Human nature

"In his autobiography, David Hume famously noted that A Treatise of Human Nature "fell dead-born from the press." Yet it is now widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works written in the English language. Within, Hume offers an empirically informed account of human nature, addressing a range of topics such as space, time, causality, the external world, personal identity, passions, freedom, necessity, virtue, and vice. This edition includes not only the full text of the Treatise but also Hume's summarizing Abstract, as well as selections drawn from critical book reviews which showcase the work's reception in Hume's own time. Angela Coventry's expert introduction and annotations serve to contextualize the book's themes and arguments for modern readers."--

@book{doi101017cbo9780511620409040,
    author = "Hume, David",
    title = "A Treatise of Human Nature",
    year = "1739",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = {"In his autobiography, David Hume famously noted that A Treatise of Human Nature "fell dead-born from the press." Yet it is now widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophical works written in the English language. Within, Hume offers an empirically informed account of human nature, addressing a range of topics such as space, time, causality, the external world, personal identity, passions, freedom, necessity, virtue, and vice. This edition includes not only the full text of the Treatise but also Hume's summarizing Abstract, as well as selections drawn from critical book reviews which showcase the work's reception in Hume's own time. Angela Coventry's expert introduction and annotations serve to contextualize the book's themes and arguments for modern readers."--},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511620409.040",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511620409.040",
    openalex = "W1591422284"
}

@misc{huxley1888the3,
    author = "Huxley, T. H",
    title = "The struggle for existance in human society",
    year = "1888",
    howpublished = "The Nineteenth Century",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Huxley, T. H., 1888, The struggle for existance in human society: The Nineteenth Century.}"
}

This insightful treatise on the essential components of human nature by the great American philosopher and educator John Dewey, in his own words, sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology, while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized mental activity. Beginning with habits, Dewey discusses these basic patterns of conduct as essential mechanisms that allow individuals to coexist harmoniously within society and to adjust to the outer environment. The process of habit formation is a major part of childhood education as the growing individual learns the established modes of behavior in society. In the next section Dewey focuses on impulses, which motivate action and are regulated in response to the reactions of others and the learned habits that the society around us instills. Intelligence, the subject of the next part, in Dewey's view, is the chief instrument that allows human beings to act creatively and experimentally in response to the demands of both inner impulses and outer challenges. How we use our intelligence to deal with our impulses and habits reflects individual variations of character and largely determines life destinies. Intelligence is also the key to morality. If we use our intelligence to make moral judgments based on a clear understanding of empirical facts, then there is a far better chance, says Dewey, that our judgments will be good and our actions right, than if we blindly accept moral rules from traditional authorities or unthinkingly give way to natural instincts. Unless we use the tool of intelligence to understand the natural world around us and our own human nature, we cannot make wise value judgments to serve our best interests. Some eighty years after its original publication, Dewey's commonsensical approach, rooted in experience and objective observation, still has much to recommend it to students of ethics, psychology, and sociology.

@article{doi1023072939506,
    author = "Ayres, C. E. and Dewey, John",
    title = "Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology.",
    year = "1922",
    journal = "The Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "This insightful treatise on the essential components of human nature by the great American philosopher and educator John Dewey, in his own words, sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology, while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized mental activity. Beginning with habits, Dewey discusses these basic patterns of conduct as essential mechanisms that allow individuals to coexist harmoniously within society and to adjust to the outer environment. The process of habit formation is a major part of childhood education as the growing individual learns the established modes of behavior in society. In the next section Dewey focuses on impulses, which motivate action and are regulated in response to the reactions of others and the learned habits that the society around us instills. Intelligence, the subject of the next part, in Dewey's view, is the chief instrument that allows human beings to act creatively and experimentally in response to the demands of both inner impulses and outer challenges. How we use our intelligence to deal with our impulses and habits reflects individual variations of character and largely determines life destinies. Intelligence is also the key to morality. If we use our intelligence to make moral judgments based on a clear understanding of empirical facts, then there is a far better chance, says Dewey, that our judgments will be good and our actions right, than if we blindly accept moral rules from traditional authorities or unthinkingly give way to natural instincts. Unless we use the tool of intelligence to understand the natural world around us and our own human nature, we cannot make wise value judgments to serve our best interests. Some eighty years after its original publication, Dewey's commonsensical approach, rooted in experience and objective observation, still has much to recommend it to students of ethics, psychology, and sociology.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2939506",
    doi = "10.2307/2939506",
    openalex = "W1679456992"
}

@misc{herrick1956the2,
    author = "Herrick, C. J",
    title = "THe Evolution of Human Nature",
    year = "1956",
    howpublished = "New York, Harper \& Brothers, 506 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Herrick, C. J., 1956, THe Evolution of Human Nature: New York, Harper \& Brothers, 506 p.}"
}

This very ingenious author adopts the principle of Mr Locke before mentioned—that all our simple ideas are derived either from sensation or reflection. This he seems to understand, even in a stricter sense than Mr Locke did. For he will have all our simple ideas to be copies of preceding impressions, either of our external senses or of consciousness. “After the most accurate examination,” says he, “of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression which resembles it, and every simple impression a correspondent idea. Every one may satisfy himself in this point, by running over as many as be pleases.”* I observe here, by the way, that this conclusion is formed by the author rashly and unphilosophically. For it is a conclusion that admits of no proof, but by induction; and it is upon this ground that he himself founds it. The induction cannot be perfect till every simple idea that can enter into the human mind be examined, and be shewn to be copied from a resembling impression of sense or of consciousness. No man can pretend to have made this examination of all our simple ideas without exception; and, therefore, no man can, consistently with the rules of philosophizing, assure us, that this conclusion holds without any exception.[27] The author professes, in his title page, to introduce into moral subjects the experimental method of reasoning. This was a very laudable attempt; but he ought to have known, that it is a rule in the experimental method of reasoning, that conclusions, established by induction ought never to exclude exceptions, if any such should afterward appear from observation or experiment. Sir Isaac Newton, speaking of such conclusions, says, “Et si quando in experiundo postea, reperiatur aliquid, quod a parte contraria faciat; tum demum, non sine istis exceptionibus affirmetur conclusio opportebit.”** “But,” says our author, “I will venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception.”

@book{openalexw614489202,
    author = "Reid, Thomas",
    title = "Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind",
    year = "1969",
    abstract = "This very ingenious author adopts the principle of Mr Locke before mentioned—that all our simple ideas are derived either from sensation or reflection. This he seems to understand, even in a stricter sense than Mr Locke did. For he will have all our simple ideas to be copies of preceding impressions, either of our external senses or of consciousness. “After the most accurate examination,” says he, “of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression which resembles it, and every simple impression a correspondent idea. Every one may satisfy himself in this point, by running over as many as be pleases.”* I observe here, by the way, that this conclusion is formed by the author rashly and unphilosophically. For it is a conclusion that admits of no proof, but by induction; and it is upon this ground that he himself founds it. The induction cannot be perfect till every simple idea that can enter into the human mind be examined, and be shewn to be copied from a resembling impression of sense or of consciousness. No man can pretend to have made this examination of all our simple ideas without exception; and, therefore, no man can, consistently with the rules of philosophizing, assure us, that this conclusion holds without any exception.[27] The author professes, in his title page, to introduce into moral subjects the experimental method of reasoning. This was a very laudable attempt; but he ought to have known, that it is a rule in the experimental method of reasoning, that conclusions, established by induction ought never to exclude exceptions, if any such should afterward appear from observation or experiment. Sir Isaac Newton, speaking of such conclusions, says, “Et si quando in experiundo postea, reperiatur aliquid, quod a parte contraria faciat; tum demum, non sine istis exceptionibus affirmetur conclusio opportebit.”** “But,” says our author, “I will venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception.”",
    openalex = "W614489202"
}

@article{thomas1974god,
    author = "Thomas, Alexander",
    title = "God or Beast: Evolution and Human Nature",
    year = "1974",
    journal = "Hospital Practice",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/21548331.1974.11706894",
    doi = "10.1080/21548331.1974.11706894",
    number = "10",
    openalex = "W2399012718",
    pages = "115-115",
    volume = "9"
}

Infants between 12 and 21 days of age can imitate both facial and manual gestures; this behavior cannot be explained in terms of either conditioning or innate releasing mechanisms. Such imitation implies that human neonates can equate their own unseen behaviors with gestures they see others perform.

