Brain

@article{brette19227,
    author = "Brette, Roubier",
    title = "7. BRAIN—BRAIN TUMOR—BRAIN ABSCESS",
    year = "1922",
    journal = "The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-192210000-00018",
    doi = "10.1097/00005053-192210000-00018",
    number = "4",
    pages = "383",
    volume = "56"
}

@article{adrian1931potential2,
    author = "Adrian, E. D. and Buytendyk, F. J",
    title = "Potential changes in the isolated brain stem of the goldfish",
    year = "1931",
    journal = "Journal of Physiology, v. 71, p. 121-135",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Adrian, E. D., and Buytendyk, F. J., 1931, Potential changes in the isolated brain stem of the goldfish: Journal of Physiology, v. 71, p. 121-135.}"
}

@book{penfield1959speech11,
    author = "Penfield, W. and Robert, L",
    title = "Speech and Brain Mechanisms",
    year = "1959",
    publisher = "Princeton, Princeton University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Penfield, W., and Robert, L., 1959, Speech and Brain Mechanisms: Princeton, Princeton University Press.}"
}

@book{aronson1968function3,
    author = "Aronson, L. R. and Kaplan, H",
    title = "Function of the Teleostean Forebrain, in Ingle, D., ed., The Central Nervous System and Fish Behavior",
    year = "1968",
    publisher = "Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 107-125",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Aronson, L. R., and Kaplan, H., 1968, Function of the Teleostean Forebrain, in Ingle, D., ed., The Central Nervous System and Fish Behavior: Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 107-125.}"
}

@misc{eccles1970responses7,
    author = "Eccles, J. C. and Tborkov, H. and Tsukahara, N",
    title = "Responses of the Purkyn cells of a selachian cerebellum ( Mustellus canis)",
    year = "1970",
    howpublished = "Brain Research, v. 17, p. 57-86",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Eccles, J. C., Tborkov, H., and Tsukahara, N., 1970, Responses of the Purkyn cells of a selachian cerebellum ( Mustellus canis): Brain Research, v. 17, p. 57-86.}"
}

@misc{ebbesson1972a5,
    author = "Ebbesson, S. O. E",
    title = "A proposal for a common nomenclature for some optic nuclei in vertebrates and the evidence for a common origin of two such cell groups",
    year = "1972",
    howpublished = "Brain, Behavior and Evolution, v. 6, p. 75-91",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Ebbesson, S. O. E., 1972, A proposal for a common nomenclature for some optic nuclei in vertebrates and the evidence for a common origin of two such cell groups: Brain, Behavior and Evolution, v. 6, p. 75-91.}"
}

@misc{ebbesson1972new4,
    author = "Ebbesson, S. O. E",
    title = "New insights into the organization of the shark brain",
    year = "1972",
    howpublished = "Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, v. 42, p. 121-129",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Ebbesson, S. O. E., 1972, New insights into the organization of the shark brain: Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology, v. 42, p. 121-129.}"
}

@book{jerison1973evolution9,
    author = "Jerison, H. J",
    title = "Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence",
    year = "1973",
    publisher = "New York, Academic Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Jerison, H. J., 1973, Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence: New York, Academic Press.}"
}

@misc{holloway1974the8,
    author = "Holloway, R. L",
    title = "The casts of fossil homonid brains",
    year = "1974",
    howpublished = "Scientific American, v. 231, no. 1, p. 106-115",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Holloway, R. L., 1974, The casts of fossil homonid brains: Scientific American, v. 231, no. 1, p. 106-115.}"
}

@article{young1974the13,
    author = "Young, J. Z",
    title = "The George Bidder Lecture 1973. Brains and worlds",
    year = "1974",
    journal = "the cerebral cosmologies: Journal of Experimental Biology, v. 61, p. 5-17",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Young, J. Z., 1974, The George Bidder Lecture 1973. Brains and worlds: the cerebral cosmologies: Journal of Experimental Biology, v. 61, p. 5-17.}"
}

@techreport{adey1977brain1,
    author = "Adey, W. R. and Bawin, S. M",
    title = "Brain interactions with weak electric and magnetic fields",
    year = "1977",
    howpublished = "Neurosciences Research Program Bulletin, v. 15; 129 pp",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Adey, W. R., and Bawin, S. M., 1977, Brain interactions with weak electric and magnetic fields: Neurosciences Research Program Bulletin, v. 15; 129 pp.}"
}

@misc{popper1978natural12,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    title = "Natural selection and the emergence of mind",
    year = "1978",
    howpublished = "Dialectica, v. 32, no. 3-4, p. 339-355",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1978, Natural selection and the emergence of mind: Dialectica, v. 32, no. 3-4, p. 339-355.}"
}

@book{young1978programs14,
    author = "Young, J. Z",
    title = "Programs of the Brain",
    year = "1978",
    publisher = "Oxford, Oxford University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Young, J. Z., 1978, Programs of the Brain: Oxford, Oxford University Press.}"
}

Abstract This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4. “Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

@article{doi101017s0140525x00005756,
    author = "Searle, John R.",
    title = "Minds, brains, and programs",
    year = "1980",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "Abstract This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4. “Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00005756",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x00005756",
    openalex = "W2251410821",
    references = "doi1010079783642618918, doi101016b9781483214467500194, doi101017cbo9780511625251, doi101093oso97801982507910030017, doi101136bjo592111c, doi101145365153365168, doi1023072183914, doi1023073331482, openalexw1614549126, openalexw2531563875, openalexw63161240"
}

@book{ebbesson1980comparative6,
    author = "Ebbesson, S. O. E",
    title = "Comparative Neurology of the Telencephalon",
    year = "1980",
    publisher = "New York, Plenum Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Ebbesson, S. O. E., 1980, Comparative Neurology of the Telencephalon: New York, Plenum Press.}"
}

@misc{crossref1981left,
    title = "Left Brain, Right Brain",
    year = "1981",
    booktitle = "PsycEXTRA Dataset",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1037/e568042010-001",
    doi = "10.1037/e568042010-001"
}

@misc{lewin1987the10,
    author = "Lewin, R",
    title = "The origin of the modern human mind",
    year = "1987",
    howpublished = "Science, v. 236, p. 668- 670",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Lewin, R., 1987, The origin of the modern human mind: Science, v. 236, p. 668- 670.}"
}

Five chapters in the book's first part, Some Elementary Neuroscience, sketch the history of the science of nervous systems and provide a general introduction to neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, and neuropsychology. In the second part, Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science, chapters place the mind-body problem within the wider context of the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research in this area, a general account of intertheoretic reduction is explained, arguments for a reductionist strategy are developed, and traditional objections from dualists and other anti reductionists are answered in novel ways. The third part, Neurophilosophical Perspective, concludes the book with a presentation and discussion of some of the most promising theoretical developments currently under exploration in functional neurobiology and in the connectionist models within artificial intelligence research. A Bradford Book.

