Design argument

@article{anderson1935design1,
    author = "Anderson, J",
    title = "Design",
    year = "1935",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. XIII, p. 241- 256",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Anderson, J., 1935, Design: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. XIII, p. 241- 256.}"
}

@misc{obriant1966a5,
    author = "O'Briant, W. H",
    title = "A new argument from design?",
    year = "1966",
    howpublished = "Sophia, v. V, p. 30-34",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {O'Briant, W. H., 1966, A new argument from design?: Sophia, v. V, p. 30-34.}"
}

The object of this paper is to show that there are no valid formal objections to the argument from design, so long as the argument is articulated with sufficient care. In particular I wish to analyse Hume's attack on the argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and to show that none of the formal objections made therein by Philo have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument.

@article{doi101017s0031819100009189,
    author = "Swinburne, Richard",
    title = "The Argument from Design",
    year = "1968",
    journal = "Philosophy",
    abstract = "The object of this paper is to show that there are no valid formal objections to the argument from design, so long as the argument is articulated with sufficient care. In particular I wish to analyse Hume's attack on the argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and to show that none of the formal objections made therein by Philo have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100009189",
    doi = "10.1017/s0031819100009189",
    openalex = "W2115596407",
    references = "doi101093oseoinstance00044084, doi102307jctvpj759p11"
}

@misc{swinburne1968the8,
    author = "Swinburne, R. G",
    title = "The Argument From Design",
    year = "1968",
    howpublished = "Philosophy, v. XXXXIII, p. 202-215",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Swinburne, R. G., 1968, The Argument From Design: Philosophy, v. XXXXIII, p. 202-215.}"
}

Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how these militate against its general plausibility.

@article{doi101017s003441250000041x,
    author = "Olding, A.",
    title = "The Argument from Design—a Reply to R. G. Swinburne",
    year = "1971",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how these militate against its general plausibility.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s003441250000041x",
    doi = "10.1017/s003441250000041x",
    openalex = "W2132766721",
    references = "doi1010029781119414384ch1, doi101017s0031819100009189, doi10103711914000, doi1023072182481"
}

Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how these militate against its general plausibility.

@article{olding1971the,
    author = "Olding, A.",
    title = "The Argument from Design—a Reply to R. G. Swinburne",
    year = "1971",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how these militate against its general plausibility.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s003441250000041x",
    doi = "10.1017/s003441250000041x",
    number = "4",
    openalex = "W2132766721",
    pages = "361-373",
    volume = "7",
    references = "doi1010029781119414384ch1, doi101017s0031819100009189, doi10103711914000, doi1023072182481"
}

@misc{olding1971the6,
    author = "Olding, A",
    title = "The Argument From Design - A Reply to R.G. Swinburne",
    year = "1971",
    howpublished = "Religious Studies, v. VII, p. 361-373",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Olding, A., 1971, The Argument From Design - A Reply to R.G. Swinburne: Religious Studies, v. VII, p. 361-373.}"
}

@article{cohen1972a,
    author = "COHEN, L. J.",
    title = "A REPLY TO SWINBURNE",
    year = "1972",
    journal = "Mind",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/lxxxi.322.249",
    doi = "10.1093/mind/lxxxi.322.249",
    number = "322",
    openalex = "W2157926712",
    pages = "249-250",
    volume = "LXXXI"
}

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence (spatial order) and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession (temporal order). I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. (We explain the gas laws by Newton's laws.) The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (When an agent brings about E ‘for its own sake’, E will be the same as G.)

@article{doi101017s0034412500005874,
    author = "Swinburne, Richard",
    title = "The Argument from Design—a Defence",
    year = "1972",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence (spatial order) and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession (temporal order). I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. (We explain the gas laws by Newton's laws.) The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (When an agent brings about E ‘for its own sake’, E will be the same as G.)",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005874",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412500005874",
    openalex = "W2153373521",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511621253006, doi101017s0031819100009189, doi101017s003441250000041x, doi101017s0034412500003991, doi101093oseoinstance00044084, doi101111j146801491970tb00067x, doi1023072217667, olding1971the"
}

@misc{glass1973taylors4,
    author = "Glass, R. J",
    title = "Taylor's Argument From Design",
    year = "1973",
    howpublished = "The Personalist, v. LIV, p. 94-99",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Glass, R. J., 1973, Taylor's Argument From Design: The Personalist, v. LIV, p. 94-99.}"
}

@misc{olding1973design7,
    author = "Olding, A",
    title = "Design - A Further Reply to R.G. Swinburne",
    year = "1973",
    howpublished = "Religious Studies, v. IX, p. 229-232",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Olding, A., 1973, Design - A Further Reply to R.G. Swinburne: Religious Studies, v. IX, p. 229-232.}"
}

@article{olding1973designa,
    author = "Olding, A.",
    title = "Design—A Further Reply to R. G. Swinburne",
    year = "1973",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500006624",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412500006624",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2100949732",
    pages = "229-232",
    volume = "9"
}

In an article in Philosophy (1968, pp. 199–211) R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument’ (p. 199). This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ (p. 206). The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding 1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body (or the material universe within his reach) as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim, that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years.