@article{doi101126science198431275,
    author = "Meltzoff, Andrew N. and Moore, Maggie",
    title = "Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates",
    year = "1977",
    journal = "Science",
    abstract = "Infants between 12 and 21 days of age can imitate both facial and manual gestures; this behavior cannot be explained in terms of either conditioning or innate releasing mechanisms. Such imitation implies that human neonates can equate their own unseen behaviors with gestures they see others perform.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1126/science.198.4312.75",
    doi = "10.1126/science.198.4312.75",
    openalex = "W1998849596"
}

@inproceedings{bischof1978on1,
    author = "Bischof, N",
    title = "On the Phylogeny of Human Morality, in Stent, G. S., ed., Morality as a Biological Phenomenon",
    year = "1978",
    booktitle = "Berlin, Abakon Verlagagesellschaft, p. 53-55; Report of the Dahlem Workshop, Berlin, 1977",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Bischof, N., 1978, On the Phylogeny of Human Morality, in Stent, G. S., ed., Morality as a Biological Phenomenon: Berlin, Abakon Verlagagesellschaft, p. 53-55; Report of the Dahlem Workshop, Berlin, 1977.}"
}

@book{midgley1978beast4,
    author = "Midgley, M",
    title = "Beast and Man",
    year = "1978",
    publisher = "The Roots of Human Nature: Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Midgley, M., 1978, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature: Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press.}"
}

In this Pulitzer prize-winning book, Edward O. Wilson argues that the key to understanding human nature lies in a combination of social theory and relevant biological principles.

@book{openalexw1978981002,
    author = "Wilson, Edward O.",
    title = "On Human Nature",
    year = "1978",
    abstract = "In this Pulitzer prize-winning book, Edward O. Wilson argues that the key to understanding human nature lies in a combination of social theory and relevant biological principles.",
    openalex = "W1978981002"
}

@book{wilson1978on5,
    author = "Wilson, E. O",
    title = "On Human Nature",
    year = "1978",
    publisher = "Cambridge, Mass., Bantam Books and Harvard University Press, 260 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Wilson, E. O., 1978, On Human Nature: Cambridge, Mass., Bantam Books and Harvard University Press, 260 p.}"
}

@article{doi1010160191886980900744,
    author = "Wilson, Glenn V.",
    title = "The evolution of human sexuality",
    year = "1980",
    journal = "Personality and Individual Differences",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(80)90074-4",
    doi = "10.1016/0191-8869(80)90074-4",
    openalex = "W2315803453"
}

@article{cua1982morality,
    author = "Cua, A. S.",
    title = "Morality and Human Nature",
    year = "1982",
    journal = "Philosophy East and West",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/1398467",
    doi = "10.2307/1398467",
    number = "3",
    openalex = "W2327184551",
    pages = "279",
    volume = "32"
}

@article{caplan1983morality,
    author = "Caplan, Arthur L.",
    title = "Morality as a biological phenomenon",
    year = "1983",
    journal = "Ethology and Sociobiology",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(83)90016-x",
    doi = "10.1016/0162-3095(83)90016-x",
    number = "4",
    pages = "237-238",
    volume = "4"
}

Our practical reasoning goes well and attains its truth when we identify ways of adequately getting or realising really desirable objectives. And our objectives are really desirable (good) when they either are really desirable in themselves, or are steps on the way to getting or realising some such intrinsically desirable objective or objectives. If there is but one such intrinsically desirable objective, our practical reasoning cannot go well unless we know what it is. If, as seems much more plausible, there are a number of intrinsically desirable objectives, our practical reasoning cannot go well unless we know whether there is some further objective to be attained or realised by or in the pursuit of some or all of these intrinsically desirable objectives, i.e. whether there is some further point to pursuing them; and if so, what that further point or objective (‘last end’) actually is. Some say that the true last end is some one of the intrinsically desirable human goods, say, the highest instantiation of the highest good attainable in this life, thus contemplation of God to the extent that God is knowable through His creatures. Others agree that it is some one human good, but place it beyond this life, and beyond merely human capacities, in the beatific vision and contemplation of God.

@article{doi101111j174120051985tb02735x,
    author = "Finnis, John",
    title = "Practical Reasoning, Human Goods and the End of Man",
    year = "1985",
    journal = "New Blackfriars",
    abstract = "Our practical reasoning goes well and attains its truth when we identify ways of adequately getting or realising really desirable objectives. And our objectives are really desirable (good) when they either are really desirable in themselves, or are steps on the way to getting or realising some such intrinsically desirable objective or objectives. If there is but one such intrinsically desirable objective, our practical reasoning cannot go well unless we know what it is. If, as seems much more plausible, there are a number of intrinsically desirable objectives, our practical reasoning cannot go well unless we know whether there is some further objective to be attained or realised by or in the pursuit of some or all of these intrinsically desirable objectives, i.e. whether there is some further point to pursuing them; and if so, what that further point or objective (‘last end’) actually is. Some say that the true last end is some one of the intrinsically desirable human goods, say, the highest instantiation of the highest good attainable in this life, thus contemplation of God to the extent that God is knowable through His creatures. Others agree that it is some one human good, but place it beyond this life, and beyond merely human capacities, in the beatific vision and contemplation of God.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1985.tb02735.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1741-2005.1985.tb02735.x",
    openalex = "W2035311174"
}

@article{doi101007bf00127565,
    author = "Smith, C. U. M.",
    title = "“Clever beasts who invented knowing”: Nietzsche's evolutionary biology of knowledge",
    year = "1987",
    journal = "Biology \& Philosophy",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00127565",
    doi = "10.1007/bf00127565",
    openalex = "W1981800039"
}

This article considers the role of the hippocampus in memory function. A central thesis is that work with rats, monkeys, and humans--which has sometimes seemed to proceed independently in 3 separate literatures--is now largely in agreement about the function of the hippocampus and related structures. A biological perspective is presented, which proposes multiple memory systems with different functions and distinct anatomical organizations. The hippocampus (together with anatomically related structures) is essential for a specific kind of memory, here termed declarative memory (similar terms include explicit and relational). Declarative memory is contrasted with a heterogeneous collection of nondeclarative (implicit) memory abilities that do not require the hippocampus (skills and habits, simple conditioning, and the phenomenon of priming). The hippocampus is needed temporarily to bind together distributed sites in neocortex that together represent a whole memory.

