@book{jevons1910the8,
    author = "Jevons, F. B",
    title = "The Idea of God in Early Religions",
    year = "1910",
    publisher = "Cambridge, Cambridge University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Jevons, F. B., 1910, The Idea of God in Early Religions: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.}"
}

@article{dingle1939the,
    author = "Dingle, H.",
    title = "The Existence of Other Minds",
    year = "1939",
    journal = "Philosophy",
    abstract = "In the October number of Philosophy x appears a very interesting article by Professor H. H. Price, entitled “Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds,” the main object of which is to formulate the grounds on which we (or I, as one should say at this stage) may claim logical justification for asserting that other minds exist. No attempt is made to “prove” the existence of other minds—an effort which is regarded as a wild-goose chase. Neither does Prof. Price seek to identify the actual process by which a particular mind accepts the existence of others as a fact; that, presumably, is a matter for the psychologist, and it may well turn out that the phenomena which give the conviction that other minds exist may vary from individual to individual and may often be logically unevidential. The object of the article, in short, is simply to state why it is reasonable to believe that other minds exist.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100027364",
    doi = "10.1017/s0031819100027364",
    number = "56",
    openalex = "W2079009261",
    pages = "457-467",
    volume = "14"
}

@misc{garrigoulagrange1952the4,
    author = "Garrigou-Lagrange, R. F",
    title = "The Trinity and God the Creator; a commentary on St. Thomas",
    year = "1952",
    howpublished = "St. Louis, Herder, 675 p.; Translated by F.C. Eckhoff",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Garrigou-Lagrange, R. F., 1952, The Trinity and God the Creator; a commentary on St. Thomas: St. Louis, Herder, 675 p.; Translated by F.C. Eckhoff.}"
}

@misc{mccloskey1960god11,
    author = "McCloskey, H. J",
    title = "God and Evil",
    year = "1960",
    howpublished = "Philosophical Quarterly, v. X, p. 97-114",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {McCloskey, H. J., 1960, God and Evil: Philosophical Quarterly, v. X, p. 97-114.}"
}

@misc{puccetti1964the15,
    author = "Puccetti, R",
    title = "The concept of God",
    year = "1964",
    howpublished = "Philosophical Quarterly, v. XV, p. 227- 245",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Puccetti, R., 1964, The concept of God: Philosophical Quarterly, v. XV, p. 227- 245.}"
}

@book{matson1965the10,
    author = "Matson, W. I",
    title = "The Existence of God",
    year = "1965",
    publisher = "Ithaca, Cornell University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Matson, W. I., 1965, The Existence of God: Ithaca, Cornell University Press.}"
}

@misc{puccetti1966the16,
    author = "Puccetti, R",
    title = "The loving God",
    year = "1966",
    howpublished = "Religious Studies, v. II, p. 255-268",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Puccetti, R., 1966, The loving God: Religious Studies, v. II, p. 255-268.}"
}

@book{plantinga1967gods14,
    author = "Plantinga, A",
    title = "Gods and Other Minds",
    year = "1967",
    publisher = "Ithaca, Cornell University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Plantinga, A., 1967, Gods and Other Minds: Ithaca, Cornell University Press.}"
}

@misc{flew1969god2,
    author = "Flew, A",
    title = "God and Philosophy",
    year = "1969",
    howpublished = "New York, Harcourt, Brace and World",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Flew, A., 1969, God and Philosophy: New York, Harcourt, Brace and World.}"
}

@misc{mellor1969god12,
    author = "Mellor, D. H",
    title = "God and Probability",
    year = "1969",
    howpublished = "Religious Studies, v. V, p. 223-234",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Mellor, D. H., 1969, God and Probability: Religious Studies, v. V, p. 223-234.}"
}

@article{loux1970god,
    author = "Loux, Michael",
    title = "God and Other Minds",
    year = "1970",
    journal = "New Scholasticism",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas197044112",
    doi = "10.5840/newscholas197044112",
    number = "1",
    openalex = "W2319254152",
    pages = "184-188",
    volume = "44"
}

@misc{martin1970a9,
    author = "Martin, M",
    title = "A Disproof of God's Existence",
    year = "1970",
    howpublished = "Darshana International, v. IV, p. 40-45",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Martin, M., 1970, A Disproof of God's Existence: Darshana International, v. IV, p. 40-45.}"
}

