Consciousness

@misc{smith1985ancestral1,
    author = "Smith, C. G",
    title = "Ancestral Views",
    year = "1985",
    howpublished = "Languages and the Evolution of Consciousness: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 178 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Smith, C. G., 1985, Ancestral Views: Languages and the Evolution of Consciousness: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 178 p.}"
}

Some unnoticed or seldom remembered precedents of current views on biological motion and its structural bases are briefly outlined, followed by a concise recapitulation of how the present theory has been constructed in the last few decades. It is shown that the evolution of the concept of fibers as main constituents of living matter led to hypothesizing microscopic structures closely resembling microtubules in the 18th century. At the beginning of this period, fibers sliding over each other and driven by interposed moving elements were envisioned as the cause of muscle contraction. In the following century, an account of the mechanism of myofibril contraction visualized longitudinal displacements of myosin-containing submicroscopic rodlets. The existence of fibrils in the protoplasm of non-muscle cells, a subject of long debate in the second half of the 19th century, was virtually discarded as irrelevant or fallacious 100 years ago. The issue resurfaced in the early 1930s as a theoretical notion--the cytosquelette--nearly two decades before intracellular filamentous structures were first observed with electron microscopy. The role originally assumed for such fibrils as signal conductors is nowadays being reappraised, although under new interpretations with a much wider significance including modulation of gene expression, morphogenesis, and even consciousness. Since all of the above ancestral conceptions were eventually abandoned, the corresponding current views are, to a certain extent, recurrent.

@article{doi1010021097016920000646230co20,
    author = "Frixione, E",
    title = "Recurring views on the structure and function of the cytoskeleton: a 300-year epic.",
    year = "2000",
    journal = "Cell motility and the cytoskeleton",
    abstract = "Some unnoticed or seldom remembered precedents of current views on biological motion and its structural bases are briefly outlined, followed by a concise recapitulation of how the present theory has been constructed in the last few decades. It is shown that the evolution of the concept of fibers as main constituents of living matter led to hypothesizing microscopic structures closely resembling microtubules in the 18th century. At the beginning of this period, fibers sliding over each other and driven by interposed moving elements were envisioned as the cause of muscle contraction. In the following century, an account of the mechanism of myofibril contraction visualized longitudinal displacements of myosin-containing submicroscopic rodlets. The existence of fibrils in the protoplasm of non-muscle cells, a subject of long debate in the second half of the 19th century, was virtually discarded as irrelevant or fallacious 100 years ago. The issue resurfaced in the early 1930s as a theoretical notion--the cytosquelette--nearly two decades before intracellular filamentous structures were first observed with electron microscopy. The role originally assumed for such fibrils as signal conductors is nowadays being reappraised, although under new interpretations with a much wider significance including modulation of gene expression, morphogenesis, and even consciousness. Since all of the above ancestral conceptions were eventually abandoned, the corresponding current views are, to a certain extent, recurrent.",
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10891854/",
    doi = "10.1002/1097-0169(200006)46:2 3.0.CO;2-0",
    pmid = "10891854"
}

Some unnoticed or seldom remembered precedents of current views on biological motion and its structural bases are briefly outlined, followed by a concise recapitulation of how the present theory has been constructed in the last few decades. It is shown that the evolution of the concept of fibers as main constituents of living matter led to hypothesizing microscopic structures closely resembling microtubules in the 18th century. At the beginning of this period, fibers sliding over each other and driven by interposed moving elements were envisioned as the cause of muscle contraction. In the following century, an account of the mechanism of myofibril contraction visualized longitudinal displacements of myosin-containing submicroscopic rodlets. The existence of fibrils in the protoplasm of non-muscle cells, a subject of long debate in the second half of the 19th century, was virtually discarded as irrelevant or fallacious 100 years ago. The issue resurfaced in the early 1930s as a theoretical notion--the cytosquelette--nearly two decades before intracellular filamentous structures were first observed with electron microscopy. The role originally assumed for such fibrils as signal conductors is nowadays being reappraised, although under new interpretations with a much wider significance including modulation of gene expression, morphogenesis, and even consciousness. Since all of the above ancestral conceptions were eventually abandoned, the corresponding current views are, to a certain extent, recurrent.