@article{doi1010370033295x992195,
    author = "Squire, Larry R.",
    title = "Memory and the hippocampus: A synthesis from findings with rats, monkeys, and humans.",
    year = "1992",
    journal = "Psychological Review",
    abstract = "This article considers the role of the hippocampus in memory function. A central thesis is that work with rats, monkeys, and humans--which has sometimes seemed to proceed independently in 3 separate literatures--is now largely in agreement about the function of the hippocampus and related structures. A biological perspective is presented, which proposes multiple memory systems with different functions and distinct anatomical organizations. The hippocampus (together with anatomically related structures) is essential for a specific kind of memory, here termed declarative memory (similar terms include explicit and relational). Declarative memory is contrasted with a heterogeneous collection of nondeclarative (implicit) memory abilities that do not require the hippocampus (skills and habits, simple conditioning, and the phenomenon of priming). The hippocampus is needed temporarily to bind together distributed sites in neocortex that together represent a whole memory.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.99.2.195",
    doi = "10.1037/0033-295x.99.2.195",
    openalex = "W1984214648",
    references = "doi101016002839329290076x, openalexw2764433274"
}

Abstract Group size covaries with relative neocortical volume in nonhuman primates. This regression equation predicts a group size for modern humans very similar to that for hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies. Similar group sizes are found in other contemporary and historical societies. Nonhuman primates maintain group cohesion through social grooming; among the Old World monkeys and apes, social grooming time is linearly related to group size. Maintaining stability of human-sized groups by grooming alone would make intolerable time demands. It is therefore suggested (1) that the evolution of large groups in the human lineage depended on developing a more efficient method for time-sharing the processes of social bonding and (2) that language uniquely fulfills this requirement. Data on the size of conversational and other small interacting groups of humans accord with the predicted relative efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process. In human conversations about 60% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and personal experiences. Language may accordingly have evolved to allow individuals to learn about the behavioural characteristics of other group members more rapidly than was feasible by direct observation alone.

@article{doi101017s0140525x00032325,
    author = "Dunbar, Robin",
    title = "Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans",
    year = "1993",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "Abstract Group size covaries with relative neocortical volume in nonhuman primates. This regression equation predicts a group size for modern humans very similar to that for hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies. Similar group sizes are found in other contemporary and historical societies. Nonhuman primates maintain group cohesion through social grooming; among the Old World monkeys and apes, social grooming time is linearly related to group size. Maintaining stability of human-sized groups by grooming alone would make intolerable time demands. It is therefore suggested (1) that the evolution of large groups in the human lineage depended on developing a more efficient method for time-sharing the processes of social bonding and (2) that language uniquely fulfills this requirement. Data on the size of conversational and other small interacting groups of humans accord with the predicted relative efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process. In human conversations about 60\% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and personal experiences. Language may accordingly have evolved to allow individuals to learn about the behavioural characteristics of other group members more rapidly than was feasible by direct observation alone.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00032325",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x00032325",
    openalex = "W2137391072",
    references = "doi1010079781468441482, doi1010160022519364900384, doi1010160047248487900224, doi101016004724849290081j, doi101016s0022519389801699, doi101017s0140525x00081061, doi101086284325, doi101093oso97801985464120010001, doi101098rstb19890106, doi101111j143903101963tb01161x, doi101152physrev1992721165, doi1023071367778, doi1023071438156, doi1023072063068, doi1023072185913, doi1023072407154, doi1043249780203037416, doi1043249781315132129, doi105860choice295104, falk1983cerebral, openalexw1659631989, openalexw1996270497"
}

Descartes' Error offers the scientific basis for ending the division between mind and body. Antonio Damasio contends that rational decisions are not the product of logic alone - they require the support of emotion and feeling. Drawing on his experience with neurological patients affected with brain damage, Dr Damasio shows how absence of emotions and feelings can break down rationality. He also offers a new perspective on what emotions and feelings actually are: a direct view of our own body states; a link between the body and its survival-oriented regulation on the one hand, and consciousness on the other. Written as a conversation between the author and an imaginary listener, Descartes' Error leads us to conclude that human organisms are endowed from their very beginning with a spirited passion for making choices, which the social mind can then use to build rational behaviour.

@book{openalexw1581387623,
    author = "Damásio, António R.",
    title = "Descarte's error: emotion, reason, and the human brain",
    year = "1994",
    booktitle = "DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library)",
    abstract = "Descartes' Error offers the scientific basis for ending the division between mind and body. Antonio Damasio contends that rational decisions are not the product of logic alone - they require the support of emotion and feeling. Drawing on his experience with neurological patients affected with brain damage, Dr Damasio shows how absence of emotions and feelings can break down rationality. He also offers a new perspective on what emotions and feelings actually are: a direct view of our own body states; a link between the body and its survival-oriented regulation on the one hand, and consciousness on the other. Written as a conversation between the author and an imaginary listener, Descartes' Error leads us to conclude that human organisms are endowed from their very beginning with a spirited passion for making choices, which the social mind can then use to build rational behaviour.",
    openalex = "W1581387623"
}

This remarkable collection of almost 1,400 aphorisms was originally published in three instalments. The first (now Volume I) appeared in 1878, just before Nietzsche abandoned academic life, with a first supplement entitled The Assorted Opinions and Maxims following in 1879, and a second entitled The Wanderer and his Shadow a year later. In 1886 Nietzsche republished them together in a two-volume edition, with new prefaces to each volume. Both volumes are presented here in R. J. Hollingdale's distinguished translation (originally published in the series Cambridge Texts in German Philosophy) with a new introduction by Richard Schacht. In this wide-ranging work Nietzsche first employed his celebrated aphoristic style, so perfectly suited to his iconoclastic, penetrating and multi-faceted thought. Many themes of his later work make their initial appearance here, expressed with unforgettable liveliness and subtlety. Human, All Too Human well deserves its subtitle 'A Book for Free Spirits', and its original dedication to Voltaire, whose project of radical enlightenment here found a new champion.

@book{doi101017cbo9780511812057,
    author = "Nietzsche, Friedrich and Schacht, Richard",
    title = "Nietzsche: Human, All Too Human",
    year = "1996",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "This remarkable collection of almost 1,400 aphorisms was originally published in three instalments. The first (now Volume I) appeared in 1878, just before Nietzsche abandoned academic life, with a first supplement entitled The Assorted Opinions and Maxims following in 1879, and a second entitled The Wanderer and his Shadow a year later. In 1886 Nietzsche republished them together in a two-volume edition, with new prefaces to each volume. Both volumes are presented here in R. J. Hollingdale's distinguished translation (originally published in the series Cambridge Texts in German Philosophy) with a new introduction by Richard Schacht. In this wide-ranging work Nietzsche first employed his celebrated aphoristic style, so perfectly suited to his iconoclastic, penetrating and multi-faceted thought. Many themes of his later work make their initial appearance here, expressed with unforgettable liveliness and subtlety. Human, All Too Human well deserves its subtitle 'A Book for Free Spirits', and its original dedication to Voltaire, whose project of radical enlightenment here found a new champion.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511812057",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511812057",
    openalex = "W3082309007"
}

This article contains the argument that the human ability to travel mentally in time constitutes a discontinuity between ourselves and other animals. Mental time travel comprises the mental reconstruction of personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible events in the future. It is not an isolated module, but depends on the sophistication of other cognitive capacities, including self-awareness, meta-representation, mental attribution, understanding the perception-knowledge relationship, and the ability to dissociate imagined mental states from one's present mental state. These capacities are also important aspects of so-called theory of mind, and they appear to mature in children at around age 4. Furthermore, mental time travel is generative, involving the combination and recombination of familiar elements, and in this respect may have been a precursor to language. Current evidence, although indirect or based on anecdote rather than on systematic study, suggests that nonhuman animals, including the great apes, are confined to a "present" that is limited by their current drive states. In contrast, mental time travel by humans is relatively unconstrained and allows a more rapid and flexible adaptation to complex, changing environments than is afforded by instincts or conventional learning. Past and future events loom large in much of human thinking, giving rise to cultural, religious, and scientific concepts about origins, destiny, and time itself.