@article{richman1972plantinga17,
    author = "Richman, R. J",
    title = "Plantinga, God and (yet) other minds",
    year = "1972",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. L, p. 40-55",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Richman, R. J., 1972, Plantinga, God and (yet) other minds: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. L, p. 40-55.}"
}

@article{doi1023072216182,
    author = "Dretske, Fred",
    title = "Perception and Other Minds",
    year = "1973",
    journal = "Noûs",
    abstract = "Assuming for the moment that I know it, how do I know that there are any other people in the world besides myself, conscious human beings who think and feel in ways similar to the way I think and feel? One of the answers that I can think to give to this question-an answer that strikes me as both true and appropriately responsive-is that I can see that there are other people, a great many of them. If asked how I know that there are any other Volkswagens in the world (besides my own) I would reply, similarly, that I see them wherever I go. Volkswagens, after all, are easy to spot. But so are people. We may someday have a more difficult time (Is this a person or a cleverly contrived robot? Is this a person or a highly evolved orangoutang?), but as things now stand a person is, in normal circumstances, quite an easy thing to pick out-easier, certainly, than apple pie. This being so, what or where is the problem of other minds? Being minded is, I take it, part of what we mean to attribute to something when we speak of it as a person. If there is no problem about identifying people, there should be no special problem about deciding whether there are other minds or how we come to know this. We routinely speak about seeing that there are some people in the waiting room, passengers on the bus, students in the office, and a crowd of people listening to the speaker. If what we routinely say is true, if we do see this sort of thing, then this is how we know (or, at least, one of the ways we know) that there are other minds. Furthermore, there are a great many other things of a more specific nature that we commonly say we see that imply that we know that there are other conscious beings in the world besides ourselves. I do not always know when my wife is angry, and some of the times that I do know this it is not because I can see that she is; but there are occasions, or so I believe, when I can see that she is angry. Knowing her as I do I can also see when she is tired, bored, irritated, uncomfortable, frustrated, and interested. Since",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2216182",
    doi = "10.2307/2216182",
    openalex = "W2319235727"
}

@misc{hinton1973god5,
    author = "Hinton, R. T",
    title = "God and the possibility of science",
    year = "1973",
    howpublished = "Sophia, v. XII, p. 25- 29",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Hinton, R. T., 1973, God and the possibility of science: Sophia, v. XII, p. 25- 29.}"
}

@misc{fulmer1977the3,
    author = "Fulmer, G",
    title = "The Concept of the Supernatural",
    year = "1977",
    howpublished = "Analysis, v. XXXVII, p. 113- 116",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Fulmer, G., 1977, The Concept of the Supernatural: Analysis, v. XXXVII, p. 113- 116.}"
}

@book{warren1977the19,
    author = "Warren, T. B. and Flew, A",
    title = "The Warren-Flew Debate on the Existence of God",
    year = "1977",
    publisher = "Jonesboro, National Christian Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Warren, T. B., and Flew, A., 1977, The Warren-Flew Debate on the Existence of God: Jonesboro, National Christian Press.}"
}

@misc{jastrow1978god6,
    author = "Jastrow, R",
    title = "God and the Astronomers",
    year = "1978",
    howpublished = "New York, Norton",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Jastrow, R., 1978, God and the Astronomers: New York, Norton.}"
}

@misc{smith1979atheism18,
    author = "Smith, G. H",
    title = "Atheism",
    year = "1979",
    howpublished = "The Case Against God: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Smith, G. H., 1979, Atheism: The Case Against God: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books.}"
}

@book{warren1979the20,
    author = "Warren, T. B. and Matson, W. I",
    title = "The Warren-Matson Debate on the Existence of God",
    year = "1979",
    publisher = "Jonesboro, National Christian Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Warren, T. B., and Matson, W. I., 1979, The Warren-Matson Debate on the Existence of God: Jonesboro, National Christian Press.}"
}

@misc{angeles1980the1,
    author = "Angeles, P. A",
    title = "The Problem of God",
    year = "1980",
    howpublished = "A Short Introduction: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books, 156 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Angeles, P. A., 1980, The Problem of God: A Short Introduction: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books, 156 p.}"
}

@misc{jastrow1980have7,
    author = "Jastrow, R",
    title = "Have astronomers found God?",
    year = "1980",
    howpublished = "Reader's Digest, v. 117 (699), p. 49-53",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Jastrow, R., 1980, Have astronomers found God?: Reader's Digest, v. 117 (699), p. 49-53.}"
}

