Knowledge

George Boole (1815-1864), a largely self-taught English mathematician, philosopher, and logician, published his monographs on algebraic logic in 1854. p. 37: Foundation of logic p. 47: Multiplication by zero. Peano's axiom. Error: see among other IJMTT p. 48: Def. 0 and 1 p. 48: Def. Anti X. Comment: To restricted. p. 49: principium contradictionis Boole's axioms of the theory of probability p. 249: q = 1-p p. 249: p(A and B) = p(A)*p(B) Boole's theory of causality pp. 320-337: Download at / see also: archive.org archive.org

@book{doi105962bhltitle29413,
    author = "Boole, George",
    title = "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on Which Are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities (1854)",
    year = "1854",
    abstract = "George Boole (1815-1864), a largely self-taught English mathematician, philosopher, and logician, published his monographs on algebraic logic in 1854. p. 37: Foundation of logic p. 47: Multiplication by zero. Peano's axiom. Error: see among other IJMTT p. 48: Def. 0 and 1 p. 48: Def. Anti X. Comment: To restricted. p. 49: principium contradictionis Boole's axioms of the theory of probability p. 249: q = 1-p p. 249: p(A and B) = p(A)*p(B) Boole's theory of causality pp. 320-337: Download at / see also: archive.org archive.org",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.29413",
    doi = "10.5962/bhl.title.29413",
    openalex = "W1563590311"
}

@article{doi101093aristotelian111108,
    author = "Russell, Bertrand",
    title = "V.—Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description",
    year = "1911",
    journal = "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/11.1.108",
    doi = "10.1093/aristotelian/11.1.108",
    openalex = "W2505960753"
}

@article{doi1010970000505319550700000020,
    author = "Johnson, Donald M.",
    title = "THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT AND JUDGMENT",
    year = "1955",
    journal = "The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-195507000-00020",
    doi = "10.1097/00005053-195507000-00020",
    openalex = "W2086084585"
}

The pioneering linguist Benjamin Whorf (1897--1941) grasped the relationship between human language and human thinking: how language can shape our innermost thoughts. His basic thesis is that our perception of the world and our ways of thinking about it are deeply influenced by the structure of the languages we speak. The writings collected in this volume include important papers on the Maya, Hopi, and Shawnee languages as well as more general reflections on language and meaning.

@article{doi1023071419256,
    author = "Miller, George A. and Carroll, John B.",
    title = "Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf",
    year = "1957",
    journal = "The American Journal of Psychology",
    abstract = "The pioneering linguist Benjamin Whorf (1897--1941) grasped the relationship between human language and human thinking: how language can shape our innermost thoughts. His basic thesis is that our perception of the world and our ways of thinking about it are deeply influenced by the structure of the languages we speak. The writings collected in this volume include important papers on the Maya, Hopi, and Shawnee languages as well as more general reflections on language and meaning.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/1419256",
    doi = "10.2307/1419256",
    openalex = "W2058429865"
}

@article{doi101037h0040373,
    author = "Campbell, Donald T.",
    title = "Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in other knowledge processes.",
    year = "1960",
    journal = "Psychological Review",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040373",
    doi = "10.1037/h0040373",
    openalex = "W1979625382",
    references = "doi101037h0048495, doi101037h0055425, doi101037h0093599, doi101086214592, doi1010970000505319440200000051, doi1023072228083, doi1023073709394, openalexw1492160417, openalexw1972586294, openalexw2126451342"
}

Journal Article Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Get access Edmund L. Gettier Edmund L. Gettier Wayne State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 23, Issue 6, June 1963, Pages 121–123, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121 Published: 01 June 1963

@article{doi101093analys236121,
    author = "Gettier, Edmund L.",
    title = "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?",
    year = "1963",
    journal = "Analysis",
    abstract = "Journal Article Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Get access Edmund L. Gettier Edmund L. Gettier Wayne State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 23, Issue 6, June 1963, Pages 121–123, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121 Published: 01 June 1963",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121",
    doi = "10.1093/analys/23.6.121",
    openalex = "W1966129247"
}

A general and systematic account of the role of knowledge in society aimed to stimulate both critical discussion and empirical investigations. This book is concerned with the sociology of 'everything that passes for knowledge in society'. It focuses particularly on that 'common-sense knowledge' which constitutes the reality of everyday life for the ordinary member of society. The authors are concerned to present an analysis of knowledge in everyday life in the context of a theory of society as a dialectical process between objective and subjective reality. Their development of a theory of institutions, legitimations and socializations has implications beyond the discipline of sociology, and their 'humanistic' approach has considerable relevance for other social scientists, historians, philosophers and anthropologists.