@article{openalexw1520377904,
    author = "Suddendorf, Thomas and Corballis, Michael C.",
    title = "Mental time travel and the evolution of the human mind.",
    year = "1997",
    journal = "PubMed",
    abstract = {This article contains the argument that the human ability to travel mentally in time constitutes a discontinuity between ourselves and other animals. Mental time travel comprises the mental reconstruction of personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible events in the future. It is not an isolated module, but depends on the sophistication of other cognitive capacities, including self-awareness, meta-representation, mental attribution, understanding the perception-knowledge relationship, and the ability to dissociate imagined mental states from one's present mental state. These capacities are also important aspects of so-called theory of mind, and they appear to mature in children at around age 4. Furthermore, mental time travel is generative, involving the combination and recombination of familiar elements, and in this respect may have been a precursor to language. Current evidence, although indirect or based on anecdote rather than on systematic study, suggests that nonhuman animals, including the great apes, are confined to a "present" that is limited by their current drive states. In contrast, mental time travel by humans is relatively unconstrained and allows a more rapid and flexible adaptation to complex, changing environments than is afforded by instincts or conventional learning. Past and future events loom large in much of human thinking, giving rise to cultural, religious, and scientific concepts about origins, destiny, and time itself.},
    openalex = "W1520377904",
    references = "doi101126science167391486"
}

The past year has seen a resurgence of interest in political thinker Hannah Arendt, the theorist of beginnings, whose work probes logics underlying unexpected transformations-from totalitarianism to revolution. A work of striking originality, The Human Condition is in many respects more relevant now than when it first appeared in 1958. In her study of state of modern humanity, Hannah Arendt considers humankind from perspective of actions of which it is capable. The problems Arendt identified then-diminishing human agency and political freedom, paradox that as human powers increase through technological and humanistic inquiry, we are less equipped to control consequences of our actions-continue to confront us today. This new edition, published to coincide with sixtieth anniversary of its original publication, contains Margaret Canovan's 1998 introduction and a new foreword by Danielle Allen. A classic in political and social theory, The Human Condition is a work that has proved both timeless and perpetually timely.

@book{doi107208chicago97802265867480010001,
    author = "Arendt, Hannah and Canovan, Margaret and Allen, Danielle",
    title = "The Human Condition",
    year = "1998",
    abstract = "The past year has seen a resurgence of interest in political thinker Hannah Arendt, the theorist of beginnings, whose work probes logics underlying unexpected transformations-from totalitarianism to revolution. A work of striking originality, The Human Condition is in many respects more relevant now than when it first appeared in 1958. In her study of state of modern humanity, Hannah Arendt considers humankind from perspective of actions of which it is capable. The problems Arendt identified then-diminishing human agency and political freedom, paradox that as human powers increase through technological and humanistic inquiry, we are less equipped to control consequences of our actions-continue to confront us today. This new edition, published to coincide with sixtieth anniversary of its original publication, contains Margaret Canovan's 1998 introduction and a new foreword by Danielle Allen. A classic in political and social theory, The Human Condition is a work that has proved both timeless and perpetually timely.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226586748.001.0001",
    doi = "10.7208/chicago/9780226586748.001.0001",
    openalex = "W2093097231"
}

To make a case for or against a trend in the evolution of complexity in biological evolution, complexity needs to be both rigorously defined and measurable. A recent information-theoretic (but intuitively evident) definition identifies genomic complexity with the amount of information a sequence stores about its environment. We investigate the evolution of genomic complexity in populations of digital organisms and monitor in detail the evolutionary transitions that increase complexity. We show that, because natural selection forces genomes to behave as a natural “Maxwell Demon,” within a fixed environment, genomic complexity is forced to increase.

@article{doi101073pnas9794463,
    author = "Adami, Christoph and Ofria, Charles and Collier, Travis C.",
    title = "Evolution of biological complexity",
    year = "2000",
    journal = "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences",
    abstract = "To make a case for or against a trend in the evolution of complexity in biological evolution, complexity needs to be both rigorously defined and measurable. A recent information-theoretic (but intuitively evident) definition identifies genomic complexity with the amount of information a sequence stores about its environment. We investigate the evolution of genomic complexity in populations of digital organisms and monitor in detail the evolutionary transitions that increase complexity. We show that, because natural selection forces genomes to behave as a natural “Maxwell Demon,” within a fixed environment, genomic complexity is forced to increase.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.97.9.4463",
    doi = "10.1073/pnas.97.9.4463",
    openalex = "W2162170584",
    references = "doi101073pnas581217, doi101111j155856461996tb03861x"
}

Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 1

@article{openalexw2134238372,
    author = "Alkire, Sabina",
    title = "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security",
    year = "2003",
    journal = "Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford)",
    abstract = "Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford 1",
    openalex = "W2134238372",
    references = "doi101093ajj32199"
}

@misc{crossref2005morality,
    title = "Morality and Human Nature",
    year = "2005",
    booktitle = "Morality Matters",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470690222.ch11",
    doi = "10.1002/9780470690222.ch11",
    openalex = "W1491253316",
    pages = "154-167"
}

The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a "mirror system" active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the mirror system hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural "missing link" between the abilities of our nonhuman ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes "beyond the mirror" to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called simple system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex "object-oriented" sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called complex system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to have provided the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to nonhuman vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of Homo sapiens, involving few if any further biological changes.

@article{doi101017s0140525x05000038,
    author = "Arbib, Michael A.",
    title = "From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics",
    year = "2005",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = {The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a "mirror system" active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the mirror system hypothesis of Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural "missing link" between the abilities of our nonhuman ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes "beyond the mirror" to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called simple system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex "object-oriented" sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called complex system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to have provided the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to nonhuman vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of Homo sapiens, involving few if any further biological changes.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05000038",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x05000038",
    openalex = "W2156256694",
    references = "doi101038nrn1180, doi1023074613021, doi105860choice351500, doi105860choice425260, openalexw227636185"
}

Abstract The chapter tackles the placement of self-reflective consciousness amongst the numberless gradations by Darwin. Discussions of self-consciousness inevitably lead to Descartes' dictum, “I think, therefore I am”. The goal is a rapprochement between this view and the Cartesian view, emphasizing this kind of consciousness applicable only to humans. Descartes maintained that animals are unable to engage in self-reflection. Negative results of various ape language projects and broad advances in animal cognition suggest that Descartes was right about the uniqueness of language but that he was wrong about animal's capacity for thought and self-reflection. There is abundant evidence that nonhuman pirates can form representations and use them to solve problems. The concept of autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving calls it, seemed close to the construct of self-reflective consciousness and metacognition which was the concern. Thus, instead of focusing on language, more fundamental capabilities are considered—the origins of self-reflective consciousness.

@incollection{doi101093acprofoso97801951615640030001,
    author = "Tulving, Endel",
    title = "Episodic Memory and Autonoesis: Uniquely Human?",
    year = "2005",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Abstract The chapter tackles the placement of self-reflective consciousness amongst the numberless gradations by Darwin. Discussions of self-consciousness inevitably lead to Descartes' dictum, “I think, therefore I am”. The goal is a rapprochement between this view and the Cartesian view, emphasizing this kind of consciousness applicable only to humans. Descartes maintained that animals are unable to engage in self-reflection. Negative results of various ape language projects and broad advances in animal cognition suggest that Descartes was right about the uniqueness of language but that he was wrong about animal's capacity for thought and self-reflection. There is abundant evidence that nonhuman pirates can form representations and use them to solve problems. The concept of autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving calls it, seemed close to the construct of self-reflective consciousness and metacognition which was the concern. Thus, instead of focusing on language, more fundamental capabilities are considered—the origins of self-reflective consciousness.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.003.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.003.0001",
    openalex = "W2502971911"
}

The well-known Human Development Index (HDI) encompasses only three rather basic aspects of human welfare. This paper aims to go beyond this, by identifying 11 categories of human development. We next propose plausible candidates as indicators of these categories. We then estimate correlations among the indicators within each category, discarding those that are highly correlated with others. This left 39 indicators to encompass the categories. Of these, eight indicators are highly correlated with the HDI and may therefore be represented by it. But 31 are not highly correlated, suggesting that a full assessment of human development requires a much broader set of indicators than the HDI alone. Following the same procedure, we find that under-five mortality rates perform equally as well as the HDI, and income per capita is less representative of other dimensions of human development. The HDI (and the other two broad indicators) are shown to be worse indicators of the extended categories of human development for OECD countries than for developing countries.

