the reification of universals. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 102–129. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Notes on the theory of reference. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 130–138. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Reference and modality. A revised reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 139–159. - Willard Van Orman Quine. Meaning and existential inference. A reprint of XXXIII 149. From a logical point of view, 9 logico-philosophical essays, by Willard Van Orman Quine, second edition, revised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1980, pp. 160–167. - Volume 47 Issue 1",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2273406",
    doi = "10.2307/2273406",
    openalex = "W4229656563"
}

@article{doi10108000455091199110717246,
    author = "Quine, W. V.",
    title = "Two Dogmas in Retrospect",
    year = "1991",
    journal = "Canadian Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "In retrospecting ‘Two Dogmas’ I find myself overshooting the mark by twenty years. I think back to college days, 61 years ago. I majored in mathematics and was doing my honors reading in mathematical logic, a subject that had not yet penetrated the Oberlin curriculum. My new love, in the platonic sense, was Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica. I was taken with the clear, clean incisiveness of its formulas. But this was not true of its long introduction to volume 1, nor of some of the explanatory patches of prose that were interspersed through the three volumes. In those pages and passages the distinction between sign and object, or use and mention, was badly blurred. Partly in consequence, there was vague recourse to intensional properties, or ideas, under the disarmingly technical name of propositional functions. These ill-conceived mentalistic notions paraded as the philosophical foundation for the clean-cut classes, truth functions, and quantification that would have been a far better starting point in their own right.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1991.10717246",
    doi = "10.1080/00455091.1991.10717246",
    openalex = "W1485110118"
}

@article{doi101086289615,
    author = "Reisch, George A.",
    title = "Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?",
    year = "1991",
    journal = "Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn's book.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1086/289615",
    doi = "10.1086/289615",
    openalex = "W2017690789",
    references = "doi10106313050879, doi101086286432, doi101103physrev47777, doi101103physrev48696, doi101103physrevlett47460, doi101103physrevlett491804, doi101103physrevlett4991, doi1023072180845, doi1023072218992, doi107208chicago97802264581060010001"
}

@article{richardson1997two,
    author = "Richardson, Alan",
    title = "Two Dogmas about Logical Empiricism",
    year = "1997",
    journal = "Philosophical Topics",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19972523",
    doi = "10.5840/philtopics19972523",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2312529029",
    pages = "145-168",
    volume = "25"
}

@book{doi101017cbo9781139173193,
    author = "Friedman, Michaël",
    title = "Reconsidering Logical Positivism",
    year = "1999",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "In this collection of essays one of the preeminent philosophers of science writing offers a reinterpretation of the enduring significance of logical positivism, the revolutionary philosophical movement centered around the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 30s. Michael Friedman argues that the logical positivists were radicals not by presenting a new version of empiricism (as is often thought to be the case) but rather by offering a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical knowledge. This collection will be mandatory reading for any philosopher or historian of science interested in the history of logical positivism in particular or the evolution of modern philosophy in general",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173193",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9781139173193",
    openalex = "W623137244"
}

@incollection{doi101017cbo9780511613975003,
    author = "Friedman, Michaël",
    title = "Kuhn and Logical Empiricism",
    year = "2002",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Conventional wisdom concerning twentieth-century philosophical approaches to scientific knowledge has held that Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is diametrically opposed to the philosophical movement known as “logical positivism” or “logical empiricism.” Logical positivism has been portrayed as a naive version of empiricist foundationalism, according to which all knowledge is to be reduced to an epistemically certain basis in observational reports. And it follows, on this view, that there can be no genuine scientific revolutions in the Kuhnian sense: scientific progress must rather follow the “development-by-accumulation” model (in this case, development by accumulation of observable facts) that Kuhn explicitly rejects at the outset. If we accept Kuhn's theory, by contrast, it follows that the progress of science is marked by radical discontinuities quite incompatible with such naive empiricism. So it is no wonder that Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is standardly taken as a major factor in the demise of logical empiricism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511613975.003",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511613975.003",
    openalex = "W2193683669",
    references = "doi102307jj113747715"
}