@article{doi101017s0034412500009422,
    author = "Gaskin, J. C. A.",
    title = "The Design Argument: Hume's Critique of Poor Reason",
    year = "1976",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "In an article in Philosophy (1968, pp. 199–211) R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument’ (p. 199). This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ (p. 206). The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding 1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body (or the material universe within his reach) as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim, that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500009422",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412500009422",
    openalex = "W2033720017",
    references = "doi101017s0031819100009189, doi101017s003441250000041x, doi101017s0034412500005874, doi101093owc97801995499000010001, olding1971the, olding1973designa, openalexw2798356456"
}

@misc{gaskin1976the3,
    author = "Gaskin, J. C. A",
    title = "The Design Argument",
    year = "1976",
    howpublished = "Hume's Critique of Poor Reason: Religious Studies, v. XII, p. 332-345",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Gaskin, J. C. A., 1976, The Design Argument: Hume's Critique of Poor Reason: Religious Studies, v. XII, p. 332-345.}"
}

I. The argument from design or ‘teleological argument’ purports to be an inductive proof for the existence of God, proceeding from the evidence of the order exhibited by natural phenomena to the probable conclusion of a rational agent responsible for producing that order. The argument was severely criticized by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and it was widely conceded that Hume's objections had cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the teleological argument, if not destroyed its credibility entirely. However, there has been a recent reappraisal of this claim by R. G. Swinburne, who maintains that none of Hume's criticisms have any validity against a ‘carefully articulated version of the argument’. Using an analogical argument based on temporal regularities rather than on spatial regularities (or arrangement of parts), Swinburne claims to have shown that the teleological argument is a legitimate inference to the best explanation whose force depends only on the strength of the analogy and on the degree to which the resulting theory makes explanation of empirical matters simpler and more coherent. Moreover, he claims to have shown that the argument provides support for the Christian monotheistic hypothesis and not merely for the weak claim that the universe was designed (somehow). This is an important claim since it has long been thought that Hume's most devastating blow was dealt when he showed that the teleological argument (if it is admitted to have any force at all) provides just as much support for the negation of certain propositions considered essential to Christian monotheism as it does for their affirmation.

@article{doi101017s0034412500012130,
    author = "Doore, Gary",
    title = "The Argument From Design: Some Better Reasons for Agreeing with Hume",
    year = "1980",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "I. The argument from design or ‘teleological argument’ purports to be an inductive proof for the existence of God, proceeding from the evidence of the order exhibited by natural phenomena to the probable conclusion of a rational agent responsible for producing that order. The argument was severely criticized by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and it was widely conceded that Hume's objections had cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the teleological argument, if not destroyed its credibility entirely. However, there has been a recent reappraisal of this claim by R. G. Swinburne, who maintains that none of Hume's criticisms have any validity against a ‘carefully articulated version of the argument’. Using an analogical argument based on temporal regularities rather than on spatial regularities (or arrangement of parts), Swinburne claims to have shown that the teleological argument is a legitimate inference to the best explanation whose force depends only on the strength of the analogy and on the degree to which the resulting theory makes explanation of empirical matters simpler and more coherent. Moreover, he claims to have shown that the argument provides support for the Christian monotheistic hypothesis and not merely for the weak claim that the universe was designed (somehow). This is an important claim since it has long been thought that Hume's most devastating blow was dealt when he showed that the teleological argument (if it is admitted to have any force at all) provides just as much support for the negation of certain propositions considered essential to Christian monotheism as it does for their affirmation.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500012130",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412500012130",
    openalex = "W2161347657",
    references = "doi101017s0031819100009189, doi101017s003441250000041x, doi101017s0034412500005874, doi101017s0034412500009422, doi101093oseoinstance00044084, doi101093owc97801995499000010001, doi101111j146801491962tb01316x, doi1023072105412, doi102307jctvpj759p11, doi105840newscholas195832239, olding1971the, openalexw2799177124"
}

@misc{doore1980the2,
    author = "Doore, G",
    title = "The argument from design",
    year = "1980",
    howpublished = "Some better reasons for agreeing with Hume: Religious Studies, v. XVI, p. 142-158",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Doore, G., 1980, The argument from design: Some better reasons for agreeing with Hume: Religious Studies, v. XVI, p. 142-158.}"
}