@article{doi1023072091739,
    author = "Simpson, George L. and Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas",
    title = "The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.",
    year = "1967",
    journal = "American Sociological Review",
    abstract = "A general and systematic account of the role of knowledge in society aimed to stimulate both critical discussion and empirical investigations. This book is concerned with the sociology of 'everything that passes for knowledge in society'. It focuses particularly on that 'common-sense knowledge' which constitutes the reality of everyday life for the ordinary member of society. The authors are concerned to present an analysis of knowledge in everyday life in the context of a theory of society as a dialectical process between objective and subjective reality. Their development of a theory of institutions, legitimations and socializations has implications beyond the discipline of sociology, and their 'humanistic' approach has considerable relevance for other social scientists, historians, philosophers and anthropologists.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2091739",
    doi = "10.2307/2091739",
    openalex = "W2073506374",
    references = "doi10106313050879, doi1023072217783"
}

Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists.

@book{doi101017cbo9781139171434,
    author = "Lakatos, Imre 1922-1974 and Musgrave, Alan 1940-",
    title = "Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge",
    year = "1970",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139171434",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9781139171434",
    openalex = "W4231992040"
}

Acknowledgments Preface 1. Communication theory 2. Communication and information 3. A semantic theory of information 4. Knowledge 5. The communication channel 6. Sensation and perception 7. Coding and content 8. The structure of belief 9. Concepts and meaning Notes Index.

@article{doi1023072184492,
    author = "Alston, William P. and Dretske, Fred",
    title = "Knowledge and the Flow of Information.",
    year = "1983",
    journal = "The Philosophical Review",
    abstract = "Acknowledgments Preface 1. Communication theory 2. Communication and information 3. A semantic theory of information 4. Knowledge 5. The communication channel 6. Sensation and perception 7. Coding and content 8. The structure of belief 9. Concepts and meaning Notes Index.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2184492",
    doi = "10.2307/2184492",
    openalex = "W2074229945"
}

KL-ONE is o system for representing knowledge in Artificial Intelligence programs. It has been developed and refined over o long period ond hos been used in both basic research and implemented knowledge-based systems in a number of places in the Al community. Here we present the kernel ideas of KL-ONE, emphasizing its ability to form complex structured descriptions. In addition to detailing oil of KL-ONE’s description-forming structures, we discuss o bit of the philosophy underlying the system, highlight notions of taxonomy and clossificotion that ore central to it, ond include on extended example of the use of KL-ONE and its classifier in a recognition task.

@article{doi101016s0364021385800148,
    author = "Brachman, R. J. and Schmolze, James G.",
    title = "An overview of the KL-ONE Knowledge Representation System",
    year = "1985",
    journal = "Cognitive Science",
    abstract = "KL-ONE is o system for representing knowledge in Artificial Intelligence programs. It has been developed and refined over o long period ond hos been used in both basic research and implemented knowledge-based systems in a number of places in the Al community. Here we present the kernel ideas of KL-ONE, emphasizing its ability to form complex structured descriptions. In addition to detailing oil of KL-ONE’s description-forming structures, we discuss o bit of the philosophy underlying the system, highlight notions of taxonomy and clossificotion that ore central to it, ond include on extended example of the use of KL-ONE and its classifier in a recognition task.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0364-0213(85)80014-8",
    doi = "10.1016/s0364-0213(85)80014-8",
    openalex = "W2159525276",
    references = "doi10100797894010255779"
}

There is clear evidence that parents can and do influence children. There is equally clear evidence that children's genetic makeup affects their own behavioral characteristics, and also influences the way they are treated by their parents. Twin and...Read More

@article{doi101146annurevps38020187001223,
    author = "Oden, Gregg C.",
    title = "Concept, Knowledge, and Thought",
    year = "1987",
    journal = "Annual Review of Psychology",
    abstract = "There is clear evidence that parents can and do influence children. There is equally clear evidence that children's genetic makeup affects their own behavioral characteristics, and also influences the way they are treated by their parents. Twin and...Read More",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.001223",
    doi = "10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.001223",
    openalex = "W2178853169",
    references = "doi101016b9780125058506500104, doi1010370033295x826407, doi1010370033295x853207, doi1010370033295x89160, doi1010370033295x923289, doi1010370033295x934411, doi101037h0048495, doi10108017470216008416717, doi1043249781032633275, openalexw3107271803"
}