@misc{morreall1980god13,
    author = "Morreall, J",
    title = "God as self-explanatory",
    year = "1980",
    howpublished = "Philosophical Quarterly, v. XXX, p. 206-214",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Morreall, J., 1980, God as self-explanatory: Philosophical Quarterly, v. XXX, p. 206-214.}"
}

@article{kumarsharma1985dharmakīrti,
    author = "Kumar Sharma, Ramesh",
    title = "Dharmakīrti on the existence of other minds",
    year = "1985",
    journal = "Journal of Indian Philosophy",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00208527",
    doi = "10.1007/bf00208527",
    number = "1",
    openalex = "W1997080825",
    pages = "55-71",
    volume = "13"
}

@misc{crossref1991the,
    title = "The Existence and Concept of God",
    year = "1991",
    booktitle = "The Shape of Catholic Theology",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472984890.ch-004",
    doi = "10.5040/9781472984890.ch-004",
    openalex = "W4231324400"
}

@article{doi101111j175525672004tb00996x,
    author = "Wikforss, Åsa",
    title = "Direct Knowledge and Other Minds",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Theoria",
    abstract = "The notion of direct knowledge is central to John McDowell’s philosophy. It is of importance not just for his account of empirical knowledge but also for his account of rule-following, singular thought, the past, ethics, and other minds. The reason McDowell appeals to the notion of direct knowledge is that he wishes to oppose certain inferential models that he thinks are pernicious and lead to skepticism. 1 For instance, in Mind and World he argues that unless we grant that there is a direct point of contact between our empirical judgments and the world, we will end up with a holism that threatens to undermine not only empirical knowledge, but also the very idea of empirical content. 2 McDowell’s reliance on the notion of direct knowledge poses a certain challenge. The problem is to present an account of direct knowledge which is both epistemologically significant (for example, it should allow for an interesting distinction between knowledge that is direct and knowledge which is not) and, at the same time, makes it true that the kinds of knowledge he wants to construe as direct come out as such. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether McDowell can meet this challenge in the case of other minds. Is there a construal of direct knowledge which is both non-trivial and yet makes it true that knowledge",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00996.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00996.x",
    openalex = "W2051837707",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511625251, doi10109301992462700010001, doi10109301992462970010001, doi101111j147549751987tb00555x, doi1023072023177, doi102307jctv22jntgn20, doi105840jphil198178268, doi105860choice514946, openalexw2041984916, openalexw583209683, openalexw63161240"
}

@article{doi10108000201750510022817,
    author = "Overgaard, Søren",
    title = "Rethinking Other Minds: Wittgenstein and Levinas on Expression",
    year = "2005",
    journal = "Inquiry",
    abstract = "other minds, Wittgenstein, Levinas, expression",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00201750510022817",
    doi = "10.1080/00201750510022817",
    openalex = "W2001604907",
    references = "doi1010079789400993426, doi101017cbo9780511805042, doi101017cbo9780511818998, doi101093nqclixdec27467a, doi1023072103745, doi1023072104548, doi1023072184551, doi102307jctvjghtzj, doi107551mitpress45510010001, openalexw1534200104"
}

@book{doi10109301951389290010001,
    author = "Goldman, Alvin I.",
    title = "Simulating Minds",
    year = "2006",
    abstract = "Abstract How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds that resemble, or aim to resemble, those of their targets; these states are then imputed to, or projected onto, the targets. In low-level mindreading, such as reading emotions from faces, simulation is mediated by automatic mirror systems. More controlled processes of simulation, here called “enactment imagination”, are used in high-level mindreading. Just as visual and motor imagery are attempts to replicate acts of seeing and doing, mindreading is characteristically an attempt to replicate the mental processes of a target, followed by projection of the imagination-generated state onto the target. Projection errors are symptomatic of simulation, because one’s own genuine states readily intrude into the simulational process. A nuanced form of introspection is introduced to explain self-attribution and also to address the question of how mental concepts are represented. A distinctive cognitive code involving introspective representations figures prominently in our concepts of mental states. The book concludes with an overview of the pervasive effects on social life of simulation, imitation, and empathy, and charts their possible roles in moral experience and the fictive arts.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/0195138929.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/0195138929.001.0001",
    openalex = "W4248926310",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511808098, doi101017s0094837300004310, doi1023072904611, doi105840philstudies1954421, doi105860choice342091"
}