@incollection{doi10100797894009630093,
    author = "Dore, Clement",
    title = "The Design Argument",
    year = "1984",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6300-9\_3",
    doi = "10.1007/978-94-009-6300-9\_3",
    openalex = "W2262189101",
    references = "doi101017s0034412500012130"
}

The recent outpouring of literature on the problem of evil has materially advanced the subject in several ways. In particular, a clear distinction has been made between the argument against the existence of God (atheological argument) from evil, which attempts to show that evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God, and the (empirical, probabilistic) argument, which contents itself with the claim that evil constitutes (sufficient) empirical evidence against the existence of God. It is now acknowledged on (almost) all sides that the logical argument is bankrupt, but the inductive argument is still very much alive and kicking. In this paper I will be concerned with the inductive argument. More specifically, I shall be contributing to a certain criticism of that argument, one based on a low estimate of human cognitive capacities in a certain application. To indicate the point at which this criticism engages the argument, I shall use one of the most careful and perspicuous formulations of the argument in a recent essay by William Rowe (1979).

@article{doi1023072214090,
    author = "Alston, William P.",
    title = "The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition",
    year = "1991",
    journal = "Philosophical Perspectives",
    abstract = "The recent outpouring of literature on the problem of evil has materially advanced the subject in several ways. In particular, a clear distinction has been made between the argument against the existence of God (atheological argument) from evil, which attempts to show that evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God, and the (empirical, probabilistic) argument, which contents itself with the claim that evil constitutes (sufficient) empirical evidence against the existence of God. It is now acknowledged on (almost) all sides that the logical argument is bankrupt, but the inductive argument is still very much alive and kicking. In this paper I will be concerned with the inductive argument. More specifically, I shall be contributing to a certain criticism of that argument, one based on a low estimate of human cognitive capacities in a certain application. To indicate the point at which this criticism engages the argument, I shall use one of the most careful and perspicuous formulations of the argument in a recent essay by William Rowe (1979).",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2214090",
    doi = "10.2307/2214090",
    openalex = "W1967923855",
    references = "doi1010579780230283961"
}

The Thomist 62 (1998): 1-39 MUST JOB LIVE FOREVER? A REPLY TO AQUINAS ON PROVIDENCE TIMOTHY P. JACKSON Emory University Atlanta, Georgia INTRODUCTION IF GOD IS SO GOOD, why isn't God's creation more so?" This is the problem of evil in nuce, and it trades on the fear that perhaps God is not so good after all-indeed, that God may not exist. To assuage this fear we moderns cast about for either (a) convincing empirical evidence of God's real benevolence or (b) imaginative scenarios in which God and evil are logically compossible. Finding (a) would suggest that we are rationally justified, if not compelled, in believing in God's goodness (a theodicy proper), while finding (b) would suggest that we are not necessarily unjustified in doing so (a more modest defense of religious faith). 1 In contrast to us with our post-Enlightenment concerns, Thomas Aquinas is not centrally occupied with the problem of evil. As we will see, this is true even in Thomas's Expositio super Job ad litteram, the place where theodicy questions would seem most pressing.2 This does not mean that Thomas is oblivious to 1 I take the distinction between a theodicy proper and a defense of faith from Terrence Tilley, The Evils ofTheodicy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991), 130-33. 2 As Eleonore Stump has noted, the story of innocent Job, horribly afflicted with undeserved suffering, seems to many people representative of the kind of evil with which any theodicy must come to grips. But Aquinas sees the problem in the book of Job differently. He seems not to recognize that suffering in the world, of the quantity and quality of Job's, calls into question God's goodness, let 1 2 TIMOTHY P. JACKSON the relevant issues, for he is clearly aware of the apparent incompatibility of worldly evils and an all-good God (see STh I, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1).3 But the vector of his commentary runs in the opposite direction from that of most modern theodicists: again, moderns tend to reason from the world even with its palpable evil to a real (or at least possible) God, whereas Thomas tends to reason from a palpable God to a defeated (or at least eschatologically defeasible) evil.4 Just as Thomas is aware of the argument from design in the world to the existence of God (the fifth of the "five ways" in STh I, q. 2, a. 3) yet focuses more on the argument to design from the existence of God,5 so he is aware of the argument from the defeasibility of evil but focuses more on the argument to the defeasibility of evil. One can overdraw the contrast here, but first of all and most of the time Aquinas begins with trust in God's providence and asks what follows with respect to the nature and final disposition of evil. Aquinas's concern is not so much with "intellectual obstacles" to justified belief in God as with practical obstacles to the profitable contemplation of God.6 His primary alone God's existence. Instead Aquinas understands the book as an attempt to come to grips with the nature and operations of divine providence. (Stump, "Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job," inReasonedFaith [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993], 333) 3 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981); all of my subsequent references to and quotations from the Summa rely on this five-volume edition. 4 I call evil "defeasible" if it can be shown by argument (either a priori or a posteriori) not to underminethe overall goodness of human lives, either individually or collectively. Present-day theists tend to argue from the defeasibility of evil to the (possible) existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God who created and governs those lives (cf. Richard Swinburne); atheists and agnostics tend to argue from the indefeasibility of evil to the (probable) nonexistence of such a God (cf. J. L. Mackie and William Rowe); Aquinas, in contrast, tends to argue from the reality of God's eternal love and providential power to the...