@article{doi105840teachphil198811256,
    author = "McIntosh, Clifton",
    title = "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge",
    year = "1988",
    journal = "Teaching Philosophy",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198811256",
    doi = "10.5840/teachphil198811256",
    openalex = "W1999773059"
}

@misc{halpern1989thought1,
    author = "Halpern, D. F",
    title = "Thought and Knowledge [2nd ed.]",
    year = "1989",
    howpublished = "Hillsdale, New Jersey, Erlbaum, 517 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Halpern, D. F., 1989, Thought and Knowledge [2nd ed.]: Hillsdale, New Jersey, Erlbaum, 517 p.}"
}

Contents: Preface. Thinking: An Introduction. Memory: The Acquisition, Retention, and Retrieval of Knowledge. The Relationship Between Thought and Language. Reasoning: Drawing Deductively Valid Conclusions. Analyzing Arguments. Thinking as Hypothesis Testing. Likelihood and Uncertainty: Understanding Probabilities. Decision Making. Development of Problem-Solving Skills. Creative Thinking. The Last Word.

@book{openalexw2077988938,
    author = "Halpern, Diane F.",
    title = "Thought and Knowledge: An Introduction to Critical Thinking",
    year = "1989",
    abstract = "Contents: Preface. Thinking: An Introduction. Memory: The Acquisition, Retention, and Retrieval of Knowledge. The Relationship Between Thought and Language. Reasoning: Drawing Deductively Valid Conclusions. Analyzing Arguments. Thinking as Hypothesis Testing. Likelihood and Uncertainty: Understanding Probabilities. Decision Making. Development of Problem-Solving Skills. Creative Thinking. The Last Word.",
    url = "https://openalex.org/W2077988938",
    openalex = "W2077988938"
}

In spite of the double burden of racial and gender discrimination, African-American women have developed a rich intellectual tradition that is not widely known. In Black Feminist Thought, Patricia Hill Collins explores the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals as well as those African-American women outside academe. She provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. The result is a superbly crafted book that provides the first synthetic overview of Black feminist thought.

@article{doi1023072074808,
    author = "Brewer, Rose M. and Collins, Patrícia Hill",
    title = "Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment.",
    year = "1992",
    journal = "Contemporary Sociology A Journal of Reviews",
    abstract = "In spite of the double burden of racial and gender discrimination, African-American women have developed a rich intellectual tradition that is not widely known. In Black Feminist Thought, Patricia Hill Collins explores the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals as well as those African-American women outside academe. She provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. The result is a superbly crafted book that provides the first synthetic overview of Black feminist thought.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2074808",
    doi = "10.2307/2074808",
    openalex = "W2005061283"
}

Contents: Part I:Introduction. R. Case, General and Specific Views of the Mind, its Structure, and its Development. R. Case, A Neo-Piagetian Approach to the Issue of Cognitive Generality and Specificity. R. Case, Advantages and Limitations of the Neo-Piagetian Position. Part II:The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Logico-Mathematical Thought. Z. Marini, Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Development of Children's Scientific Reasoning. S. Griffin, R. Case, R. Sandieson, Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Acquisition of Children's Everyday Mathematical Knowledge. A.M. Capodilupo, A Neo-Structural Analysis of Children's Response to Instruction in the Sight-Reading of Musical Notation. R. Case, R. Sandieson, Testing for the Presence of a Central Quantative Structure: Use of the Transfer Paradigm. Part III:The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Social and Emotional Thought. J. Goldberg-Reitman, Young Girls' Conception of Their Mothers' Role: A Neo- Structural Analysis. M. Bruchkowsky, The Development of Empathic Cognition in Middle and Early Childhood. A. McKeough, A Neo-Structural Analysis of Children's Narrative and its Development. S. Griffin, Young Children's Awareness of Their Inner World: A Neo-Structural Analysis of the Development of Intrapersonal Intelligence. A. McKeough, Testing for the Presence of a Central Social Structure: Use of the Transfer Paradigm. Part IV:The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Spatial Thought. S. Dennis, Stage and Structure in the Development of Children's Spatial Representations. D.T. Reid, Horizontal and Vertical Structure: Stages and Substages in Children's Motor Development. Part V:Cross-Domain Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Acquisition of Different Central Conceptual Structures. R. Case, S. Griffin, A. McKeough, Y. Okamoto, Parallels in the Development of Children's Social, Numerical, and Spatial Thought. J. Crammond, Analyzing the Basic Cognitive-Developmental Processes of Children with Specific Types of Learning Disability. M. Porath, Stage and Structure in the Development of Children with Various Types of Giftedness. T.A. Fiati, Cross-Cultural Variation in the Structure of Children's Thought. Part VI:Conclusion. R. Case, The Mind and its Modules: Toward a Multi-Level View of the Development of Human Intelligence.