@article{doi10108014649880600815917,
    author = "Ranis, Gustav and Stewart, Frances and Samman, Emma",
    title = "Human Development: Beyond the Human Development Index",
    year = "2006",
    journal = "Journal of Human Development",
    abstract = "The well-known Human Development Index (HDI) encompasses only three rather basic aspects of human welfare. This paper aims to go beyond this, by identifying 11 categories of human development. We next propose plausible candidates as indicators of these categories. We then estimate correlations among the indicators within each category, discarding those that are highly correlated with others. This left 39 indicators to encompass the categories. Of these, eight indicators are highly correlated with the HDI and may therefore be represented by it. But 31 are not highly correlated, suggesting that a full assessment of human development requires a much broader set of indicators than the HDI alone. Following the same procedure, we find that under-five mortality rates perform equally as well as the HDI, and income per capita is less representative of other dimensions of human development. The HDI (and the other two broad indicators) are shown to be worse indicators of the extended categories of human development for OECD countries than for developing countries.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880600815917",
    doi = "10.1080/14649880600815917",
    openalex = "W2047390361",
    references = "doi1023072621505"
}

In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.

@article{doi101017s0140525x07001975,
    author = "Suddendorf, Thomas and Corballis, Michael C.",
    title = "The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans?",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07001975",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x07001975",
    openalex = "W2165108227",
    references = "doi101006jhev19960099, doi101017s0140525x05000105, doi101017s0140525x05000129, doi101017s0305004100015644, doi101037003329091283473, doi101038nrn1180, doi101038nrn1606, doi101126science1098410, doi101126science167391486, doi101126science29855981569, doi105860choice351500, openalexw2126603167"
}

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as "one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.

@article{doi101017s0140525x08003543,
    author = "Penn, Derek C. and Holyoak, Keith J. and Povinelli, Daniel J.",
    title = "Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = {Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as "one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x08003543",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x08003543",
    openalex = "W2118450042",
    references = "doi101017s0140525x00076512, doi101017s0140525x0100396x, doi101017s0140525x99002149, doi1010370033295x1042211, doi10103711059000, doi10103712293000, doi101038nrn1180, doi10106313067010, doi101126science1098410, doi101126science1146282, doi101371journalpbio0050139, doi101537ase188722495, doi104159harvard9780674419131, doi105962bhltitle17416, doi107551mitpress52360010001, doi107551mitpress97802625146200010001, doi107551mitpress97802625273470010001, openalexw2531563875"
}

Kuhn made two attempts at providing an evolutionary analogy for scientific change. The first attempt, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is very brief and unstructured; in this article I discuss some of its weaknesses. Alexander Bird takes this attempt more seriously and provides a criticism based on oversimplified evolutionary assumptions. These assumptions prove to be inadequate for the second, more articulate, evolutionary analogy suggested by Kuhn in “The Road since Structure.” I argue, however, that this second Kuhnian attempt is undermined by his inadequate view of biological progress and by his misunderstanding of the concept of ecological niche.

@article{doi101086647928,
    author = "Renzi, Barbara Gabriella",
    title = "Kuhn's Evolutionary Epistemology and Its Being Undermined by Inadequate Biological Concepts",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "Kuhn made two attempts at providing an evolutionary analogy for scientific change. The first attempt, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is very brief and unstructured; in this article I discuss some of its weaknesses. Alexander Bird takes this attempt more seriously and provides a criticism based on oversimplified evolutionary assumptions. These assumptions prove to be inadequate for the second, more articulate, evolutionary analogy suggested by Kuhn in “The Road since Structure.” I argue, however, that this second Kuhnian attempt is undermined by his inadequate view of biological progress and by his misunderstanding of the concept of ecological niche.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1086/647928",
    doi = "10.1086/647928",
    openalex = "W2085668071",
    references = "doi101007bf00140962"
}

Episodic memory, enabling conscious recollection of past episodes, can be distinguished from semantic memory, which stores enduring facts about the world. Episodic memory shares a core neural network with the simulation of future episodes, enabling mental time travel into both the past and the future. The notion that there might be something distinctly human about mental time travel has provoked ingenious attempts to demonstrate episodic memory or future simulation in non-human animals, but we argue that they have not yet established a capacity comparable to the human faculty. The evolution of the capacity to simulate possible future events, based on episodic memory, enhanced fitness by enabling action in preparation of different possible scenarios that increased present or future survival and reproduction chances. Human language may have evolved in the first instance for the sharing of past and planned future events, and, indeed, fictional ones, further enhancing fitness in social settings.

@article{doi101098rstb20080301,
    author = "Suddendorf, Thomas and Addis, Donna Rose and Corballis, Michael C.",
    title = "Mental time travel and the shaping of the human mind",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences",
    abstract = "Episodic memory, enabling conscious recollection of past episodes, can be distinguished from semantic memory, which stores enduring facts about the world. Episodic memory shares a core neural network with the simulation of future episodes, enabling mental time travel into both the past and the future. The notion that there might be something distinctly human about mental time travel has provoked ingenious attempts to demonstrate episodic memory or future simulation in non-human animals, but we argue that they have not yet established a capacity comparable to the human faculty. The evolution of the capacity to simulate possible future events, based on episodic memory, enhanced fitness by enabling action in preparation of different possible scenarios that increased present or future survival and reproduction chances. Human language may have evolved in the first instance for the sharing of past and planned future events, and, indeed, fictional ones, further enhancing fitness in social settings.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0301",
    doi = "10.1098/rstb.2008.0301",
    openalex = "W2156715492",
    references = "caplan1983morality, doi101016jtics200611004, doi1010370033295x992195, doi10103710538000, doi10103711059000, doi101037h0080017, doi101126science29855981569, doi101136jnnp20111, doi101146annurevneuro27070203144130, doi101146annurevpsych53100901135114, openalexw1519522181"
}

W hile most of the art world turned to abstraction towards the middle of the twentieth century, Philadelphia-born Alice Neel (1900-1984) courageously chose to remain a figure painter.Occasionally she painted the rich and famous-artists, playwrights, scientists, even a papal nuncio-but mostly her subjects were the unnoticed, the overlooked, the difficult.They were her neighbors in Spanish Harlem: stay-at-home mothers, pregnant mothers, door-to-door salesmen, restaurant workers, tradesmen.Nor did she shy away from those most would rather not confront-a dying, querulous old woman, a middle-aged man in the late stages of cancer, a young man ravaged by tuberculosis.But whether her subjects are young, old, famous, unknown, nude or clothed, Neel's gift was to reveal their common denominator: an ineffable, undefinable, invisible human quality we call dignity.T. B. Harlem, completed in 1940, is one of the most well-known of Neel's paintings.Gaunt and resigned, the subject could have been a young man dying on a battlefield of World War II pinned with a medal of honor.Instead he is a young man in a Harlem hospital fighting an all too prevalent disease to the death.His badge of honor covers the wound of thoracoplasty, or surgically induced lung collapse, then a radical treatment of last resort for tuberculosis.Neel also accurately portrays the side-effects of both the treatment and the disease: owing to the loss of several ribs on the affected side, compensatory thoracic and cervical curvatures of the spine pull it into the opposite directions of an S-curve.Atrophied muscles of the arms and hands and the lax abdominal muscles suggest that the battle has been a long one; the atrophy is the result of disuse, the protuberant abdomen indicative of a long-standing lack of proper nutrition.But Neel's painting is not a medical treatise on tuberculosis.It is rather an eloquent essay on the inherent dignity of human beings that exists quite independently of exterior circumstances.