@article{doi101353tho19980040,
    author = "Jackson, Timothy P.",
    title = "Must Job Live Forever?: A Reply to Aquinas on Providence",
    year = "1998",
    journal = "The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review",
    abstract = {The Thomist 62 (1998): 1-39 MUST JOB LIVE FOREVER? A REPLY TO AQUINAS ON PROVIDENCE TIMOTHY P. JACKSON Emory University Atlanta, Georgia INTRODUCTION IF GOD IS SO GOOD, why isn't God's creation more so?" This is the problem of evil in nuce, and it trades on the fear that perhaps God is not so good after all-indeed, that God may not exist. To assuage this fear we moderns cast about for either (a) convincing empirical evidence of God's real benevolence or (b) imaginative scenarios in which God and evil are logically compossible. Finding (a) would suggest that we are rationally justified, if not compelled, in believing in God's goodness (a theodicy proper), while finding (b) would suggest that we are not necessarily unjustified in doing so (a more modest defense of religious faith). 1 In contrast to us with our post-Enlightenment concerns, Thomas Aquinas is not centrally occupied with the problem of evil. As we will see, this is true even in Thomas's Expositio super Job ad litteram, the place where theodicy questions would seem most pressing.2 This does not mean that Thomas is oblivious to 1 I take the distinction between a theodicy proper and a defense of faith from Terrence Tilley, The Evils ofTheodicy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991), 130-33. 2 As Eleonore Stump has noted, the story of innocent Job, horribly afflicted with undeserved suffering, seems to many people representative of the kind of evil with which any theodicy must come to grips. But Aquinas sees the problem in the book of Job differently. He seems not to recognize that suffering in the world, of the quantity and quality of Job's, calls into question God's goodness, let 1 2 TIMOTHY P. JACKSON the relevant issues, for he is clearly aware of the apparent incompatibility of worldly evils and an all-good God (see STh I, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1).3 But the vector of his commentary runs in the opposite direction from that of most modern theodicists: again, moderns tend to reason from the world even with its palpable evil to a real (or at least possible) God, whereas Thomas tends to reason from a palpable God to a defeated (or at least eschatologically defeasible) evil.4 Just as Thomas is aware of the argument from design in the world to the existence of God (the fifth of the "five ways" in STh I, q. 2, a. 3) yet focuses more on the argument to design from the existence of God,5 so he is aware of the argument from the defeasibility of evil but focuses more on the argument to the defeasibility of evil. One can overdraw the contrast here, but first of all and most of the time Aquinas begins with trust in God's providence and asks what follows with respect to the nature and final disposition of evil. Aquinas's concern is not so much with "intellectual obstacles" to justified belief in God as with practical obstacles to the profitable contemplation of God.6 His primary alone God's existence. Instead Aquinas understands the book as an attempt to come to grips with the nature and operations of divine providence. (Stump, "Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job," inReasonedFaith [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993], 333) 3 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981); all of my subsequent references to and quotations from the Summa rely on this five-volume edition. 4 I call evil "defeasible" if it can be shown by argument (either a priori or a posteriori) not to underminethe overall goodness of human lives, either individually or collectively. Present-day theists tend to argue from the defeasibility of evil to the (possible) existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God who created and governs those lives (cf. Richard Swinburne); atheists and agnostics tend to argue from the indefeasibility of evil to the (probable) nonexistence of such a God (cf. J. L. Mackie and William Rowe); Aquinas, in contrast, tends to argue from the reality of God's eternal love and providential power to the...},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.1998.0040",
    doi = "10.1353/tho.1998.0040",
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}

First, my thanks to Richard Swinburne for his probing and thoughtful review of my book Warranted Christian Belief (WCB). His account of the book's mainline of argument is accurate as far as it goes; it does contain an important lacuna, however. The focus of the book is twofold; it is aimed in two directions. First, just as Swinburne says, I argue that there are no plausible de iure objections to Christian belief that are independent of de facto objections; any plausible objection to the rationality of Christian belief, or to its warrant (the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), or its justification, will either be obviously mistaken or will (as with Freud, and Marx and a thousand others) presuppose one or more de facto objections. This is intended as a contribution to apologetics; it is important, because many or most objections to Christian belief are of just the sort I attempt to discredit. (‘I don't know whether Christian belief is true or not – who could know a thing like that? – but I do know that it is irrational, or unwarranted, or not rationally justified, or…’.) Second (and this is the focus Swinburne fails to mention), I proposed the extended A/C (Aquinas/Calvin) model as, from the perspective of Christian belief, a plausible account of the way in which Christian belief is, in fact, justified, rational and warranted. So the book is aimed in two directions: first towards readers generally, whether Christian believers or not, and second towards Christian believers.