@book{openalexw1503411050,
    author = "Klein, Carsten and Awodey, Steven",
    title = "Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Medical Entomology and Zoology",
    abstract = "Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was the most important philosopher of the movement known as logical empiricism or logical positivism, still the basis of much modern analytic philosophy. It was long thought that this movement had been destroyed by the polemics of Quine, Popper, and Kuhn. But recently, leading philosophers have been re-appraising this verdict. It is no longer universally agreed that Quine or Popper won their disputes with Carnap, and some have now been arguing that Kuhn's ideas are--as Carnap himself thought--perfectly compatible with logical empiricism. This volume presents the latest contributions to this discussion from both sides, and adds a number of new voices, who look at Carnap from a more international point of view -- bringing out, for instance, the roots of his thought in Continental neo-Kantianism and Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, and stressing his deep commitment to political and cultural change. Carnap grew up in Jena, and in his student days was an active member there of the utopian Sera Group, part of the German youth movement. At the same time, he was one of Frege's few students, and was deeply influenced by him.",
    openalex = "W1503411050"
}

@article{bensusan2007minimal,
    author = "Bensusan, Hilan and Pinedo-Garcia, Manuel",
    title = "Minimal Empiricism Without Dogmas",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Philosophia",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9061-0",
    doi = "10.1007/s11406-007-9061-0",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2049667763",
    pages = "197-206",
    volume = "35",
    references = "doi101007bf00485246, doi101017s1358246100007748, doi1011111468037800079, doi101215003181081104645, doi101215003181081144540, doi1023072023177, doi1023072106498, doi1023072216097, openalexw2041984916, openalexw631493948"
}

@article{doi101080096087882014891195,
    author = "Ebbs, Gary",
    title = "Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?",
    year = "2014",
    journal = "British Journal for the History of Philosophy",
    abstract = "W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism is confused in ways that have not yet been noticed in the literature. This may seem to favour Strawson's side of the debate. In fact, however, a proper analysis of the difficulties that Quine's reply faces suggests a new way to clarify and defend the view that logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.891195",
    doi = "10.1080/09608788.2014.891195",
    openalex = "W2041297289",
    references = "doi101093mindfzr020"
}

@article{doi101111hypa12221,
    author = "Yap, Audrey",
    title = "Feminist Radical Empiricism, Values, and Evidence",
    year = "2015",
    journal = "Hypatia",
    abstract = "Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender (among other social factors) influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism (where the empiricism, not the feminism, is radical). I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open‐mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value‐change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12221",
    doi = "10.1111/hypa.12221",
    openalex = "W2170191603",
    references = "doi101111j15272001200901080x"
}

@article{koterski2015quines,
    author = "Koterski, Artur",
    title = "Quine’s Two Dogmas as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism",
    year = "2015",
    journal = "Philosophia Scientiae",
    abstract = "Dans les « Deux dogmes», Quine voulait démontrer que le positivisme logique n’était possible qu’en raison d’hypothèses injustifiées. L’intention de Quine était de montrer qu’il n’est possible de sauver l’empirisme que si l’on accepte une autre approche, holistique. Toutefois, l’article de Quine était anachronique dès le moment de sa publication. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, on esquissera l’argument de Quine et on le confrontera aux positions de Carnap et Dubislav. On montrera que la critique de Quine était en retard d’au moins 15 ans. En deuxième lieu, on examinera le postulat de Quine de l’empirisme sans dogmes et on comparera brièvement à la théorie de Poznański et Wundheiler. On soutiendra que ce postulat avait été réalisé déjà dans les années 1930.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1046",
    doi = "10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1046",
    openalex = "W1917153407",
    pages = "127-142",
    volume = "19-1",
    references = "doi1010079783709141779, doi10108000455091199110717246, doi101086289615, doi101093bjps463285, doi1011631875673590000817, doi1023072102968, doi1023072182828, doi1023072185043, doi102307jctv1c5cx5c7, doi102307jj113747715"
}