@article{doi1010021097016920000646273aidcm130co20,
    author = "Frixione, Eugenio",
    title = "Recurring views on the structure and function of the cytoskeleton: A 300-Year Epic",
    year = "2000",
    journal = "Cell Motility and the Cytoskeleton",
    abstract = "Some unnoticed or seldom remembered precedents of current views on biological motion and its structural bases are briefly outlined, followed by a concise recapitulation of how the present theory has been constructed in the last few decades. It is shown that the evolution of the concept of fibers as main constituents of living matter led to hypothesizing microscopic structures closely resembling microtubules in the 18th century. At the beginning of this period, fibers sliding over each other and driven by interposed moving elements were envisioned as the cause of muscle contraction. In the following century, an account of the mechanism of myofibril contraction visualized longitudinal displacements of myosin-containing submicroscopic rodlets. The existence of fibrils in the protoplasm of non-muscle cells, a subject of long debate in the second half of the 19th century, was virtually discarded as irrelevant or fallacious 100 years ago. The issue resurfaced in the early 1930s as a theoretical notion--the cytosquelette--nearly two decades before intracellular filamentous structures were first observed with electron microscopy. The role originally assumed for such fibrils as signal conductors is nowadays being reappraised, although under new interpretations with a much wider significance including modulation of gene expression, morphogenesis, and even consciousness. Since all of the above ancestral conceptions were eventually abandoned, the corresponding current views are, to a certain extent, recurrent.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/1097-0169(200006)46:2<73::aid-cm1>3.0.co;2-0",
    doi = "10.1002/1097-0169(200006)46:2<73::aid-cm1>3.0.co;2-0",
    openalex = "W2096335633",
    references = "doi101016s0092867485800994, doi101038173973a0, doi101038283249a0, doi101038368113a0, doi101038385313a0, doi101073pnas7251858, doi101083jcb17119, doi101113jphysiol1966sp007909, doi101126science8316857, doi101126science8316858"
}

@article{doi101016jfsigen200706008,
    author = "Phillips, Christopher and Salas, Antonio and Sánchez, Juan José Martínez and Fondevila, M. and Gómez‐Tato, Antonio and Álvarez-Dios, J. and Calaza, Manuel and de Cal, M. Casares and Ballard, David and Lareu, M.V. and Carracedo, Ángel",
    title = "Inferring ancestral origin using a single multiplex assay of ancestry-informative marker SNPs",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Forensic Science International Genetics",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2007.06.008",
    doi = "10.1016/j.fsigen.2007.06.008",
    openalex = "W2132497218",
    references = "doi1012019781317952268"
}

A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain - spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data - is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form a centralized functional design in which an upper brain stem system organized for conscious function performs a penultimate step in action control. This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an expanding forebrain - culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals - came to serve as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone.

@article{doi101017s0140525x07000891,
    author = "Merker, Bjørn",
    title = "Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain - spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data - is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form a centralized functional design in which an upper brain stem system organized for conscious function performs a penultimate step in action control. This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an expanding forebrain - culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals - came to serve as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07000891",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x07000891",
    openalex = "W2095596789",
    references = "doi1010079783642182624, doi1010160166432888900721, doi101046j14697580200119910085x, doi101073pnas0608062103, doi101073pnas101086398, doi101093aesa283408, doi10111911934936, doi1023073223017"
}

The aim of this research was to complement and advance Wilber's integral approach through an investigation into ancestral consciousness by the Zulu. Five isiZulu home language speakers (age range 33 to 56 years) and a sixth English speaking person were participant-researchers. Experiences of ancestral consciousness from individual, collective, subjective, objective, cultural and social perspectives were explored. Findings suggested that ancestral consciousness increased perceived spirituality as assessed on a standardized spirituality scale. It was also associated with immediate apprehensions of senior kinsmen, living and dead, of God and/or more generally of Spirit. Wilber's integral approach appears to hold explanatory value in non-Western culture.