@article{plantinga2001rationality,
    author = "PLANTINGA, ALVIN",
    title = "Rationality and public evidence: a reply to Richard Swinburne",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "First, my thanks to Richard Swinburne for his probing and thoughtful review of my book Warranted Christian Belief (WCB). His account of the book's mainline of argument is accurate as far as it goes; it does contain an important lacuna, however. The focus of the book is twofold; it is aimed in two directions. First, just as Swinburne says, I argue that there are no plausible de iure objections to Christian belief that are independent of de facto objections; any plausible objection to the rationality of Christian belief, or to its warrant (the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), or its justification, will either be obviously mistaken or will (as with Freud, and Marx and a thousand others) presuppose one or more de facto objections. This is intended as a contribution to apologetics; it is important, because many or most objections to Christian belief are of just the sort I attempt to discredit. (‘I don't know whether Christian belief is true or not – who could know a thing like that? – but I do know that it is irrational, or unwarranted, or not rationally justified, or…’.) Second (and this is the focus Swinburne fails to mention), I proposed the extended A/C (Aquinas/Calvin) model as, from the perspective of Christian belief, a plausible account of the way in which Christian belief is, in fact, justified, rational and warranted. So the book is aimed in two directions: first towards readers generally, whether Christian believers or not, and second towards Christian believers.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412501005613",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412501005613",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2170102080",
    pages = "215-222",
    volume = "37"
}

This paper considers the Bayesian form of the fine-tuning argument as advanced by Richard Swinburne. An expository section aims to identify the precise character of the argument, and three lines of objection are then advanced. The first of these holds that there is an inconsistency in Swinburne's procedure, the second that his argument has an unacceptable dependence on an objectivist theory of value, the third that his method is powerless to single out traditional theism from a vast number of competitors. In the final section of the paper the fine-tuning argument is considered, not now as self-standing, but as one of a number of theistic arguments taken together and applied in the manner of the final chapter of Swinburne's The Existence of God. It is argued that points already made also block the way for this line of thought.

@article{doi101017s0034412502006212,
    author = "BRADLEY, M. C.",
    title = "The fine-tuning argument: the Bayesian version",
    year = "2002",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "This paper considers the Bayesian form of the fine-tuning argument as advanced by Richard Swinburne. An expository section aims to identify the precise character of the argument, and three lines of objection are then advanced. The first of these holds that there is an inconsistency in Swinburne's procedure, the second that his argument has an unacceptable dependence on an objectivist theory of value, the third that his method is powerless to single out traditional theism from a vast number of competitors. In the final section of the paper the fine-tuning argument is considered, not now as self-standing, but as one of a number of theistic arguments taken together and applied in the manner of the final chapter of Swinburne's The Existence of God. It is argued that points already made also block the way for this line of thought.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412502006212",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412502006212",
    openalex = "W2040799464",
    references = "doi101017s0034412500012130"
}

Like Richard Norman, Nick Bostrom is also unconvinced by Swinburne's two arguments from design (from issue one).

@article{bostrom2003reasons,
    author = "Bostrom, Nick",
    title = "Reasons for doubting design: Response to Swinburne",
    year = "2003",
    journal = "Think",
    abstract = "Like Richard Norman, Nick Bostrom is also unconvinced by Swinburne's two arguments from design (from issue one).",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s1477175600000610",
    doi = "10.1017/s1477175600000610",
    number = "4",
    openalex = "W2122432158",
    pages = "43-50",
    volume = "2"
}

@incollection{crossref2003the,
    title = "The Nobel Laureates in Medicine (1901 - 2001)",
    year = "2003",
    booktitle = "A Century of Nobel Prize Recipients",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1201/9780203014189.ch3",
    doi = "10.1201/9780203014189.ch3"
}

@article{armstrong2006reply,
    author = "Armstrong, D. M.",
    title = "Reply to Swinburne",
    year = "2006",
    journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400600758961",
    doi = "10.1080/00048400600758961",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2001223202",
    pages = "191-192",
    volume = "84"
}

Peter Millican thinks that his objection is more powerful than any other because it does not dispute contentious 'deep philosophical theories' that underlie the argument. Instead, it tries to reveal the 'fatal flaw' of the argument by considering its 'shallow logical details'. Millican's objection is based on his interpretation of the argument, according to which Anselm relies on what I call the 'principle of the superiority of existence' (PSE). I argue that (i) the textual evidence Millican cites does not provide a convincing case that Anselm relies on PSE and that, moreover, (ii) Anselm does not even need PSE for the ontological argument. I introduce a plausible interpretation of the ontological argument that is not vulnerable to Millican's objection and conclude that even if the ontological argument fails, it does not fail in the way Millican thinks it does.