@article{doi1010800020174x20211883476,
    author = "Cull, Matthew J.",
    title = "Engineering is not a luxury: Black feminists and logical positivists on conceptual engineering",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Inquiry",
    abstract = "Recent historical discussion of conceptual engineering by analytic philosophers has largely focused on precedents for contemporary conceptual engineering within the history of analytic philosophy. However, I suggest that we can and should look outside of the analytic tradition for further examples of conceptual engineering, and inspiration for further work in conceptual engineering. Here I will look to one such other tradition – American Black feminism. I do this by considering the work of Audre Lorde and Patricia Hill Collins in tandem with a tradition that is the more usual stomping ground of analytic philosophers: logical positivism. I draw out Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath’s respective views on conceptual engineering, before turning to Collins and Lorde. I suggest that Collins on the power of self-definition provides a model of conceptual engineering that closely matches that given by Neurath, whilst we can read Lorde’s work on poetry as giving a distinctively individualist spin on the conceptual engineering. I conclude with a comparative discussion of the various models on offer, suggesting that rather than being in competition, these various views of conceptual engineering are best seen as a toolbox of methods for conceptual engineering.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2021.1883476",
    doi = "10.1080/0020174x.2021.1883476",
    openalex = "W3126679716",
    references = "doi101111j15272001200901080x"
}

@article{doi101093pqpqac072,
    author = "Shields, Matthew",
    title = "Truth from the Agent Point of View",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
    abstract = "Abstract I defend a novel pragmatist account of truth that I call ‘truth from the agent point of view’ or ‘agential truth’, drawing on insights from Hilary Putnam. According to the agential view, as inquirers, when we take something to be truth-apt, we are taking ourselves and all other thinkers to be accountable to getting right a shared target that is independent of any individual's or community's view of that target. That we have this relationship to truth is what enables our practices of disagreement and agreement, even when subject to the glare of self-conscious reflection, and represents a crucial ingredient in our capacity for rational thought. The resulting account shares elements with Huw Price's and Cheryl Misak's views, but also has important advantages over both. It also yields a surprising conclusion—that our best pragmatist account of truth may well be a version of the correspondence theory of truth.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac072",
    doi = "10.1093/pq/pqac072",
    openalex = "W4308918381",
    references = "doi1010179781316823392"
}

@article{doi1011631875673500000199,
    author = "Koterski, Artur",
    title = "Did A. J. Ayer Bring Logical Positivism to England?",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Grazer Philosophische Studien",
    abstract = "Abstract Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) was immediately regarded as a clear and faithful presentation of the views of the Vienna Circle to English-speaking readers. Since Ayer wrote this book after his visit to Vienna, where he participated in the meetings of the Circle, one may often hear to this day that he brought logical positivism to England. However, while Ayer’s conception was a form of logical positivism, it significantly differed from its Viennese counterpart(s). The key discrepancies are related to verificationism: this article aims to analyse these discrepancies. It will be claimed that upon his return from Vienna Ayer assumed positions that were no longer, or had never been, held in the Circle: regarding the verification principle, test-statements, phenomenalist reductionism and analyticity.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000199",
    doi = "10.1163/18756735-00000199",
    openalex = "W4390881965",
    references = "doi101007bf02028153, doi101017cbo9781139172240, doi101086286432, doi1023071572864, doi1023072016260, doi1023072022668, doi1023072024353, doi1023072180845, doi10432497810032495732, koterski2015quines, openalexw63161240"
}

@incollection{feyerabend2024the,
    author = "Feyerabend, Paul K.",
    title = "The Dogmas of Logical Empiricism (1951)",
    year = "2024",
    booktitle = "Vienna Circle Institute Library",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57519-8\_2",
    doi = "10.1007/978-3-031-57519-8\_2",
    openalex = "W4401918698",
    pages = "63-94"
}