@article{doi1023072185418,
    author = "Hill, Christopher and Churchland, Patricia Smith",
    title = "Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain.",
    year = "1988",
    journal = "The Philosophical Review",
    abstract = "Five chapters in the book's first part, Some Elementary Neuroscience, sketch the history of the science of nervous systems and provide a general introduction to neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, and neuropsychology. In the second part, Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science, chapters place the mind-body problem within the wider context of the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research in this area, a general account of intertheoretic reduction is explained, arguments for a reductionist strategy are developed, and traditional objections from dualists and other anti reductionists are answered in novel ways. The third part, Neurophilosophical Perspective, concludes the book with a presentation and discussion of some of the most promising theoretical developments currently under exploration in functional neurobiology and in the connectionist models within artificial intelligence research. A Bradford Book.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2185418",
    doi = "10.2307/2185418",
    openalex = "W2052424880"
}

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PART I PROBLEMS 1 Mind 2 Putting the Mind Back into Nature 3 The Matter of the Mind. PART II ORIGINS 4 Putting Psychology on a Biological Basis 5 Morphology and Mind. Completing Darwin's Program 6 Topobiology: Lessons from the Embryo 7 The Problems Reconsidered. PART III PROPOSALS 8 The Sciences of Recognition 9 Neural Darwinism 10 Memory and Concepts: Building a Bridge to Consciousness 11 Consciousness: The Remembered Present 12 Language and Higher Order Consciousness 13 Attention and the Unconscious 14 Layers and Loops: A Summary. PART IV HARMONIES 15 A Graveyard of Isms: Philosophy and Its Claims 16 Memory and the Individual Soul: Against Silly Reductionism 17 Higher Products: Thoughts, Moments, Emotions 18 Diseases of the Mind: The Reintegrated Self 19 Is It Possible to Construct a Conscious Artifact? 20 Symmetry and Memory: On the Ultimate Origins of Mind. Epilogue. Mind Without Biology: A Critical Postscript. SELECTED READINGS. CREDITS. INDEX.

@article{doi105860choice301781,
    title = "Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind",
    year = "1992",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PART I PROBLEMS 1 Mind 2 Putting the Mind Back into Nature 3 The Matter of the Mind. PART II ORIGINS 4 Putting Psychology on a Biological Basis 5 Morphology and Mind. Completing Darwin's Program 6 Topobiology: Lessons from the Embryo 7 The Problems Reconsidered. PART III PROPOSALS 8 The Sciences of Recognition 9 Neural Darwinism 10 Memory and Concepts: Building a Bridge to Consciousness 11 Consciousness: The Remembered Present 12 Language and Higher Order Consciousness 13 Attention and the Unconscious 14 Layers and Loops: A Summary. PART IV HARMONIES 15 A Graveyard of Isms: Philosophy and Its Claims 16 Memory and the Individual Soul: Against Silly Reductionism 17 Higher Products: Thoughts, Moments, Emotions 18 Diseases of the Mind: The Reintegrated Self 19 Is It Possible to Construct a Conscious Artifact? 20 Symmetry and Memory: On the Ultimate Origins of Mind. Epilogue. Mind Without Biology: A Critical Postscript. SELECTED READINGS. CREDITS. INDEX.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.30-1781",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.30-1781",
    openalex = "W1694447789"
}

@article{calne1993brain,
    author = "Calne, Roy",
    title = "Brain Dead, Brain Absent, Brain Donors",
    year = "1993",
    journal = "Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0035-8819(25)00988-2",
    doi = "10.1016/s0035-8819(25)00988-2",
    number = "3",
    pages = "331-332",
    volume = "27"
}

PART I: THEORIES OF BRAIN FUNCTION PART II: SENSORY SYSTEMS PART III: MOTOR FUNCTIONS PART IV: SLEEP AND FUNCTION PART V: INTELLECT AND MEMORY PART VI: SPEECH AND CEREBRAL DOMINANCE PART VII: TREATMENTS AND THERAPIES EPILOGUE APPENDIX: DATES OF BIRTH AND DEATH INDEX

@article{doi105860choice320292,
    title = "Origins of neuroscience: a history of explorations into brain function",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "PART I: THEORIES OF BRAIN FUNCTION PART II: SENSORY SYSTEMS PART III: MOTOR FUNCTIONS PART IV: SLEEP AND FUNCTION PART V: INTELLECT AND MEMORY PART VI: SPEECH AND CEREBRAL DOMINANCE PART VII: TREATMENTS AND THERAPIES EPILOGUE APPENDIX: DATES OF BIRTH AND DEATH INDEX",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.32-0292",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.32-0292",
    openalex = "W1492910370"
}

This revolutionary book provides fresh answers to long-standing questions of human origins and consciousness. Drawing on his breakthrough research in comparative neuroscience, Terrence Deacon offers a wealth of insights into the significance of symbolic thinking: from the co-evolutionary exchange between language and brains over two million years of hominid evolution to the ethical repercussions that followed man's newfound access to other people's thoughts and emotions. Informing these insights is a new understanding of how Darwinian processes underlie the brain's development and function as well as its evolution. In contrast to much contemporary neuroscience that treats the brain as no more or less than a computer, Deacon provides a new clarity of vision into the mechanism of mind. It injects a renewed sense of adventure into the experience of being human.