@article{doi10584020099346,
    author = "Benestad, J. Brian",
    title = "Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly",
    abstract = "W hile most of the art world turned to abstraction towards the middle of the twentieth century, Philadelphia-born Alice Neel (1900-1984) courageously chose to remain a figure painter.Occasionally she painted the rich and famous-artists, playwrights, scientists, even a papal nuncio-but mostly her subjects were the unnoticed, the overlooked, the difficult.They were her neighbors in Spanish Harlem: stay-at-home mothers, pregnant mothers, door-to-door salesmen, restaurant workers, tradesmen.Nor did she shy away from those most would rather not confront-a dying, querulous old woman, a middle-aged man in the late stages of cancer, a young man ravaged by tuberculosis.But whether her subjects are young, old, famous, unknown, nude or clothed, Neel's gift was to reveal their common denominator: an ineffable, undefinable, invisible human quality we call dignity.T. B. Harlem, completed in 1940, is one of the most well-known of Neel's paintings.Gaunt and resigned, the subject could have been a young man dying on a battlefield of World War II pinned with a medal of honor.Instead he is a young man in a Harlem hospital fighting an all too prevalent disease to the death.His badge of honor covers the wound of thoracoplasty, or surgically induced lung collapse, then a radical treatment of last resort for tuberculosis.Neel also accurately portrays the side-effects of both the treatment and the disease: owing to the loss of several ribs on the affected side, compensatory thoracic and cervical curvatures of the spine pull it into the opposite directions of an S-curve.Atrophied muscles of the arms and hands and the lax abdominal muscles suggest that the battle has been a long one; the atrophy is the result of disuse, the protuberant abdomen indicative of a long-standing lack of proper nutrition.But Neel's painting is not a medical treatise on tuberculosis.It is rather an eloquent essay on the inherent dignity of human beings that exists quite independently of exterior circumstances.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/20099346",
    doi = "10.5840/20099346",
    openalex = "W2333617604",
    references = "doi101017s0140525x05000129, doi101038427311a, doi101073pnas070039597, doi101126science2705234305, doi101146annurevneuro27070203144216, doi1011861472693972, doi10230720031996, doi1023072063899, doi1023072621505, doi102307jctv19fvzzk20, openalexw1555328317, openalexw2498297308"
}

This article seeks to elucidate the content and implications of two debates that grew up around female orgasm in the 1970s, under the aegis of feminist science and of feminist politics, respectively. The scientific controversy began when a cadre of self‐proclaimed feminist primatologists led by Sarah Blaffer Hrdy insisted, against an overwhelmingly male anthropological consensus, that female orgasm was both present and evolutionarily efficacious in nonhuman primates. This dispute has received two able and very different scholarly treatments, one from historian Donna Haraway and one from philosopher Elisabeth Lloyd. Neither scholar, however, has attended adequately to the background of contemporary feminist politics against which support for the existence of female orgasm in nonhuman primates was construed as the feminist position and against which defending its human uniqueness appeared as a gender‐conservative view. I reject the facile conclusion that the debate was simply a recapitulation of the Victorian contest over human female orgasm projected backward in evolutionary time. Instead, I relate the emergence of the scientific dispute to a contemporaneous controversy internal to second‐wave feminism itself. During the 1970s, the so‐called sex wars pitted feminists who extolled the liberatory potential of women’s sexual pleasure against those who sought to foreground the dangers of sexuality for women. Hrdy’s primatological work, I argue, suggested one conceptual strategy for defusing these political and ideological tensions, by assigning female orgasm to the domain of nature rather than culture.

@article{doi101086648515,
    author = "Bosley, Jocelyn",
    title = "From Monkey Facts to Human Ideologies: Theorizing Female Orgasm in Human and Nonhuman Primates, 1967–1983",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "Signs",
    abstract = "This article seeks to elucidate the content and implications of two debates that grew up around female orgasm in the 1970s, under the aegis of feminist science and of feminist politics, respectively. The scientific controversy began when a cadre of self‐proclaimed feminist primatologists led by Sarah Blaffer Hrdy insisted, against an overwhelmingly male anthropological consensus, that female orgasm was both present and evolutionarily efficacious in nonhuman primates. This dispute has received two able and very different scholarly treatments, one from historian Donna Haraway and one from philosopher Elisabeth Lloyd. Neither scholar, however, has attended adequately to the background of contemporary feminist politics against which support for the existence of female orgasm in nonhuman primates was construed as the feminist position and against which defending its human uniqueness appeared as a gender‐conservative view. I reject the facile conclusion that the debate was simply a recapitulation of the Victorian contest over human female orgasm projected backward in evolutionary time. Instead, I relate the emergence of the scientific dispute to a contemporaneous controversy internal to second‐wave feminism itself. During the 1970s, the so‐called sex wars pitted feminists who extolled the liberatory potential of women’s sexual pleasure against those who sought to foreground the dangers of sexuality for women. Hrdy’s primatological work, I argue, suggested one conceptual strategy for defusing these political and ideological tensions, by assigning female orgasm to the domain of nature rather than culture.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1086/648515",
    doi = "10.1086/648515",
    openalex = "W1978059761",
    references = "doi101017s0730938400015100"
}

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.

@article{doi101017s0140525x10000968,
    author = "Mercier, Hugo and Sperber, Dan",
    title = "Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000968",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x10000968",
    openalex = "W2104256533",
    references = "doi101002sici15206505199865178aidevan530co28, doi101017cbo9780511808098004, doi101017s0140525x00003435, doi101017s0140525x00081061, doi101017s0140525x05000129"
}

Abstract This volume collects twenty-two published and unpublished chapters on a variety of topics related directly to human rights, justice, and the common good. The first nine date from 1970 through to 2007. They begin with a study — in dialectic with Dworkin's earlier lecture on the same themes — of the bearing of contemporary legal and political theory on the incorporation of a declaration of rights and freedoms in British law. There follow chapters on place of rights, and of duties to oneself, in Kant's moral and legal theory and some contemporary interpreters of Kant; on the application classical conceptions of distributive justice to modern problems; on the emergence of the ideal of government limited by, inter alia, respect for human rights, and contemporary distortions of the ideal that are proposed by Rawls, Dworkin, and followers of theirs (not least in relation to marriage); on the place of civic virtues and respect for diverse persons in constitutional order; and two chapters on the great question of migration rights and the legitimacy of national boundaries preventing free and equal migration. Part Two groups three chapters on the justice of punishment, concluding with the mature statement of retribution's place as punishment's formative justifying aim, in engagement especially with Nietzsche's ‘genealogy of morals’. Part Three surveys just way theory in its historic development and current shape. Parts Four, Five, and Six each group three chapters: on autonomy, justice, and euthanasia; on autonomy, justice, and human reproduction; and on marriage in its relation to justice and the common good.