@article{doi105860choice296574,
    title = "The mind's staircase: exploring the conceptual underpinnings of children's thought and knowledge",
    year = "1992",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "Contents: Part I:Introduction. R. Case, General and Specific Views of the Mind, its Structure, and its Development. R. Case, A Neo-Piagetian Approach to the Issue of Cognitive Generality and Specificity. R. Case, Advantages and Limitations of the Neo-Piagetian Position. Part II:The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Logico-Mathematical Thought. Z. Marini, Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Development of Children's Scientific Reasoning. S. Griffin, R. Case, R. Sandieson, Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Acquisition of Children's Everyday Mathematical Knowledge. A.M. Capodilupo, A Neo-Structural Analysis of Children's Response to Instruction in the Sight-Reading of Musical Notation. R. Case, R. Sandieson, Testing for the Presence of a Central Quantative Structure: Use of the Transfer Paradigm. Part III:The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Social and Emotional Thought. J. Goldberg-Reitman, Young Girls' Conception of Their Mothers' Role: A Neo- Structural Analysis. M. Bruchkowsky, The Development of Empathic Cognition in Middle and Early Childhood. A. McKeough, A Neo-Structural Analysis of Children's Narrative and its Development. S. Griffin, Young Children's Awareness of Their Inner World: A Neo-Structural Analysis of the Development of Intrapersonal Intelligence. A. McKeough, Testing for the Presence of a Central Social Structure: Use of the Transfer Paradigm. Part IV:The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Spatial Thought. S. Dennis, Stage and Structure in the Development of Children's Spatial Representations. D.T. Reid, Horizontal and Vertical Structure: Stages and Substages in Children's Motor Development. Part V:Cross-Domain Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Acquisition of Different Central Conceptual Structures. R. Case, S. Griffin, A. McKeough, Y. Okamoto, Parallels in the Development of Children's Social, Numerical, and Spatial Thought. J. Crammond, Analyzing the Basic Cognitive-Developmental Processes of Children with Specific Types of Learning Disability. M. Porath, Stage and Structure in the Development of Children with Various Types of Giftedness. T.A. Fiati, Cross-Cultural Variation in the Structure of Children's Thought. Part VI:Conclusion. R. Case, The Mind and its Modules: Toward a Multi-Level View of the Development of Human Intelligence.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.29-6574",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.29-6574",
    openalex = "W1527168894"
}

@article{doi1010160165489694900051,
    author = "Fagin, Ronald 1945- and Halpern, Joseph Y. 1953- and Moses, Yoram 1957- and Vardi, Moshe Y. 1954-",
    title = "Reasoning about knowledge",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)90005-1",
    doi = "10.1016/0165-4896(94)90005-1",
    openalex = "W2146819619"
}

This paper proposes a paradigm for managing the dynamic aspects of organizational knowledge creating processes. Its central theme is that organizational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge. The nature of this dialogue is examined and four patterns of interaction involving tacit and explicit knowledge are identified. It is argued that while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organizations play a critical role in articulating and amplifying that knowledge. A theoretical framework is developed which provides an analytical perspective on the constituent dimensions of knowledge creation. This framework is then applied in two operational models for facilitating the dynamic creation of appropriate organizational knowledge.

@article{doi101287orsc5114,
    author = "Nonaka, Ikujiro",
    title = "A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Organization Science",
    abstract = "This paper proposes a paradigm for managing the dynamic aspects of organizational knowledge creating processes. Its central theme is that organizational knowledge is created through a continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge. The nature of this dialogue is examined and four patterns of interaction involving tacit and explicit knowledge are identified. It is argued that while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organizations play a critical role in articulating and amplifying that knowledge. A theoretical framework is developed which provides an analytical perspective on the constituent dimensions of knowledge creation. This framework is then applied in two operational models for facilitating the dynamic creation of appropriate organizational knowledge.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.5.1.14",
    doi = "10.1287/orsc.5.1.14",
    openalex = "W2132454116",
    references = "doi101007bf00623322, doi101016b9780750670098500161, doi101016b978075069718750010x, doi10105797811373995950007, doi101093acprofoso97801982455370010001, doi101287orsc2140, doi1023072184492, doi1023072392088, doi1023072989929, doi1023073709394, doi10230741166514, doi102307429816, doi107208chicago97802264709930010001, openalexw1498488428, openalexw2024135760, openalexw2398143670"
}