@article{doi105860choice351500,
    title = "The symbolic species: the co-evolution of language and the brain",
    year = "1997",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "This revolutionary book provides fresh answers to long-standing questions of human origins and consciousness. Drawing on his breakthrough research in comparative neuroscience, Terrence Deacon offers a wealth of insights into the significance of symbolic thinking: from the co-evolutionary exchange between language and brains over two million years of hominid evolution to the ethical repercussions that followed man's newfound access to other people's thoughts and emotions. Informing these insights is a new understanding of how Darwinian processes underlie the brain's development and function as well as its evolution. In contrast to much contemporary neuroscience that treats the brain as no more or less than a computer, Deacon provides a new clarity of vision into the mechanism of mind. It injects a renewed sense of adventure into the experience of being human.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.35-1500",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.35-1500",
    openalex = "W2148300948",
    references = "doi101006jhev19960099, doi101615critrevneurobiolv10i3430, doi1023071423235, doi1023071423541, doi105860choice285670"
}

This revolutionary book provides fresh answers to long-standing questions of human origins and consciousness. Drawing on his breakthrough research in comparative neuroscience, Terrence Deacon offers a wealth of insights into the significance of symbolic thinking: from the co-evolutionary exchange between language and brains over two million years of hominid evolution to the ethical repercussions that followed man's newfound access to other people's thoughts and emotions. Informing these insights is a new understanding of how Darwinian processes underlie the brain's development and function as well as its evolution. In contrast to much contemporary neuroscience that treats the brain as no more or less than a computer, Deacon provides a new clarity of vision into the mechanism of mind. It injects a renewed sense of adventure into the experience of being human.

@book{openalexw2902019039,
    author = "Deacon, Terrence W.",
    title = "The symbolic species: the co-evolution of language and the brain",
    year = "1997",
    abstract = "This revolutionary book provides fresh answers to long-standing questions of human origins and consciousness. Drawing on his breakthrough research in comparative neuroscience, Terrence Deacon offers a wealth of insights into the significance of symbolic thinking: from the co-evolutionary exchange between language and brains over two million years of hominid evolution to the ethical repercussions that followed man's newfound access to other people's thoughts and emotions. Informing these insights is a new understanding of how Darwinian processes underlie the brain's development and function as well as its evolution. In contrast to much contemporary neuroscience that treats the brain as no more or less than a computer, Deacon provides a new clarity of vision into the mechanism of mind. It injects a renewed sense of adventure into the experience of being human.",
    url = "https://openalex.org/W2902019039",
    openalex = "W2902019039"
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Preface Three Time-Bytes 1. Discovering Human Antiquity 2 Seeking Answers 3. Creative Illusion 4. The Matter of the Mind 5. Case Study 1: Southern African San Rock Art 6. Case Study 2: North American Rock Art 7. An Origin of Image-Making 8. The Cave in the Mind 9. Cave and Community 10. Cave and Conflict Envoi

@article{doi105860choice405281,
    title = "The mind in the cave: consciousness and the origins of art",
    year = "2003",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "Preface Three Time-Bytes 1. Discovering Human Antiquity 2 Seeking Answers 3. Creative Illusion 4. The Matter of the Mind 5. Case Study 1: Southern African San Rock Art 6. Case Study 2: North American Rock Art 7. An Origin of Image-Making 8. The Cave in the Mind 9. Cave and Community 10. Cave and Conflict Envoi",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.40-5281",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.40-5281",
    openalex = "W1493053577",
    references = "doi105860choice301781"
}

List of Contributors.Preface (M. Brune, et al.).Introduction (L. Brothers).PART I: EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.Stereotypy vs. Plasticity in Vertebrate Cognition (C. Strungaru).Is the Human Brain Unique? (G. Roth).Tracing the Evolutionary Path of Cognition (R. Byrne).ProtocadherinXY: a Candidate Gene for Cerebral Asymmetry and Language (T. Crow).Part II: CULTURE AND THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.Evolution of the Cultured Mind: Lessons from Wild Chimpanzees (W. McGrew).Ninye Kanye: the Human Mind. Traditional Papuan Societies as Models to Understand Evolution towards the Social Brain (W. Schiefenhovel).PART III: DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.Big Brains, Slow Development, and Social Complexity: The Developmental and Evolutionary Origins of Social Cognition (D. Bjorklund & J. Bering).Where Is 'The Other' in the Self? Multiplicity, Unity, and Transformation of the Self from a Developmental Standpoint (I. Josephs & H. Ribbert).PART IV: PATHOLOGIES OF THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.The Social Brain in Autism (F. Volkmar, et al.).Do Children with ADHD not Need Their Frontal Lobes for Theory of Mind? A Review of Brain Imaging and Neuropsychological Studies (W. Kain & J. Perner).Social Cognition following Prefrontal Cortical Lesions (R. Morris, et al.).Social Cognition at the Neural Level: Invesigations in Autism, Psychopathy and Schizophrenia (T. Russell & T. Sharma).Social Cognition and Behaviour in Schizophrenia (M. Brune).Theory of Mind Delusions and Bizarre Delusions in an Evolutionary Perspective: Psychiatry and the Social Brain (B. Charlton).Social Cognition in Paranoia and Bipolar Affective Disorder (P. Kinderman).Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and Theory of Mind (L. Mealey & S. Kinner).Borderline Personality Disorder Theory of Mind: An Evolutionary Perspective (G. Dammann).Awareness and Theory of Mind in Dementia (S. Starkstein & M. Garau).Postscript (M. Brune, et al.).Index.