@book{doi1043249780203086599,
    author = "Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan",
    title = "The Phenomenological Mind",
    year = "2007",
    abstract = "The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203086599",
    doi = "10.4324/9780203086599",
    openalex = "W571383449",
    references = "doi10108000201750510022817"
}

@article{ellis2010god,
    author = "ELLIS, FIONA",
    title = "God and other minds",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "I reconsider the idea that there is an analogy between belief in other minds and belief in God, and examine two approaches to the relevant beliefs. The ‘explanatory inductive’ approach raises difficulties in both contexts, and involves questionable assumptions. The ‘expressivist’ approach is more promising, and presupposes a more satisfactory metaphysical framework in the first context. Its application to God is similarly insightful, and offers an intellectually respectable, albeit resistible, version of the doctrine that nature is a book of lessons.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990321",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412509990321",
    number = "3",
    openalex = "W2108927959",
    pages = "331-351",
    volume = "46",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511520693, doi10108000201750510022817, doi101111j147549751987tb00555x, doi101111j175525672004tb00996x, doi1023072216182, doi105840philstudies1954421, openalexw1013930821, openalexw2041984916, openalexw2799177124, openalexw3164222368"
}

@article{doi101111j14679264201100314x,
    author = "Gomes, Anil",
    title = "XII-Is There a Problem of Other Minds?",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society",
    abstract = "Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00314.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00314.x",
    openalex = "W2067738773",
    references = "openalexw3164222368"
}

@article{openalexw2789874677,
    author = "Gomes, Anil",
    title = "Is There a Problem of Other Minds?",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)",
    abstract = "Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people",
    openalex = "W2789874677",
    references = "openalexw3164222368"
}

@incollection{button2017other,
    author = "Button, Tim",
    title = "Other Minds and God",
    year = "2017",
    booktitle = "Pragmatism and the European Traditions",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106236-5",
    doi = "10.4324/9781315106236-5",
    openalex = "W2908177686",
    pages = "86-109"
}

@article{doi1010800955236720171284372,
    author = "Perrett, Roy W.",
    title = "Buddhist idealism and the problem of other minds",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Asian Philosophy",
    abstract = "This essay is concerned with Indian Yogācāra philosophers’ treatment of the problem of other minds in the face of a threatened collapse into solipsism suggested by Vasubandhu’s epistemological argument for idealism. I discuss the attempts of Dharmakīrti and Ratnakīrti to address this issue, concluding that Dharmakīrti is best seen as addressing the epistemological problem of other minds and Ratnakīrti as addressing the conceptual problem of other minds.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2017.1284372",
    doi = "10.1080/09552367.2017.1284372",
    openalex = "W2586169082",
    references = "doi101023a1013151011789"
}

@article{doi101111ejop12238,
    author = "Sollberger, Michael",
    title = "The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "European Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "Abstract The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self‐knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non‐inferential and non‐observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else's mental life in the same way as one knows one's own mind is a complete non‐starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds and also that the idea of having someone else's mind in one's own introspective reach is not obviously self‐contradictory. So the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else's mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12238",
    doi = "10.1111/ejop.12238",
    openalex = "W2606543415",
    references = "doi101111j147549751987tb00555x"
}

@incollection{doi101093oso97801987944000030001,
    author = "Parrott, Matthew C.",
    title = "Enquiries Concerning the Minds of Others",
    year = "2019",
    abstract = "Abstract This chapter serves as substantive introduction to the topic of this volume. More specifically, it discusses three central problems relating to our everyday knowledge of other minds. The first is an epistemological problem concerning whether we are capable of knowing anything at all about the mental states of others and, if we are, how we are able to do this. The second is a conceptual problem, concerning our ability to have concepts of mental states that are applicable both to oneself and to others in a way that preserves unity of meaning. As we will see, this conceptual problem arises if we think that a subject typically acquires mental state concepts on the basis of her own experiences. The third problem is explanatory, and it concerns the psychological processes and mechanisms that underpin our ordinary attributions of mental states to others. These three problems are not only central to existing philosophical discussions of our knowledge of other minds, but they are also the primary questions addressed in this volume. As well as outlining the questions, this chapter serves as an introduction to the way in which each of the subsequent chapters chooses to address one or another of them. The chapter concludes with a proposal for how we might consider the answers to each of these problems as related to the others.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0001",
    openalex = "W2981572657",
    references = "doi101111j175525672004tb00996x"
}