@article{doi10108014330237201110820439,
    author = "Edwards, Stephen D. and Thwala, Jabulani D. and Mbele, Pricilla B. and Siyaya, Vusi and Ndlazi, Nozipho and Magwaza, Ntombintombi Judith",
    title = "Ancestral Consciousness in the Zulu Culture: A Wilberian View",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Journal of Psychology in Africa",
    abstract = "The aim of this research was to complement and advance Wilber's integral approach through an investigation into ancestral consciousness by the Zulu. Five isiZulu home language speakers (age range 33 to 56 years) and a sixth English speaking person were participant-researchers. Experiences of ancestral consciousness from individual, collective, subjective, objective, cultural and social perspectives were explored. Findings suggested that ancestral consciousness increased perceived spirituality as assessed on a standardized spirituality scale. It was also associated with immediate apprehensions of senior kinsmen, living and dead, of God and/or more generally of Spirit. Wilber's integral approach appears to hold explanatory value in non-Western culture.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/14330237.2011.10820439",
    doi = "10.1080/14330237.2011.10820439",
    openalex = "W2246566476",
    references = "doi10108000401706199410485859, doi1011770898010105276180, doi1012019781317952268, doi1023071581169, doi102307221497, doi1041359781483326030, doi10432497802034276068, doi105860choice331474, openalexw2036343883, openalexw651164138"
}

This article discusses concepts from traditional beliefs in ancestral spirits as therapeutic behavior change agents. Specifically, it examines ancestral consciousness in relation to attachment theory and its application in conventional counselling. A case illustration is discussed to show the potential incremental value of addressing ancestral consciousness in counselling people of African ancestry.

@article{doi10108014330237201110820471,
    author = "Bojuwoye, Olaniyi and Edwards, Steve",
    title = "Integrating Ancestral Consciousness into Conventional Counselling",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Journal of Psychology in Africa",
    abstract = "This article discusses concepts from traditional beliefs in ancestral spirits as therapeutic behavior change agents. Specifically, it examines ancestral consciousness in relation to attachment theory and its application in conventional counselling. A case illustration is discussed to show the potential incremental value of addressing ancestral consciousness in counselling people of African ancestry.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/14330237.2011.10820471",
    doi = "10.1080/14330237.2011.10820471",
    openalex = "W1544171169",
    references = "doi101001jama199303510010107047, doi1010370003066x442112, doi10108014330237201110820439, doi101207s15327965pli05011, doi102307351282, doi105860choice371841, openalexw1522489207, openalexw1720881856, openalexw1796738135, openalexw3158829169"
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This article discusses the traditional beliefs, of many indigenous cultures of Africa, associated with ancestral spirits and its use as powerful therapeutic agent for \ninfluencing behavior or lifestyle changes. Explanatory models of attachment to ancestral spirits by living descendants are first discussed, followed by a discussion on major factors responsible for real sense experience of ancestral spirits. Special emphasis of the paper is on the employment of exemplary behavior or status of dead relative, during their lifetime, for influencing different aspects of life of living descendants including lifestyle and career choices. Also featured in the paper are the drawing of significant parallels between traditional and Western psychotherapeutic practices and suggestions as to how to incorporate ancestral spirits belief into conventional counselling and psychotherapy.

@article{openalexw1538547885,
    author = "Bojuwoye, Olaniyi",
    title = "Integrating principles underlying ancestral spirits belief in counseling and psychotherapy",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "UWC Research Repository (University of the Western Cape)",
    abstract = "This article discusses the traditional beliefs, of many indigenous cultures of Africa, associated with ancestral spirits and its use as powerful therapeutic agent for \ninfluencing behavior or lifestyle changes. Explanatory models of attachment to ancestral spirits by living descendants are first discussed, followed by a discussion on major factors responsible for real sense experience of ancestral spirits. Special emphasis of the paper is on the employment of exemplary behavior or status of dead relative, during their lifetime, for influencing different aspects of life of living descendants including lifestyle and career choices. Also featured in the paper are the drawing of significant parallels between traditional and Western psychotherapeutic practices and suggestions as to how to incorporate ancestral spirits belief into conventional counselling and psychotherapy.",
    openalex = "W1538547885",
    references = "doi10108014330237201110820439, doi10108014330237201110820471"
}