@book{openalexw657637402,
    author = "Brüne, Martin and Ribbert, Hedda and Schiefenhövel, Wulf",
    title = "The social brain: evolution and pathology",
    year = "2003",
    abstract = "List of Contributors.Preface (M. Brune, et al.).Introduction (L. Brothers).PART I: EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.Stereotypy vs. Plasticity in Vertebrate Cognition (C. Strungaru).Is the Human Brain Unique? (G. Roth).Tracing the Evolutionary Path of Cognition (R. Byrne).ProtocadherinXY: a Candidate Gene for Cerebral Asymmetry and Language (T. Crow).Part II: CULTURE AND THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.Evolution of the Cultured Mind: Lessons from Wild Chimpanzees (W. McGrew).Ninye Kanye: the Human Mind. Traditional Papuan Societies as Models to Understand Evolution towards the Social Brain (W. Schiefenhovel).PART III: DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.Big Brains, Slow Development, and Social Complexity: The Developmental and Evolutionary Origins of Social Cognition (D. Bjorklund \& J. Bering).Where Is 'The Other' in the Self? Multiplicity, Unity, and Transformation of the Self from a Developmental Standpoint (I. Josephs \& H. Ribbert).PART IV: PATHOLOGIES OF THE 'SOCIAL BRAIN'.The Social Brain in Autism (F. Volkmar, et al.).Do Children with ADHD not Need Their Frontal Lobes for Theory of Mind? A Review of Brain Imaging and Neuropsychological Studies (W. Kain \& J. Perner).Social Cognition following Prefrontal Cortical Lesions (R. Morris, et al.).Social Cognition at the Neural Level: Invesigations in Autism, Psychopathy and Schizophrenia (T. Russell \& T. Sharma).Social Cognition and Behaviour in Schizophrenia (M. Brune).Theory of Mind Delusions and Bizarre Delusions in an Evolutionary Perspective: Psychiatry and the Social Brain (B. Charlton).Social Cognition in Paranoia and Bipolar Affective Disorder (P. Kinderman).Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and Theory of Mind (L. Mealey \& S. Kinner).Borderline Personality Disorder Theory of Mind: An Evolutionary Perspective (G. Dammann).Awareness and Theory of Mind in Dementia (S. Starkstein \& M. Garau).Postscript (M. Brune, et al.).Index.",
    url = "https://openalex.org/W657637402",
    openalex = "W657637402"
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@incollection{crossref2009brain,
    title = "“Brain drain,” “brain gain,” and “brain circulation”",
    year = "2009",
    booktitle = "China's Emerging Technological Edge",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803468.007",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511803468.007",
    pages = "212-253"
}

Abstract Does the brain create the mind, or is some external entity involved? In addressing this hard problem of consciousness, we face a central human challenge: what do we really know and how do we know it? Tentative answers in this book follow from a synthesis of profound ideas, borrowed from philosophy, religion, politics, economics, neuroscience, physics, mathematics, and cosmology, the knowledge structures supporting our meager grasp of reality. This search for new links in the web of human knowledge extends in many directions: the shadows of our thought processes revealed by brain imagining, brains treated as complex adaptive systems that reveal fractal-like behavior in the brain's nested hierarchy, resonant interactions facilitating functional connections in brain tissue, probability and entropy as measures of human ignorance, fundamental limits on human knowledge, and the central role played by information in both brains and physical systems. The author discusses the possibility of deep connections between relativity, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and consciousness; all entities involved with fundamental information barriers. This study elaborates on possible new links in this nested web of human knowledge that may tell us something new about the nature and origins of consciousness. In the end, does the brain create the mind? Or is the mind already out there?

@book{doi101093acprofoso97801953407160010001,
    author = "Nunez, Paul L.",
    title = "Brain, Mind, and the Structure of Reality",
    year = "2010",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Abstract Does the brain create the mind, or is some external entity involved? In addressing this hard problem of consciousness, we face a central human challenge: what do we really know and how do we know it? Tentative answers in this book follow from a synthesis of profound ideas, borrowed from philosophy, religion, politics, economics, neuroscience, physics, mathematics, and cosmology, the knowledge structures supporting our meager grasp of reality. This search for new links in the web of human knowledge extends in many directions: the shadows of our thought processes revealed by brain imagining, brains treated as complex adaptive systems that reveal fractal-like behavior in the brain's nested hierarchy, resonant interactions facilitating functional connections in brain tissue, probability and entropy as measures of human ignorance, fundamental limits on human knowledge, and the central role played by information in both brains and physical systems. The author discusses the possibility of deep connections between relativity, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and consciousness; all entities involved with fundamental information barriers. This study elaborates on possible new links in this nested web of human knowledge that may tell us something new about the nature and origins of consciousness. In the end, does the brain create the mind? Or is the mind already out there?",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340716.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340716.001.0001",
    openalex = "W1601102089"
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This title is winner of the CORINE International Book Award 2011. It is from one of the most important neuroscientists at work today, a path-breaking investigation of a question that has confounded neurologists, philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists for centuries: how is consciousness created? Antonio Damasio has spent the past thirty years studying and writing about how the brain operates, and his work has garnered acclaim for its singular melding of the scientific and the humanistic. In Self Comes to Mind, he goes against the long-standing idea that consciousness is somehow separate from the body, presenting compelling new scientific evidence that consciousness - what we think of as a mind with a self - is in fact a biological process created by a living organism. The result is a groundbreaking investigative journey into the neurobiological foundations of mind and self.

@book{openalexw1576702020,
    author = "Damásio, António R.",
    title = "Self comes to mind: constructing the conscious brain",
    year = "2010",
    abstract = "This title is winner of the CORINE International Book Award 2011. It is from one of the most important neuroscientists at work today, a path-breaking investigation of a question that has confounded neurologists, philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists for centuries: how is consciousness created? Antonio Damasio has spent the past thirty years studying and writing about how the brain operates, and his work has garnered acclaim for its singular melding of the scientific and the humanistic. In Self Comes to Mind, he goes against the long-standing idea that consciousness is somehow separate from the body, presenting compelling new scientific evidence that consciousness - what we think of as a mind with a self - is in fact a biological process created by a living organism. The result is a groundbreaking investigative journey into the neurobiological foundations of mind and self.",
    openalex = "W1576702020"
}

A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as "mind" and "consciousness," are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual and empirical virtues, among them: (a) it (re)solves the problem of how minds are created by brains ─ also known as the "Hard Problem" (Chalmers 1995) ─ by revealing that the apparent difficulty results from a category error, (b) it redirects the search for the origins of mind from complex neural structures to foundational biomechanical ones, and (c) it reformulates the long-term research focus from looking for "miracle moments" where a brain is suddenly capable of making a mind to discovering how complex and sophisticated cognitive, emotional and behavioral functions evolve from more primitive ones.