@incollection{doi101093oso97801987944000030006,
    author = "Avramides, Anita",
    title = "Perception, Reliability, and Other Minds",
    year = "2019",
    abstract = "Abstract It has been suggested that we can come by our knowledge of what others think and feel through perception. The idea has been worked out in different ways by different philosophers. In this chapter I consider the perceptual account proposed by Fred Dretske. In section one I outline Dretske’s account, and highlight a particular feature of it. In section two I set out an adequacy condition for any account that proposes to be an account of our mental life. In section three I consider Dretske’s account in the light of this adequacy condition and argue that Dretske’s account does not meet this condition. I conclude that while Dretske holds that we get our knowledge of other minds in much the same way that we get our knowledge of bodies in the world around us, I argue that the account cannot be extended to give us knowledge of other minds because there is a crucial asymmetry here that must be acknowledged.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0006",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0006",
    openalex = "W2982199489",
    references = "doi101111j175525672004tb00996x, openalexw3164222368"
}

@incollection{doi101093oso97801987944000030008,
    author = "Gomes, Anil",
    title = "Perception, Evidence, and Our Expressive Knowledge of Others’ Minds",
    year = "2019",
    abstract = "Abstract ‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the first part of this chapter I argue that this debate is best understood as concerning the question of whether our knowledge of others’ minds is based on perception or based on evidence. In the second part of the chapter I suggest that our ordinary ways of thinking take our knowledge of others’ minds to be both non-evidential and non-perceptual. A satisfactory resolution to the philosophical problem of other minds thus requires us to take seriously the idea that we have a way of knowing about others’ minds which is both non-evidential and non-perceptual. I suggest that our knowledge of others’ minds which is based on their expressions—our expressive knowledge—may fit this bill.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0008",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0008",
    openalex = "W2981459759",
    references = "doi101111j175525672004tb00996x, openalexw3164222368"
}

@incollection{doi101093oso97801987944000030009,
    author = "McNeill, Will",
    title = "Expressions, Looks, and Others’ Minds",
    year = "2019",
    abstract = "Abstract We can know some things about each others’ mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each other’s mental states themselves—the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis—remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James’s expression or on the way James appears—versions of what I call the Expressive Hypothesis. The Expressive Hypothesis is intuitive. But in this chapter I argue that it does not allow us to do away with the thought that we sometimes perceive people’s mental states. I take my arguments to provide some tentative support for the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0009",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780198794400.003.0009",
    openalex = "W2981380485",
    references = "doi101111j175525672004tb00996x, openalexw3164222368"
}

@article{doi101111papq12380,
    author = "Merlo, Giovanni",
    title = "The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Pacific philosophical quarterly",
    abstract = "Abstract This paper presents a distinctively metaphysical version of the problem of other minds. The main source of this version of the problem lies in the principle that, when it comes to consciousness, no distinction can sensibly be drawn between appearance and reality. I will argue that, unless we want to call that principle into question, we should seriously consider the possibility of accepting the conclusion that other minds are not like our own. This option is less problematic than it might seem at first if we are willing to reconceive facts of consciousness as subjective rather than objective in nature.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12380",
    doi = "10.1111/papq.12380",
    openalex = "W3190719849",
    references = "openalexw3164222368"
}

@article{doi101007s11245022098279,
    author = "Avramides, Anita",
    title = "The Sceptic, The Outsider, and Other Minds",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "Topoi",
    abstract = "Abstract The usual way with scepticism is to formulate a problem in connection with the external world and then apply this to other minds. Drawing on work by Stanley Cavell and Richard Moran, I argue that the sceptic misses an important difference in our concepts of mind and of body, and that this is reflected in the sceptic’s formulation of a problem regarding other minds. I suggest that an understanding of this important conceptual difference is also missing from the work of those who attempt to reply to (dismiss, or ignore) the sceptic. In this connection I discuss both inferential and perceptual accounts of our knowledge of other minds. I identify an error in these accounts that may be thought to arise from a lack of understanding of the important conceptual difference here, and then develop an understanding of this error that draws on the work of Edith Stein and Stanley Cavell.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09827-9",
    doi = "10.1007/s11245-022-09827-9",
    openalex = "W4312204825",
    references = "doi1023072216182"
}

@incollection{fullertonNonethe,
    author = "Fullerton, George Stuart",
    title = "The existence of other minds.",
    year = "None",
    booktitle = "A system of metaphysics.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1037/13695-027",
    doi = "10.1037/13695-027",
    openalex = "W2498713546",
    pages = "433-457"
}