@book{doi101093acprofoso97801995800710010001,
    author = "Finnis, John",
    title = "Human Rights and Common Good",
    year = "2011",
    abstract = "Abstract This volume collects twenty-two published and unpublished chapters on a variety of topics related directly to human rights, justice, and the common good. The first nine date from 1970 through to 2007. They begin with a study — in dialectic with Dworkin's earlier lecture on the same themes — of the bearing of contemporary legal and political theory on the incorporation of a declaration of rights and freedoms in British law. There follow chapters on place of rights, and of duties to oneself, in Kant's moral and legal theory and some contemporary interpreters of Kant; on the application classical conceptions of distributive justice to modern problems; on the emergence of the ideal of government limited by, inter alia, respect for human rights, and contemporary distortions of the ideal that are proposed by Rawls, Dworkin, and followers of theirs (not least in relation to marriage); on the place of civic virtues and respect for diverse persons in constitutional order; and two chapters on the great question of migration rights and the legitimacy of national boundaries preventing free and equal migration. Part Two groups three chapters on the justice of punishment, concluding with the mature statement of retribution's place as punishment's formative justifying aim, in engagement especially with Nietzsche's ‘genealogy of morals’. Part Three surveys just way theory in its historic development and current shape. Parts Four, Five, and Six each group three chapters: on autonomy, justice, and euthanasia; on autonomy, justice, and human reproduction; and on marriage in its relation to justice and the common good.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580071.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580071.001.0001",
    openalex = "W1584457273",
    references = "doi101093ajj32199, doi101093mindxciv374196"
}

This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination, body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.

@article{doi101017s0140525x11001452,
    author = "Vaesen, Krist",
    title = "The cognitive bases of human tool use",
    year = "2012",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination, body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001452",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x11001452",
    openalex = "W2143093968",
    references = "doi101111j14677687201000950x"
}

What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants’ distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant’s rights on the resources to be distributed.

@article{doi101017s0140525x11002202,
    author = "Baumard, Nicolas and André, Jean‐Baptiste and Sperber, Dan",
    title = "A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
    abstract = "What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants’ distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant’s rights on the resources to be distributed.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11002202",
    doi = "10.1017/s0140525x11002202",
    openalex = "W2027076429",
    references = "doi101007978140206287210, doi101017s0140525x11000069, doi101037003329091283473, doi101073pnas0904312106, doi101086668207, doi101126science1216902"
}

@incollection{crossref2014human,
    title = "Human Nature and Morality",
    year = "2014",
    booktitle = "Conjugal Union",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446670.002",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9781107446670.002",
    openalex = "W2500102060",
    pages = "11-36",
    references = "doi101093ajj32199, doi101093oso97801987808470010001, doi1023072621505, doi102307jj2199545712, doi105840newscholas198155218"
}

This book analyses the cultural, neurobiological and psychological aspects of early childhood and their impact on later morality and decision making. Offering an optimistic view of how we can create a society that fosters human success and caring, it puts into developmental context many of the choices we make as adults.

@book{openalexw603647627,
    author = "Narváez, Darcia",
    title = "Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture, and Wisdom",
    year = "2014",
    abstract = "This book analyses the cultural, neurobiological and psychological aspects of early childhood and their impact on later morality and decision making. Offering an optimistic view of how we can create a society that fosters human success and caring, it puts into developmental context many of the choices we make as adults.",
    openalex = "W603647627"
}

@article{reynhout2015human,
    author = "Reynhout, Kenneth A.",
    title = "Human evolution and the nature of morality",
    year = "2015",
    journal = "Theology Today",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1177/0040573615581548",
    doi = "10.1177/0040573615581548",
    number = "2",
    openalex = "W2566268181",
    pages = "135-140",
    volume = "72"
}

@article{czerniak2016moralisation,
    author = "Czerniak, Stanisław",
    title = "Moralisation, Human Nature, Morality",
    year = "2016",
    journal = "Dialogue and Universalism",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/du20162615",
    doi = "10.5840/du20162615",
    number = "1",
    openalex = "W2333711409",
    pages = "39-52",
    volume = "26"
}

Climate change mitigation research is fundamentally motivated by the preservation of human lives and the environmental conditions which enable them. However, the field has to date rather superficial in its appreciation of theoretical claims in well‐being thought, with deep implications for the framing of mitigation priorities, policies, and research. Major strands of well‐being thought are hedonic well‐being—typically referred to as happiness or subjective well‐being—and eudaimonic well‐being, which includes theories of human needs, capabilities, and multidimensional poverty. Aspects of each can be found in political and procedural accounts such as the Sustainable Development Goals. Situating these concepts within the challenges of addressing climate change, the choice of approach is highly consequential for: (1) understanding inter‐ and intra‐generational equity; (2) defining appropriate mitigation strategies; and (3) conceptualizing the socio‐technical provisioning systems that convert biophysical resources into well‐being outcomes. Eudaimonic approaches emphasize the importance of consumption thresholds, beyond which dimensions of well‐being become satiated. Related strands of well‐being and mitigation research suggest constraining consumption to within minimum and maximum consumption levels, inviting normative discussions on the social benefits, climate impacts, and political challenges associated with a given form of provisioning. The question of how current socio‐technical provisioning systems can be shifted towards low‐carbon, well‐being enhancing forms constitutes a new frontier in mitigation research, involving not just technological change and economic incentives, but wide‐ranging social, institutional, and cultural shifts. WIREs Clim Change 2017, 8:e485. doi: 10.1002/wcc.485 This article is categorized under: Climate and Development > Sustainability and Human Well‐Being

@article{doi101002wcc485,
    author = "Lamb, William F. and Steinberger, J.",
    title = "Human well‐being and climate change mitigation",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change",
    abstract = "Climate change mitigation research is fundamentally motivated by the preservation of human lives and the environmental conditions which enable them. However, the field has to date rather superficial in its appreciation of theoretical claims in well‐being thought, with deep implications for the framing of mitigation priorities, policies, and research. Major strands of well‐being thought are hedonic well‐being—typically referred to as happiness or subjective well‐being—and eudaimonic well‐being, which includes theories of human needs, capabilities, and multidimensional poverty. Aspects of each can be found in political and procedural accounts such as the Sustainable Development Goals. Situating these concepts within the challenges of addressing climate change, the choice of approach is highly consequential for: (1) understanding inter‐ and intra‐generational equity; (2) defining appropriate mitigation strategies; and (3) conceptualizing the socio‐technical provisioning systems that convert biophysical resources into well‐being outcomes. Eudaimonic approaches emphasize the importance of consumption thresholds, beyond which dimensions of well‐being become satiated. Related strands of well‐being and mitigation research suggest constraining consumption to within minimum and maximum consumption levels, inviting normative discussions on the social benefits, climate impacts, and political challenges associated with a given form of provisioning. The question of how current socio‐technical provisioning systems can be shifted towards low‐carbon, well‐being enhancing forms constitutes a new frontier in mitigation research, involving not just technological change and economic incentives, but wide‐ranging social, institutional, and cultural shifts. WIREs Clim Change 2017, 8:e485. doi: 10.1002/wcc.485 This article is categorized under: Climate and Development > Sustainability and Human Well‐Being",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.485",
    doi = "10.1002/wcc.485",
    openalex = "W2750539425",
    references = "doi101093ajj32199"
}

Cognitive brain networks such as the default-mode network (DMN), frontoparietal network, and salience network, are key functional networks of the human brain. Here we show that the rapid evolutionary cortical expansion of cognitive networks in the human brain, and most pronounced the DMN, runs parallel with high expression of human-accelerated genes (HAR genes). Using comparative transcriptomics analysis, we present that HAR genes are differentially more expressed in higher-order cognitive networks in humans compared to chimpanzees and macaques and that genes with high expression in the DMN are involved in synapse and dendrite formation. Moreover, HAR and DMN genes show significant associations with individual variations in DMN functional activity, intelligence, sociability, and mental conditions such as schizophrenia and autism. Our results suggest that the expansion of higher-order functional networks subserving increasing cognitive properties has been an important locus of genetic changes in recent human brain evolution.