@article{doi1051291237774781124,
    author = "Reber, Arthur S.",
    title = "Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind",
    year = "2016",
    journal = "Animal Sentience",
    abstract = {A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as "mind" and "consciousness," are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual and empirical virtues, among them: (a) it (re)solves the problem of how minds are created by brains ─ also known as the "Hard Problem" (Chalmers 1995) ─ by revealing that the apparent difficulty results from a category error, (b) it redirects the search for the origins of mind from complex neural structures to foundational biomechanical ones, and (c) it reformulates the long-term research focus from looking for "miracle moments" where a brain is suddenly capable of making a mind to discovering how complex and sophisticated cognitive, emotional and behavioral functions evolve from more primitive ones.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1124",
    doi = "10.51291/2377-7478.1124",
    openalex = "W2519183946",
    references = "doi101126science27452941926, doi1023072216056, doi104324978020382643011, doi105860choice301781, doi105860choice313490, doi105860choice342091, doi107551mitpress28340030047, doi107551mitpress68600030003, openalexw1576702020, openalexw2889936086"
}

The entropic brain hypothesis holds that the key facts concerning psychedelics are partially explained in terms of increased entropy of the brain's functional connectivity. Ayahuasca is a psychedelic beverage of Amazonian indigenous origin with legal status in Brazil in religious and scientific settings. In this context, we use tools and concepts from the theory of complex networks to analyze resting state fMRI data of the brains of human subjects under two distinct conditions: (i) under ordinary waking state and (ii) in an altered state of consciousness induced by ingestion of Ayahuasca. We report an increase in the Shannon entropy of the degree distribution of the networks subsequent to Ayahuasca ingestion. We also find increased local and decreased global network integration. Our results are broadly consistent with the entropic brain hypothesis. Finally, we discuss our findings in the context of descriptions of "mind-expansion" frequently seen in self-reports of users of psychedelic drugs.

@article{doi101038s41598017068540,
    author = "Viol, Aline and Palhano-Fontes, Fernanda and Onias, Heloisa and de Araújo, Dráulio Barros and Viswanathan, G. M.",
    title = "Shannon entropy of brain functional complex networks under the influence of the psychedelic Ayahuasca",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Scientific Reports",
    abstract = {The entropic brain hypothesis holds that the key facts concerning psychedelics are partially explained in terms of increased entropy of the brain's functional connectivity. Ayahuasca is a psychedelic beverage of Amazonian indigenous origin with legal status in Brazil in religious and scientific settings. In this context, we use tools and concepts from the theory of complex networks to analyze resting state fMRI data of the brains of human subjects under two distinct conditions: (i) under ordinary waking state and (ii) in an altered state of consciousness induced by ingestion of Ayahuasca. We report an increase in the Shannon entropy of the degree distribution of the networks subsequent to Ayahuasca ingestion. We also find increased local and decreased global network integration. Our results are broadly consistent with the entropic brain hypothesis. Finally, we discuss our findings in the context of descriptions of "mind-expansion" frequently seen in self-reports of users of psychedelic drugs.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-06854-0",
    doi = "10.1038/s41598-017-06854-0",
    openalex = "W2548043919",
    references = "doi1010020471200611, doi101002j153873051948tb01338x, doi101016jneuroimage200910003, doi101016jneuroimage201110018, doi10103830918, doi101038nrn2575, doi101073pnas7982554, doi10108817425468200810p10008, doi101103physreve69026113, doi101103revmodphys7447"
}

Abstract The book presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive unicellular species of bacteria are conscious, though it is a sentience of a primitive kind. They have minds, though they are tiny and limited in scope. There is nothing even close to this thesis in the current literature on consciousness. Hints that cells might be conscious can be found in the writings of a few cell biologists, but a fully developed theory has never been put forward before. Other approaches to the origins of consciousness are examined and shown to be seriously or fatally flawed, specifically ones based on: (a) the assumption that minds are computational and can be captured by an artificial intelligence (AI), (b) efforts to discover the neurocorrelates of mental experiences, the so-called Hard Problem, and (c) looking for consciousness in less complex species by identifying those that possess precursors of those neurocorrelates. Each of these approaches is shown to be either essentially impossible (the AI models) or so burdened by philosophical and empirical difficulties that they are effectively unworkable. The CBC approach is developed using standard models of evolutionary biology. The remarkable repertoire of single-celled species that micro- and cell-biologists have discovered is reviewed. Bacteria, for example, have sophisticated sensory and perceptual systems, learn, form memories, make decisions based on information about their environment relative to internal metabolic states, communicate with one another, and even show a primitive form of altruism. All such functions are indicators of sentience. Conversations with a caterpillar function as a literary vehicle Finally, the implications of the CBC model are discussed along with a number of related issues in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, the possibility of sentient plants, the ethical repercussions of universal animal sentience, and the long-range impact of adopting the CBC stance.