@article{doi101006ijhc19951066,
    author = "Guarino, Nicola",
    title = "Formal ontology, conceptual analysis and knowledge representation",
    year = "1995",
    journal = "International Journal of Human-Computer Studies",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1006/ijhc.1995.1066",
    doi = "10.1006/ijhc.1995.1066",
    openalex = "W1991183254",
    references = "openalexw1511493290, openalexw1556837482"
}

1. I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge-at least as enjoyed by rational animals-is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons.2 My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of standings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. That it is a deformation is something we can learn from how unsatisfactory the familiar dialectic is.

@article{doi1023072108338,
    author = "McDowell, John",
    title = "Knowledge and the Internal",
    year = "1995",
    journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
    abstract = "1. I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge-at least as enjoyed by rational animals-is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons.2 My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of standings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. That it is a deformation is something we can learn from how unsatisfactory the familiar dialectic is.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2108338",
    doi = "10.2307/2108338",
    openalex = "W2325092135"
}

Robbie Case, Yukari Okamoto, Sharon Griffin, Anne McKeough, Charles Bleiker, Barbara Henderson, Kimberly Marra Stephenson, Robert S. Siegler, Daniel P. Keating, The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Thought, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 61, No. 1/2, The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Thought (1996), pp. i+iii-vi+1-295

@article{doi1023071166077,
    author = "Case, Robbie and Okamoto, Yukari and Griffin, Sharon and McKeough, Anne and Bleiker, Charles and Henderson, Barbara and Stephenson, Kimberly Marra and Siegler, Robert S. and Keating, Daniel P.",
    title = "The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Thought",
    year = "1996",
    journal = "Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development",
    abstract = "Robbie Case, Yukari Okamoto, Sharon Griffin, Anne McKeough, Charles Bleiker, Barbara Henderson, Kimberly Marra Stephenson, Robert S. Siegler, Daniel P. Keating, The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Thought, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 61, No. 1/2, The Role of Central Conceptual Structures in the Development of Children's Thought (1996), pp. i+iii-vi+1-295",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/1166077",
    doi = "10.2307/1166077",
    openalex = "W2014366154",
    references = "doi105860choice296574"
}

Part 1 Thought: the mysteries of Islam foreign influences and recurring Isma'ili motifs in the Rasa'il of the brethren of purity the neoplatonic substrate of Suhrawardi's philosophy of illumination - Falsafa as Tasawwuf theophany as paradox - Ibn al-'Arabi's account of al-Khadir in his Fusus al-Hikam the breath of Felicity - Adab, Ahwal of Maqamat and Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi. Part 2 Travel: Ibn Jubayr - penitent pilgrim and observant traveller myth, miracle and magic in the Rihla of Ibn Battuta Arabia and the pilgrim paradigm of Ibn Battuta - a Braudelian approach basic structures and sign of alienation in the Rihla of Ibn Jubayr tourist Adab and Cairene architecture - the medieval paradigm of Ibn Jubayr and Ibn Battuta.

@article{doi105860choice335051,
    title = "Seek knowledge: thought and travel in the House of Islam",
    year = "1996",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "Part 1 Thought: the mysteries of Islam foreign influences and recurring Isma'ili motifs in the Rasa'il of the brethren of purity the neoplatonic substrate of Suhrawardi's philosophy of illumination - Falsafa as Tasawwuf theophany as paradox - Ibn al-'Arabi's account of al-Khadir in his Fusus al-Hikam the breath of Felicity - Adab, Ahwal of Maqamat and Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi. Part 2 Travel: Ibn Jubayr - penitent pilgrim and observant traveller myth, miracle and magic in the Rihla of Ibn Battuta Arabia and the pilgrim paradigm of Ibn Battuta - a Braudelian approach basic structures and sign of alienation in the Rihla of Ibn Jubayr tourist Adab and Cairene architecture - the medieval paradigm of Ibn Jubayr and Ibn Battuta.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.33-5051",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.33-5051",
    openalex = "W604472297"
}