@article{doi101038s41467019127648,
    author = "Wei, Yongbin and de Lange, Siemon C. and Scholtens, Lianne H. and Watanabe, Kyoko and Ardesch, Dirk Jan and Jansen, Philip R. and Savage, Jeanne E. and Li, Longchuan and Preuss, Todd M. and Rilling, James K. and Posthuma, Daniëlle and van den Heuvel, Martijn P.",
    title = "Genetic mapping and evolutionary analysis of human-expanded cognitive networks",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "Nature Communications",
    abstract = "Cognitive brain networks such as the default-mode network (DMN), frontoparietal network, and salience network, are key functional networks of the human brain. Here we show that the rapid evolutionary cortical expansion of cognitive networks in the human brain, and most pronounced the DMN, runs parallel with high expression of human-accelerated genes (HAR genes). Using comparative transcriptomics analysis, we present that HAR genes are differentially more expressed in higher-order cognitive networks in humans compared to chimpanzees and macaques and that genes with high expression in the DMN are involved in synapse and dendrite formation. Moreover, HAR and DMN genes show significant associations with individual variations in DMN functional activity, intelligence, sociability, and mental conditions such as schizophrenia and autism. Our results suggest that the expansion of higher-order functional networks subserving increasing cognitive properties has been an important locus of genetic changes in recent human brain evolution.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-12764-8",
    doi = "10.1038/s41467-019-12764-8",
    openalex = "W2981674673",
    references = "doi101098rstb20080301"
}

Every human society and almost all of human life are infused with ethics. How do we best understand human morality and ethics? I want to argue that responsible ethics rests on a credible understanding of what it means to be human. This article proposes that a more comprehensive understanding of the distinctive human imagination, religious awareness and morality – all of which are significant aspects of being human – will facilitate a more responsible understanding and practice of ethics. Such an understanding entails a bottom-up view, which takes seriously the exploration of the fundamental evolutionary realities of human nature, that is, a natural history of morality. The quest for understanding the propensity for imagination, religious awareness and morality can be aided by exploring the core role of the evolutionary transition between becoming and being human. Accordingly, this research combines a niche construction perspective with fossil and archaeological evidence, highlighting the role of complexity in human evolution, which adds to our understanding of a completely human way of being in the world. A distinctively human imagination is part of the explanation for human evolutionary success and accordingly our sense of morality and religious disposition. The methodology this article applies is that of an interdisciplinary approach combining perspectives of some of the most prominent voices in the modern discourses on imagination, religious awareness and morality. What results from this approach is, first, a more comprehensive understanding of the human imagination, the capacity for religious awareness and morality. Ultimately, by creatively integrating the various perspectives evident in this research – by way of a philosophical bridge theory between evolutionary anthropology and theology – this article attempts to determine whether evolutionary thought can be constructively appropriated to interdisciplinary Christian theology and ethics.

@article{doi104102htsv75i15350,
    author = "Serfontein, Bernice",
    title = "Imagination, religion and morality: An interdisciplinary approach",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies",
    abstract = "Every human society and almost all of human life are infused with ethics. How do we best understand human morality and ethics? I want to argue that responsible ethics rests on a credible understanding of what it means to be human. This article proposes that a more comprehensive understanding of the distinctive human imagination, religious awareness and morality – all of which are significant aspects of being human – will facilitate a more responsible understanding and practice of ethics. Such an understanding entails a bottom-up view, which takes seriously the exploration of the fundamental evolutionary realities of human nature, that is, a natural history of morality. The quest for understanding the propensity for imagination, religious awareness and morality can be aided by exploring the core role of the evolutionary transition between becoming and being human. Accordingly, this research combines a niche construction perspective with fossil and archaeological evidence, highlighting the role of complexity in human evolution, which adds to our understanding of a completely human way of being in the world. A distinctively human imagination is part of the explanation for human evolutionary success and accordingly our sense of morality and religious disposition. The methodology this article applies is that of an interdisciplinary approach combining perspectives of some of the most prominent voices in the modern discourses on imagination, religious awareness and morality. What results from this approach is, first, a more comprehensive understanding of the human imagination, the capacity for religious awareness and morality. Ultimately, by creatively integrating the various perspectives evident in this research – by way of a philosophical bridge theory between evolutionary anthropology and theology – this article attempts to determine whether evolutionary thought can be constructively appropriated to interdisciplinary Christian theology and ethics.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v75i1.5350",
    doi = "10.4102/hts.v75i1.5350",
    openalex = "W2950850702",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511814686, doi101017s0094837300004310, doi1010370033295x1084814, doi101537ase188722495, doi102307jctt1cgf6tc14, doi104102htsv75i15350, doi105860choice294184, openalexw1498642788, openalexw1581387623, openalexw1987789700, openalexw2799156793, reynhout2015human"
}

Every human society as well as almost all human life is infused with ethics. There is common acknowledgement that morality and ethics are indispensable in addressing the serious global challenges humanity is faced with today. However, we seemed to have lost our grip on what morality is. How do we best understand human morality and ethics? This research argues that responsible ethics rests on a credible understanding of what it means to be human. The following exploration of the emergence of religion within the science and religion discourse formed part of a series of three seminars that have as their main objective to address a giant void regarding ethical and moral reflection within our society. This research was part of the discourse of the first seminar with the following main research question: What do we learn from the empirical study of morality (in the evolutionary sciences, the neurosciences, cultural anthropology, sociology, and moral psychology) about the sources, functions and characteristics of morality, and its relation to religion? This study offers an exploration of our capacity for religious awareness and belief against the background of niche construction theory. The capacity for imagination seems to have contributed to human evolutionary success and consequently our religious disposition. This transdisciplinary study combines perspectives of some of the most prominent interlocutors in the contemporary discourse on the emergence of religious awareness. By integrating the numerous perspectives evident in this study, this research explores how evolutionary thought can be constructively appropriated to interdisciplinary theology and ethics.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article explores the origin of religious awareness and belief as part of a larger discourse on morality in history. The interdisciplinary conversation covers the fields of evolutionary anthropology and theology within the contemporary science-theology discourses.

@article{doi104102vev45i12931,
    author = "Serfontein, Bernice",
    title = "Evolving belief and being human: The emergence of religion in science and theology",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Verbum et Ecclesia",
    abstract = "Every human society as well as almost all human life is infused with ethics. There is common acknowledgement that morality and ethics are indispensable in addressing the serious global challenges humanity is faced with today. However, we seemed to have lost our grip on what morality is. How do we best understand human morality and ethics? This research argues that responsible ethics rests on a credible understanding of what it means to be human. The following exploration of the emergence of religion within the science and religion discourse formed part of a series of three seminars that have as their main objective to address a giant void regarding ethical and moral reflection within our society. This research was part of the discourse of the first seminar with the following main research question: What do we learn from the empirical study of morality (in the evolutionary sciences, the neurosciences, cultural anthropology, sociology, and moral psychology) about the sources, functions and characteristics of morality, and its relation to religion? This study offers an exploration of our capacity for religious awareness and belief against the background of niche construction theory. The capacity for imagination seems to have contributed to human evolutionary success and consequently our religious disposition. This transdisciplinary study combines perspectives of some of the most prominent interlocutors in the contemporary discourse on the emergence of religious awareness. By integrating the numerous perspectives evident in this study, this research explores how evolutionary thought can be constructively appropriated to interdisciplinary theology and ethics.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article explores the origin of religious awareness and belief as part of a larger discourse on morality in history. The interdisciplinary conversation covers the fields of evolutionary anthropology and theology within the contemporary science-theology discourses.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v45i1.2931",
    doi = "10.4102/ve.v45i1.2931",
    openalex = "W4399327887",
    references = "doi104102htsv75i15350"
}

@incollection{crossrefNonemorality,
    title = "Morality and Human Nature",
    year = "None",
    booktitle = "Moral Vision and Tradition",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22h6r0w.10",
    doi = "10.2307/j.ctt22h6r0w.10",
    openalex = "W2586659272",
    pages = "100-118"
}