@book{doi101093oso97801908541570010001,
    author = "Reber, Arthur S.",
    title = "The First Minds",
    year = "2018",
    abstract = "Abstract The book presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive unicellular species of bacteria are conscious, though it is a sentience of a primitive kind. They have minds, though they are tiny and limited in scope. There is nothing even close to this thesis in the current literature on consciousness. Hints that cells might be conscious can be found in the writings of a few cell biologists, but a fully developed theory has never been put forward before. Other approaches to the origins of consciousness are examined and shown to be seriously or fatally flawed, specifically ones based on: (a) the assumption that minds are computational and can be captured by an artificial intelligence (AI), (b) efforts to discover the neurocorrelates of mental experiences, the so-called Hard Problem, and (c) looking for consciousness in less complex species by identifying those that possess precursors of those neurocorrelates. Each of these approaches is shown to be either essentially impossible (the AI models) or so burdened by philosophical and empirical difficulties that they are effectively unworkable. The CBC approach is developed using standard models of evolutionary biology. The remarkable repertoire of single-celled species that micro- and cell-biologists have discovered is reviewed. Bacteria, for example, have sophisticated sensory and perceptual systems, learn, form memories, make decisions based on information about their environment relative to internal metabolic states, communicate with one another, and even show a primitive form of altruism. All such functions are indicators of sentience. Conversations with a caterpillar function as a literary vehicle Finally, the implications of the CBC model are discussed along with a number of related issues in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, the possibility of sentient plants, the ethical repercussions of universal animal sentience, and the long-range impact of adopting the CBC stance.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190854157.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780190854157.001.0001",
    openalex = "W4235317699",
    references = "doi101001jama195002910470083028, doi101002j153892351995tb03988x, doi101017s0140525x00005756, doi101017s0140525x00076512, doi101037h0074428, doi10108015294145200010773287, doi101126science1138140, doi101126science27452941926, doi101146annurevcellbio21012704131001, doi1023073119338, doi1051291237774781124, doi1051291237774781160"
}

A reductionistic, bottom-up, cellular-based concept of the origins of sentience and consciousness has been put forward. Because all life is based on cells, any evolutionary theory of the emergence of sentience and consciousness must be grounded in mechanisms that take place in prokaryotes, the simplest unicellular species. It has been posited that subjective awareness is a fundamental property of cellular life. It emerges as an inherent feature of, and contemporaneously with, the very first life-forms. All other varieties of mentation are the result of evolutionary mechanisms based on this singular event. Therefore, all forms of sentience and consciousness evolve from this original instantiation in prokaryotes. It has also been identified that three cellular structures and mechanisms that likely play critical roles here are excitable membranes, oscillating cytoskeletal polymers, and structurally flexible proteins. Finally, basic biophysical principles are proposed to guide those processes that underly the emergence of supracellular sentience from cellular sentience in multicellular organisms.

@article{doi101002bies201800229,
    author = "Baluška, František and Reber, Arthur S.",
    title = "Sentience and Consciousness in Single Cells: How the First Minds Emerged in Unicellular Species",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "BioEssays",
    abstract = "A reductionistic, bottom-up, cellular-based concept of the origins of sentience and consciousness has been put forward. Because all life is based on cells, any evolutionary theory of the emergence of sentience and consciousness must be grounded in mechanisms that take place in prokaryotes, the simplest unicellular species. It has been posited that subjective awareness is a fundamental property of cellular life. It emerges as an inherent feature of, and contemporaneously with, the very first life-forms. All other varieties of mentation are the result of evolutionary mechanisms based on this singular event. Therefore, all forms of sentience and consciousness evolve from this original instantiation in prokaryotes. It has also been identified that three cellular structures and mechanisms that likely play critical roles here are excitable membranes, oscillating cytoskeletal polymers, and structurally flexible proteins. Finally, basic biophysical principles are proposed to guide those processes that underly the emergence of supracellular sentience from cellular sentience in multicellular organisms.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/bies.201800229",
    doi = "10.1002/bies.201800229",
    openalex = "W2914463176",
    references = "doi101093oso97801908541570010001"
}

Variability of neural activity is regarded as a crucial feature of healthy brain function, and several neuroimaging approaches have been employed to assess it noninvasively. Studies on the variability of both evoked brain response and spontaneous brain signals have shown remarkable changes with aging but it is unclear if the different measures of brain signal variability - identified with either hemodynamic or electrophysiological methods - reflect the same underlying physiology. In this study, we aimed to explore age differences of spontaneous brain signal variability with two different imaging modalities (EEG, fMRI) in healthy younger (25 ​± ​3 years, N ​= ​135) and older (67 ​± ​4 years, N ​= ​54) adults. Consistent with the previous studies, we found lower blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) variability in the older subjects as well as less signal variability in the amplitude of low-frequency oscillations (1-12 ​Hz), measured in source space. These age-related reductions were mostly observed in the areas that overlap with the default mode network. Moreover, age-related increases of variability in the amplitude of beta-band frequency EEG oscillations (15-25 ​Hz) were seen predominantly in temporal brain regions. There were significant sex differences in EEG signal variability in various brain regions while no significant sex differences were observed in BOLD signal variability. Bivariate and multivariate correlation analyses revealed no significant associations between EEG- and fMRI-based variability measures. In summary, we show that both BOLD and EEG signal variability reflect aging-related processes but are likely to be dominated by different physiological origins, which relate differentially to age and sex.

@article{doi101016jneuroimage2019116373,
    author = "Kumral, Deniz and Şansal, Fırat and Cesnaite, E. and Mahjoory, K. and Al, E. and Gaebler, Michael and Nikulin, Vadim V. and Villringer, Arno",
    title = "BOLD and EEG signal variability at rest differently relate to aging in the human brain",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "NeuroImage",
    abstract = "Variability of neural activity is regarded as a crucial feature of healthy brain function, and several neuroimaging approaches have been employed to assess it noninvasively. Studies on the variability of both evoked brain response and spontaneous brain signals have shown remarkable changes with aging but it is unclear if the different measures of brain signal variability - identified with either hemodynamic or electrophysiological methods - reflect the same underlying physiology. In this study, we aimed to explore age differences of spontaneous brain signal variability with two different imaging modalities (EEG, fMRI) in healthy younger (25 ​± ​3 years, N ​= ​135) and older (67 ​± ​4 years, N ​= ​54) adults. Consistent with the previous studies, we found lower blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) variability in the older subjects as well as less signal variability in the amplitude of low-frequency oscillations (1-12 ​Hz), measured in source space. These age-related reductions were mostly observed in the areas that overlap with the default mode network. Moreover, age-related increases of variability in the amplitude of beta-band frequency EEG oscillations (15-25 ​Hz) were seen predominantly in temporal brain regions. There were significant sex differences in EEG signal variability in various brain regions while no significant sex differences were observed in BOLD signal variability. Bivariate and multivariate correlation analyses revealed no significant associations between EEG- and fMRI-based variability measures. In summary, we show that both BOLD and EEG signal variability reflect aging-related processes but are likely to be dominated by different physiological origins, which relate differentially to age and sex.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116373",
    doi = "10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116373",
    openalex = "W2991135406",
    references = "doi101016jclinph201404003"
}