@article{doi101093mindfzm1027,
    author = "Nagasawa, Yujin",
    title = "Millican on the Ontological Argument",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Mind",
    abstract = "Peter Millican thinks that his objection is more powerful than any other because it does not dispute contentious 'deep philosophical theories' that underlie the argument. Instead, it tries to reveal the 'fatal flaw' of the argument by considering its 'shallow logical details'. Millican's objection is based on his interpretation of the argument, according to which Anselm relies on what I call the 'principle of the superiority of existence' (PSE). I argue that (i) the textual evidence Millican cites does not provide a convincing case that Anselm relies on PSE and that, moreover, (ii) Anselm does not even need PSE for the ontological argument. I introduce a plausible interpretation of the ontological argument that is not vulnerable to Millican's objection and conclude that even if the ontological argument fails, it does not fail in the way Millican thinks it does.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm1027",
    doi = "10.1093/mind/fzm1027",
    openalex = "W2014645994",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511498978"
}

Abstract Bayne and Nagasawa have argued that the properties traditionally attributed to God provide an insufficient grounding for the obligation to worship God. They do so partly because the same properties, when possessed in lesser quantities by human beings, do not give rise to similar obligations. In a recent paper, Jeremy Gwiazda challenges this line of argument. He does so because it neglects the possible existence of a threshold obligation to worship, i.e. an obligation that only kicks in when the value of a parameter has crossed a certain threshold. This article argues that there is a serious flaw in Gwiazda's proposal. Although thresholds may play an important part in how we think about our obligations, their function is distinct from that envisaged by Gwiazda. To be precise, this article argues that thresholds are only relevant to obligations to the extent that they transform a pre-existing imperfect obligation or act of supererogation into a perfect obligation. Since it is not clear that there is an imperfect obligation to worship any being, and indeed since on a certain conception of moral agency it is highly unlikely that there could be, the search for a rational basis for the obligation to worship must continue.

@article{doi101017s0034412512000029,
    author = "Danaher, John",
    title = "Stumbling on the threshold: a reply to Gwiazda on threshold obligations",
    year = "2012",
    journal = "Religious Studies",
    abstract = "Abstract Bayne and Nagasawa have argued that the properties traditionally attributed to God provide an insufficient grounding for the obligation to worship God. They do so partly because the same properties, when possessed in lesser quantities by human beings, do not give rise to similar obligations. In a recent paper, Jeremy Gwiazda challenges this line of argument. He does so because it neglects the possible existence of a threshold obligation to worship, i.e. an obligation that only kicks in when the value of a parameter has crossed a certain threshold. This article argues that there is a serious flaw in Gwiazda's proposal. Although thresholds may play an important part in how we think about our obligations, their function is distinct from that envisaged by Gwiazda. To be precise, this article argues that thresholds are only relevant to obligations to the extent that they transform a pre-existing imperfect obligation or act of supererogation into a perfect obligation. Since it is not clear that there is an imperfect obligation to worship any being, and indeed since on a certain conception of moral agency it is highly unlikely that there could be, the search for a rational basis for the obligation to worship must continue.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412512000029",
    doi = "10.1017/s0034412512000029",
    openalex = "W2020380319",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511498978"
}

Este artigo tem como objetivo responder até que ponto a proposta de justificação teísta apresentada por Richard Swinburne responde as críticas de Hume e Kant quanto à possibilidade de fundamentação racional da crença na existência de Deus. Para isso, a seguinte metodologia será adotada: em primeiro lugar, serão apresentadas as objeções dos dois autores citados; em seguida, terá lugar uma exposição das respostas de Swinburne, com ênfase em aspectos específicos da sua versão do argumento teleológico e no princípio da simplicidade adotado como critério de escolha entre hipóteses conflitantes. Na sequência, serão expostas e discutidas algumas das críticas contemporâneas ao trabalho de Swinburne. Por fim, com base na discussão realizada, será dada uma resposta à questão inicial do artigo.Este artigo tem como objetivo responder até que ponto a proposta de justificação teísta apresentada por Richard Swinburne responde as críticas de Hume e Kant quanto à possibilidade de fundamentação racional da crença na existência de Deus. Para isso, a seguinte metodologia será adotada: em primeiro lugar, serão apresentadas as objeções dos dois autores citados; em seguida, terá lugar uma exposição das respostas de Swinburne, com ênfase em aspectos específicos da sua versão do argumento teleológico e no princípio da simplicidade adotado como critério de escolha entre hipóteses conflitantes. Na sequência, serão expostas e discutidas algumas das críticas contemporâneas ao trabalho de Swinburne. Por fim, com base na discussão realizada, será dada uma resposta à questão inicial do artigo.