Conscious experience can be treated as a complex unified whole, but to do so is problematic from an evolutionary perspective if, like other products of evolution, consciousness had simple beginnings, and achieved complexity only secondarily over an extended period of time as new categories of subjective experience were added and refined. The premise here is twofold, first that these simple beginnings can be investigated regardless of whether the ultimate source of subjective experience is known or understood, and second, that of the contents known to us, the most accessible for investigation will be those that are, or appear, most fundamental, in the sense that they resist further deconstruction or analysis. This would include qualia as they are usually defined, but excludes more complex experiences (here, formats) that are structured, or depend on algorithmic processes and/or memory. Vision and language for example, would by this definition be formats. More formally, qualia, but not formats, can be represented as points, lines, or curves on a topological experience space, and as domains in a configuration space representing a subset of neural correlates of consciousness, the selector circuits (SCs), responsible for ensuring that a particular experience is evoked rather than some other. It is a matter of conjecture how points in SC-space map to experience space, but both will exhibit divergence, insuring that a minimal distance separates points in experience space representing different qualia and the SCs that evoke them. An analysis of how SCs evolve over time is used to highlight the importance of understanding patterns of descent among putative qualia, i.e., their homology across species, and whether this implies descent from an ancestral experience, or ur-quale, that combines modes of experience that later came to be experienced separately. The analysis also provides insight into the function of consciousness as viewed from an evolutionary perspective, defined here in terms of the access it allows to regions of SC-space that would otherwise be unavailable to real brains, to produce consciously controlled behaviors that could otherwise not occur.

@article{doi103389fnsys2021697129,
    author = "Lacalli, Thurston C.",
    title = "Consciousness as a Product of Evolution: Contents, Selector Circuits, and Trajectories in Experience Space",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience",
    abstract = "Conscious experience can be treated as a complex unified whole, but to do so is problematic from an evolutionary perspective if, like other products of evolution, consciousness had simple beginnings, and achieved complexity only secondarily over an extended period of time as new categories of subjective experience were added and refined. The premise here is twofold, first that these simple beginnings can be investigated regardless of whether the ultimate source of subjective experience is known or understood, and second, that of the contents known to us, the most accessible for investigation will be those that are, or appear, most fundamental, in the sense that they resist further deconstruction or analysis. This would include qualia as they are usually defined, but excludes more complex experiences (here, formats) that are structured, or depend on algorithmic processes and/or memory. Vision and language for example, would by this definition be formats. More formally, qualia, but not formats, can be represented as points, lines, or curves on a topological experience space, and as domains in a configuration space representing a subset of neural correlates of consciousness, the selector circuits (SCs), responsible for ensuring that a particular experience is evoked rather than some other. It is a matter of conjecture how points in SC-space map to experience space, but both will exhibit divergence, insuring that a minimal distance separates points in experience space representing different qualia and the SCs that evoke them. An analysis of how SCs evolve over time is used to highlight the importance of understanding patterns of descent among putative qualia, i.e., their homology across species, and whether this implies descent from an ancestral experience, or ur-quale, that combines modes of experience that later came to be experienced separately. The analysis also provides insight into the function of consciousness as viewed from an evolutionary perspective, defined here in terms of the access it allows to regions of SC-space that would otherwise be unavailable to real brains, to produce consciously controlled behaviors that could otherwise not occur.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2021.697129",
    doi = "10.3389/fnsys.2021.697129",
    openalex = "W3210815168",
    references = "doi101016jcognition200408004, doi101016jneunet201409003, doi101016jtics200412006, doi101016s0010027700001232, doi101017s0140525x00038188, doi101017s0140525x07000891, doi101093acprofoso97801982701260010001, doi101162necoa01199, doi101371journalpcbi1003588, doi107551mitpress67120010001"
}

is historical, in being lodged firmly in past evolutionary events. The prospects for a further extension of Turing's ideas to the complexities of brain development and consciousness is discussed, where a case can be made that it could well be in neuroscience that his ideas find their most important application.