Spontaneous fluctuations in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signals correlate across distant brain areas, shaping functionally relevant intrinsic networks. However, the generative mechanism of fMRI signal correlations, and in particular the link with locally-detected ultra-slow oscillations, are not fully understood. To investigate this link, we record ultrafast ultrahigh field fMRI signals (9.4 Tesla, temporal resolution = 38 milliseconds) from female rats across three anesthesia conditions. Power at frequencies extending up to 0.3 Hz is detected consistently across rat brains and is modulated by anesthesia level. Principal component analysis reveals a repertoire of modes, in which transient oscillations organize with fixed phase relationships across distinct cortical and subcortical structures. Oscillatory modes are found to vary between conditions, resonating at faster frequencies under medetomidine sedation and reducing both in number, frequency, and duration with the addition of isoflurane. Peaking in power within clear anatomical boundaries, these oscillatory modes point to an emergent systemic property. This work provides additional insight into the origin of oscillations detected in fMRI and the organizing principles underpinning spontaneous long-range functional connectivity.

@article{doi101038s4146702336025x,
    author = "Cabral, Joana and Fernandes, Francisca F. and Shemesh, Noam",
    title = "Intrinsic macroscale oscillatory modes driving long range functional connectivity in female rat brains detected by ultrafast fMRI",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Nature Communications",
    abstract = "Spontaneous fluctuations in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signals correlate across distant brain areas, shaping functionally relevant intrinsic networks. However, the generative mechanism of fMRI signal correlations, and in particular the link with locally-detected ultra-slow oscillations, are not fully understood. To investigate this link, we record ultrafast ultrahigh field fMRI signals (9.4 Tesla, temporal resolution = 38 milliseconds) from female rats across three anesthesia conditions. Power at frequencies extending up to 0.3 Hz is detected consistently across rat brains and is modulated by anesthesia level. Principal component analysis reveals a repertoire of modes, in which transient oscillations organize with fixed phase relationships across distinct cortical and subcortical structures. Oscillatory modes are found to vary between conditions, resonating at faster frequencies under medetomidine sedation and reducing both in number, frequency, and duration with the addition of isoflurane. Peaking in power within clear anatomical boundaries, these oscillatory modes point to an emergent systemic property. This work provides additional insight into the origin of oscillations detected in fMRI and the organizing principles underpinning spontaneous long-range functional connectivity.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-36025-x",
    doi = "10.1038/s41467-023-36025-x",
    openalex = "W4319298552",
    references = "doi101016jbrainres201310036"
}

Abstract Reasonable disagreement about sentience requires responsiveness to evidence and argument. It excludes baseless recommendations, dogmatic adherence to refuted theories, and morally abhorrent (e.g. sadistic) positions. However, the uncertainty in this area is such that many very different positions can be held by reasonable people. This chapter examines sources of disagreement that have their origins in the philosophy of mind. Major metaphysical pictures including materialism, epiphenomenalism, interactionism, Russellian monism, biopsychism, and the ‘integrated information theory’ are introduced and their major strengths and weaknesses are considered. The chapter then turns to other axes of disagreement. One concerns the importance of agency and embodiment, real or virtual. Another concerns the scale of functional organization that matters. A third concerns whether the edge of sentience is sharp or blurred.

@incollection{doi10109397801919667290030004,
    author = "Birch, Jonathan",
    title = "The Mind-Body Problem",
    year = "2024",
    abstract = "Abstract Reasonable disagreement about sentience requires responsiveness to evidence and argument. It excludes baseless recommendations, dogmatic adherence to refuted theories, and morally abhorrent (e.g. sadistic) positions. However, the uncertainty in this area is such that many very different positions can be held by reasonable people. This chapter examines sources of disagreement that have their origins in the philosophy of mind. Major metaphysical pictures including materialism, epiphenomenalism, interactionism, Russellian monism, biopsychism, and the ‘integrated information theory’ are introduced and their major strengths and weaknesses are considered. The chapter then turns to other axes of disagreement. One concerns the importance of agency and embodiment, real or virtual. Another concerns the scale of functional organization that matters. A third concerns whether the edge of sentience is sharp or blurred.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191966729.003.0004",
    doi = "10.1093/9780191966729.003.0004",
    openalex = "W4400876437",
    references = "doi1051291237774781268"
}

The mind-brain problem, which explores the relationship between the mind and brain and the nature of consciousness, remains a scientific challenge. It is not a purely theoretical issue; it profoundly shapes our understanding of human nature. This paper reviews evidence on mind-brain problem views impacting ethical, clinical, and academic domains. Evidence shows that dualism is prevalent, even among mental health professionals. This belief declines with age, likely due to generational shifts rather than maturation. Prevalent metaphysical assumptions embedded in academic training (e.g., physicalist reductive views emphasizing biological causes - gene expression and neurologic alterations) may influence this generational shift. Regarding ethics, radical determinism-aligned with a physicalist view of the mind-can diminish perceptions of responsibility, agency, and free will, affecting individual sense of autonomy and legal systems by portraying individuals as less responsive to rehabilitation and seen as more prone to repeat behaviors. In mental health, the mind-brain problem influences four key areas: understanding the origins of mental disorders, treatment approaches, patient self-agency, stigma. Deterministic views reduce patient self-agency, impacting adherence and outcomes, while belief in control enhances responsibility and positive results. Biogenetic models reduce blame but may lower perceptions of self-control and increase perceptions of unpredictability in patient behavior.