@article{doi1026512plv1i211533,
    author = "Gomes, João Víctor Oliveira",
    title = "RICHARD SWINBURNE E A POSSIBILIDADE DE FUNDAMENTAÇÃO RACIONAL DA CRENÇA EM DEUS",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília",
    abstract = "Este artigo tem como objetivo responder até que ponto a proposta de justificação teísta apresentada por Richard Swinburne responde as críticas de Hume e Kant quanto à possibilidade de fundamentação racional da crença na existência de Deus. Para isso, a seguinte metodologia será adotada: em primeiro lugar, serão apresentadas as objeções dos dois autores citados; em seguida, terá lugar uma exposição das respostas de Swinburne, com ênfase em aspectos específicos da sua versão do argumento teleológico e no princípio da simplicidade adotado como critério de escolha entre hipóteses conflitantes. Na sequência, serão expostas e discutidas algumas das críticas contemporâneas ao trabalho de Swinburne. Por fim, com base na discussão realizada, será dada uma resposta à questão inicial do artigo.Este artigo tem como objetivo responder até que ponto a proposta de justificação teísta apresentada por Richard Swinburne responde as críticas de Hume e Kant quanto à possibilidade de fundamentação racional da crença na existência de Deus. Para isso, a seguinte metodologia será adotada: em primeiro lugar, serão apresentadas as objeções dos dois autores citados; em seguida, terá lugar uma exposição das respostas de Swinburne, com ênfase em aspectos específicos da sua versão do argumento teleológico e no princípio da simplicidade adotado como critério de escolha entre hipóteses conflitantes. Na sequência, serão expostas e discutidas algumas das críticas contemporâneas ao trabalho de Swinburne. Por fim, com base na discussão realizada, será dada uma resposta à questão inicial do artigo.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v1i2.11533",
    doi = "10.26512/pl.v1i2.11533",
    openalex = "W2107323943",
    references = "doi101017s0034412500024264"
}

The conclusion of Swinburne’s book The existence of God is that “On our total evidence theism is more probable than not”. I will not dispute that conclusion, as others have done. I will concede that the conclusion is supported by Swinburne’s argument and that the argument is in fact “good”. I will question, however, the impact of that conclusion ”“ with the use of the argument that supports it - for the epistemological enterprise of justifying theistic belief, that is, the belief that God exists. Developing criticism given by Alvin Plantinga (2001), I will question the sufficiency and necessity of Swinburne’s probabilistic argument for the epistemic justification of a subject S’s belief that God exists, where S is a religious person, say, a Christian.

@article{doi1026512235882842015e17380,
    author = "de Oliveira, Rogel Esteves",
    title = "The sufficiency and necessity of (Swinburne’s) Natural Theology",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião.",
    abstract = "The conclusion of Swinburne’s book The existence of God is that “On our total evidence theism is more probable than not”. I will not dispute that conclusion, as others have done. I will concede that the conclusion is supported by Swinburne’s argument and that the argument is in fact “good”. I will question, however, the impact of that conclusion ”“ with the use of the argument that supports it - for the epistemological enterprise of justifying theistic belief, that is, the belief that God exists. Developing criticism given by Alvin Plantinga (2001), I will question the sufficiency and necessity of Swinburne’s probabilistic argument for the epistemic justification of a subject S’s belief that God exists, where S is a religious person, say, a Christian.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.26512/2358-82842015e17380",
    doi = "10.26512/2358-82842015e17380",
    openalex = "W2613965378",
    references = "doi10109301982396370010001, doi10109301992574690010001, doi10109301992695560010001, doi101111j1748092220060011112x, doi1023072185914, doi1043249780203563304, plantinga2001rationality"
}

With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics.

@article{blondé2021proving,
    author = "Blondé, Ward and Jansen, Ludger",
    title = "Proving God without Dualism: Improving the Swinburne-Moreland Argument from Consciousness",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Metaphysica",
    abstract = "With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0035",
    doi = "10.1515/mp-2020-0035",
    number = "1",
    openalex = "W3142501892",
    pages = "75-87",
    volume = "22",
    references = "doi1010029780470751466ch18, doi101017cbo9780511625398, doi10105100046361201425195, doi10109301982396370010001, doi101093oso97801906770150010001, doi1011111467921300309, doi101111j146801141983tb00207x, doi1023072183914, doi103389neuro090312009, openalexw2155535944"
}

Abstract LeMans’s gontological argument aims to prove the non-existence of God on the basis that it is possible to conceive of a being that is greater than any actual thing. If God were actual, then it would be possible to conceive of something greater than God. As this is not possible, God does not exist.