@article{doi103389fcell2022871950,
    author = "Lacalli, Thurston C.",
    title = "Patterning, From Conifers to Consciousness: Turing’s Theory and Order From Fluctuations",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "Frontiers in Cell and Developmental Biology",
    abstract = "is historical, in being lodged firmly in past evolutionary events. The prospects for a further extension of Turing's ideas to the complexities of brain development and consciousness is discussed, where a case can be made that it could well be in neuroscience that his ideas find their most important application.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3389/fcell.2022.871950",
    doi = "10.3389/fcell.2022.871950",
    openalex = "W4225396488",
    references = "doi103389fnsys2021697129"
}

Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness "machine" is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.

@article{doi103389fpsyg20231196576,
    author = "Lacalli, Thurston C.",
    title = "Consciousness and its hard problems: separating the ontological from the evolutionary",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Frontiers in Psychology",
    abstract = {Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness "machine" is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576",
    doi = "10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576",
    openalex = "W4383533418",
    references = "doi103389fnsys2021697129"
}

Accepting the ancestral calling to healing and undergoing the training to become a traditional healer in southern Africa is seen as a process of identity formation which is constructed by the knowledge acquired throughout the process. The researcher embarked on a journey with traditional health practitioners to understand their lived experiences and explored the psychological meanings of Vhavenḓa ancestral calling with a view to identifying and documenting the psychological meanings embedded in this culturally entrenched practice. A qualitative research method located within the interpretative paradigm was used. A descriptive phenomenological research design was adopted to explore the lived experiences of traditional health practitioners who have gone through the process of ancestral calling. Both snowball and purposive sampling methods were used to recruit 17 participants until saturation was researched in the findings. The findings of the study revealed that there are several symptoms that are indicative that one has an ancestral calling. These symptoms are often misunderstood and misdiagnosed when interpreted from the Western and Eurocentric perspectives. However, accepting the ancestral calling and going through training is linked with identity formation. The findings also revealed that ancestral calling is a life-transforming and therapeutic experience and a journey of self-realisation.

@article{doi1046222pharosjot10411,
    author = "Sigida, Salome Thilivhali and Sodi, Tholene",
    title = "Ancestral calling as identity and the rite of passage: The case of Vhavenḓa indigenous healers",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Pharos Journal of Theology",
    abstract = "Accepting the ancestral calling to healing and undergoing the training to become a traditional healer in southern Africa is seen as a process of identity formation which is constructed by the knowledge acquired throughout the process. The researcher embarked on a journey with traditional health practitioners to understand their lived experiences and explored the psychological meanings of Vhavenḓa ancestral calling with a view to identifying and documenting the psychological meanings embedded in this culturally entrenched practice. A qualitative research method located within the interpretative paradigm was used. A descriptive phenomenological research design was adopted to explore the lived experiences of traditional health practitioners who have gone through the process of ancestral calling. Both snowball and purposive sampling methods were used to recruit 17 participants until saturation was researched in the findings. The findings of the study revealed that there are several symptoms that are indicative that one has an ancestral calling. These symptoms are often misunderstood and misdiagnosed when interpreted from the Western and Eurocentric perspectives. However, accepting the ancestral calling and going through training is linked with identity formation. The findings also revealed that ancestral calling is a life-transforming and therapeutic experience and a journey of self-realisation.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.46222/pharosjot.10411",
    doi = "10.46222/pharosjot.10411",
    openalex = "W4313560057",
    references = "doi10108014330237201110820466"
}

@article{doi101007s13752024004744,
    author = "Domínguez, Asier Arias",
    title = "Ancient Inner Feelings: Interoceptive Insights into the Evolution of Consciousness",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Biological Theory",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-024-00474-4",
    doi = "10.1007/s13752-024-00474-4",
    openalex = "W4403604774",
    references = "doi103389fnsys2021697129"
}

The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the time scale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real-time. But neither answers Velmans' question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velmans' question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary time scale.

@article{doi103389fpsyg20241493423,
    author = "Lacalli, Thurston C.",
    title = "The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Frontiers in Psychology",
    abstract = "The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the time scale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real-time. But neither answers Velmans' question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velmans' question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary time scale.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423",
    doi = "10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423",
    openalex = "W4404730186",
    references = "doi103389fnsys2021697129"
}