@article{doi1010800954026120252474965,
    author = "de Abreu Costa, Marianna and Moreira‐Almeida, Alexander",
    title = "The mind-brain problem: Ethical and clinical implications for psychiatry",
    year = "2025",
    journal = "International Review of Psychiatry",
    abstract = "The mind-brain problem, which explores the relationship between the mind and brain and the nature of consciousness, remains a scientific challenge. It is not a purely theoretical issue; it profoundly shapes our understanding of human nature. This paper reviews evidence on mind-brain problem views impacting ethical, clinical, and academic domains. Evidence shows that dualism is prevalent, even among mental health professionals. This belief declines with age, likely due to generational shifts rather than maturation. Prevalent metaphysical assumptions embedded in academic training (e.g., physicalist reductive views emphasizing biological causes - gene expression and neurologic alterations) may influence this generational shift. Regarding ethics, radical determinism-aligned with a physicalist view of the mind-can diminish perceptions of responsibility, agency, and free will, affecting individual sense of autonomy and legal systems by portraying individuals as less responsive to rehabilitation and seen as more prone to repeat behaviors. In mental health, the mind-brain problem influences four key areas: understanding the origins of mental disorders, treatment approaches, patient self-agency, stigma. Deterministic views reduce patient self-agency, impacting adherence and outcomes, while belief in control enhances responsibility and positive results. Biogenetic models reduce blame but may lower perceptions of self-control and increase perceptions of unpredictability in patient behavior.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261.2025.2474965",
    doi = "10.1080/09540261.2025.2474965",
    openalex = "W4408235579",
    references = "doi101016jpbiomolbio202312003"
}

@article{doi101016jbbi2026106602,
    author = "Hu, Xiao-Yi and Wu, Hai-Peng and He, Qiu-Li and Liu, Kai and Shi, Cui-Na and Wu, Xin-Miao and Sun, Jie and Yang, Jian-Jun and Ji, Mu-Huo",
    title = {Corrigendum to "Excitation-inhibition imbalance and impaired neuronal interactions contribute to cognitive impairments in neuroinflammation by disrupting neuronal avalanche dynamics and criticality" [Brain Behav. Immun. 136 (2026) 106569].},
    year = "2026",
    journal = "Brain, behavior, and immunity",
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/42044568/",
    doi = "10.1016/j.bbi.2026.106602",
    pmid = "42044568"
}

OBJECTIVE: Brain abscess (BA) is a life-threatening infection affecting the brain parenchyma. It can be caused by various microorganisms and often occurs due to underlying etiology. This study aimed to assess the clinical profile, etiology, paraclinical data, and outcomes of pediatric BA. MATERIALS AND METHODS: This retrospective descriptive study was conducted at the Children's Medical Center Hospital in Tehran, Iran, from 2010 to 2020. Diagnosis was based on clinical presentation and imaging. Data was collected for each patient from the hospital database. RESULTS: A total of 45 patients were included in the study. The mean age of patients was 4.93 years (range: 2 months old-18 years old (216 months old) (SD: 58.16 months)), with a male-to-female ratio of 1.36:1. The most frequent clinical symptoms were vomiting, headache, and fever. Streptococcus viridans was the most common organism isolated (25%), though causative organisms were identified in only 35.5% of cases. Predisposing factors included cyanotic heart disease (CHD) (17.7%), meningitis (6.6%), and otitis media (6.6%). The most involved anatomical regions were the frontal lobe (35.5%) and then the multiple lobes (26.6%), respectively. Antibiotic treatment resulted in the cure of 23 patients (51.1%), while 22 patients (48.9%) required surgical abscess drainage in addition to antibiotics. The average hospital stay was 39 days and overall mortality was 6.66%. CONCLUSION: Considering BA in patients with CHD, meningitis, and otitis media helps in earlier diagnosis. Early initiation of antibiotics and selection based on the causative organism can improve BA outcomes in children.

@article{doi1065717turkarchpediatr202525244,
    author = "Khodabandeh, Mahmoud and Haghighi, Roya and Soltani, AmirAli and Khiabani, Mahsa Soti",
    title = "Brain Abscess Clinical Presentation, Microbiology, Management, and Outcome: Evidence from a Tertiary Pediatric Center.",
    year = "2026",
    journal = "Turkish archives of pediatrics",
    abstract = "OBJECTIVE: Brain abscess (BA) is a life-threatening infection affecting the brain parenchyma. It can be caused by various microorganisms and often occurs due to underlying etiology. This study aimed to assess the clinical profile, etiology, paraclinical data, and outcomes of pediatric BA. MATERIALS AND METHODS: This retrospective descriptive study was conducted at the Children's Medical Center Hospital in Tehran, Iran, from 2010 to 2020. Diagnosis was based on clinical presentation and imaging. Data was collected for each patient from the hospital database. RESULTS: A total of 45 patients were included in the study. The mean age of patients was 4.93 years (range: 2 months old-18 years old (216 months old) (SD: 58.16 months)), with a male-to-female ratio of 1.36:1. The most frequent clinical symptoms were vomiting, headache, and fever. Streptococcus viridans was the most common organism isolated (25\%), though causative organisms were identified in only 35.5\% of cases. Predisposing factors included cyanotic heart disease (CHD) (17.7\%), meningitis (6.6\%), and otitis media (6.6\%). The most involved anatomical regions were the frontal lobe (35.5\%) and then the multiple lobes (26.6\%), respectively. Antibiotic treatment resulted in the cure of 23 patients (51.1\%), while 22 patients (48.9\%) required surgical abscess drainage in addition to antibiotics. The average hospital stay was 39 days and overall mortality was 6.66\%. CONCLUSION: Considering BA in patients with CHD, meningitis, and otitis media helps in earlier diagnosis. Early initiation of antibiotics and selection based on the causative organism can improve BA outcomes in children.",
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/42044411/",
    doi = "10.65717/TurkArchPediatr.2025.25244",
    pmid = "42044411"
}