@article{doi101093analysanab014,
    author = "Kearns, Stephen",
    title = "LeMans’s gontological argument",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Analysis",
    abstract = "Abstract LeMans’s gontological argument aims to prove the non-existence of God on the basis that it is possible to conceive of a being that is greater than any actual thing. If God were actual, then it would be possible to conceive of something greater than God. As this is not possible, God does not exist.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab014",
    doi = "10.1093/analys/anab014",
    openalex = "W3184415690",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511498978"
}

Abstract Richard Swinburne is one of the best‐known names in the international philosophical scene. His apologetic project is considered one of the largest and most impactful and profound of the last century. The interview conducted here explores many biographical and theoretical issues (Omniscience, Eternity, God’s existence, Free will, Analogy, Relational ontology and Powers ontology, Soul‐Body relation, Trinity, Evil), and it aims to trace a broad (albeit necessarily partial) path through his numerous works. The interview took place in 2016, in Oxford, at Swinburne’s home. Today, Swinburne’s thought is discussed in monographs and doctoral theses, witnessing to an influence that will undoubtedly be lasting.

@article{doi101111phin12325,
    author = "Migliorini, Damiano",
    title = "Faith and Philosophy: Richard Swinburne and the Analytic Philosophy of Religion – An Interview",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Philosophical Investigations",
    abstract = "Abstract Richard Swinburne is one of the best‐known names in the international philosophical scene. His apologetic project is considered one of the largest and most impactful and profound of the last century. The interview conducted here explores many biographical and theoretical issues (Omniscience, Eternity, God’s existence, Free will, Analogy, Relational ontology and Powers ontology, Soul‐Body relation, Trinity, Evil), and it aims to trace a broad (albeit necessarily partial) path through his numerous works. The interview took place in 2016, in Oxford, at Swinburne’s home. Today, Swinburne’s thought is discussed in monographs and doctoral theses, witnessing to an influence that will undoubtedly be lasting.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12325",
    doi = "10.1111/phin.12325",
    openalex = "W3193373660",
    references = "doi101017s0034412500005874"
}

Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) claims that if both naturalism (N) and evolutionary theory (E) are true, then all our beliefs are unreliable (premiss 1). Consequently, given N&E, the belief in N&E is unreliable (premiss 2) and N&E is self-defeating (conclusion). The empirical verification argument against naturalism (EVAAN) is more cautious and improves EAAN by withstanding a rejoinder of the evolutionary naturalist to premiss 1. EVAAN claims that non-abstract beliefs that are not empirically verifiable are unreliable, given N&E (premiss 1a). This anticipates the evolutionary naturalist’s claim that empirical verifications play a crucial role in peer assessments and sexual selection of intelligence, and that, therefore, N&E makes empirically verifiable beliefs often reliable (premiss-1 rejoinder). However, even then it can be argued that the belief in N&E is unreliable, given N&E (premiss 2), because N&E is neither abstract, nor empirically verifiable (premiss 1b). EVAAN distinguishes reliably verifiable intelligence from metaphysical intelligence and claims that, if N&E is true, humans are lacking metaphysical intelligence. This paper also contains an argument against EAAN, by supporting the premiss-1 rejoinder.

@article{doi105209asem88829,
    author = "Blondé, Ward",
    title = "EVAAN: An empirical verification argument against naturalism",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Logos Anales del Seminario de Metafísica",
    abstract = "Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) claims that if both naturalism (N) and evolutionary theory (E) are true, then all our beliefs are unreliable (premiss 1). Consequently, given N\&E, the belief in N\&E is unreliable (premiss 2) and N\&E is self-defeating (conclusion). The empirical verification argument against naturalism (EVAAN) is more cautious and improves EAAN by withstanding a rejoinder of the evolutionary naturalist to premiss 1. EVAAN claims that non-abstract beliefs that are not empirically verifiable are unreliable, given N\&E (premiss 1a). This anticipates the evolutionary naturalist’s claim that empirical verifications play a crucial role in peer assessments and sexual selection of intelligence, and that, therefore, N\&E makes empirically verifiable beliefs often reliable (premiss-1 rejoinder). However, even then it can be argued that the belief in N\&E is unreliable, given N\&E (premiss 2), because N\&E is neither abstract, nor empirically verifiable (premiss 1b). EVAAN distinguishes reliably verifiable intelligence from metaphysical intelligence and claims that, if N\&E is true, humans are lacking metaphysical intelligence. This paper also contains an argument against EAAN, by supporting the premiss-1 rejoinder.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5209/asem.88829",
    doi = "10.5209/asem.88829",
    openalex = "W4389736206",
    references = "blondé2021proving"
}