Abstract A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but replaces its customary emphasis on solitary knowers with a focus on social institutions and interpersonal practices. Postmodernism, science studies, and pragmatism pose worries about the meaning and attainability of objective truth and knowledge. After laying these concerns to rest, “veritistic” social epistemology is advanced as a normative discipline seeking practices and institutions that would best foster knowledge. The book explores forms and methods of communication, including norms of argumentation, information technology, and institutional structures governing speech and the media. Social dimensions of knowledge quests are explored in science, law, democracy, and education. The book examines popular topics in contemporary epistemology such as testimony and Bayesianism, while breaking new ground by connecting epistemology with historically unrelated branches of philosophy such as political and legal theory. Democracy's success, it is argued, requires the attainment of certain epistemic desiderata, and substantive justice depends on well‐chosen procedures of legal evidence.

@book{doi10109301982382070010001,
    author = "Goldman, Alvin I.",
    title = "Knowledge in a Social World",
    year = "1999",
    abstract = "Abstract A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but replaces its customary emphasis on solitary knowers with a focus on social institutions and interpersonal practices. Postmodernism, science studies, and pragmatism pose worries about the meaning and attainability of objective truth and knowledge. After laying these concerns to rest, “veritistic” social epistemology is advanced as a normative discipline seeking practices and institutions that would best foster knowledge. The book explores forms and methods of communication, including norms of argumentation, information technology, and institutional structures governing speech and the media. Social dimensions of knowledge quests are explored in science, law, democracy, and education. The book examines popular topics in contemporary epistemology such as testimony and Bayesianism, while breaking new ground by connecting epistemology with historically unrelated branches of philosophy such as political and legal theory. Democracy's success, it is argued, requires the attainment of certain epistemic desiderata, and substantive justice depends on well‐chosen procedures of legal evidence.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238207.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/0198238207.001.0001",
    openalex = "W2081443600",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511625398, doi101086288975, doi10109301982470440010001"
}

INTRODUCTION 1. A STATE OF MIND 2. BROADNESS 3. PRIMENESS 4. ANTI-LUMINOSITY 5. MARGINS AND ITERATIONS 6. AN APPLICATION 7. SENSITIVITY 8. SCEPTICISM 9. EVIDENCE 10. EVIDENTIAL PROBABILITY 11. ASSERTION 12. STRUCTURAL UNKNOWABILITY APPENDICES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX.

@article{openalexw3127507699,
    author = "Williamson, Timothy",
    title = "Knowledge and Its Limits",
    year = "2000",
    abstract = "INTRODUCTION 1. A STATE OF MIND 2. BROADNESS 3. PRIMENESS 4. ANTI-LUMINOSITY 5. MARGINS AND ITERATIONS 6. AN APPLICATION 7. SENSITIVITY 8. SCEPTICISM 9. EVIDENCE 10. EVIDENTIAL PROBABILITY 11. ASSERTION 12. STRUCTURAL UNKNOWABILITY APPENDICES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX.",
    openalex = "W3127507699"
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Abstract This study examined the outcomes of a unit that integrates explicit teaching of general reasoning patterns into the teaching of a specific science content. Specifically, this article examined the teaching of argumentation skills in the context of dilemmas in human genetics. Before instruction only a minority (16.2%) of the students referred to correct, specific biological knowledge in constructing arguments in the context of dilemmas in genetics. Approximately 90% of the students were successful in formulating simple arguments. An assessment that took place following instruction supported the conclusion that integrating explicit teaching of argumentation into the teaching of dilemmas in human genetics enhances performance in both biological knowledge and argumentation. An increase was found in the frequency of students who referred to correct, specific biological knowledge in constructing arguments. Students in the experimental group scored significantly higher than students in the comparison group in a test of genetics knowledge. An increase was also found in the quality of students' argumentation. Students were able to transfer the reasoning abilities taught in the context of genetics to the context of dilemmas taken from everyday life. The effects of metacognitive thinking and of changing students' thinking dispositions by modifying what is considered valuable in the class culture are discussed. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 39: 35–62, 2002

@article{doi101002tea10008,
    author = "Zohar, Anat and Nemet, Flora",
    title = "Fostering students' knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "Journal of Research in Science Teaching",
    abstract = "Abstract This study examined the outcomes of a unit that integrates explicit teaching of general reasoning patterns into the teaching of a specific science content. Specifically, this article examined the teaching of argumentation skills in the context of dilemmas in human genetics. Before instruction only a minority (16.2\%) of the students referred to correct, specific biological knowledge in constructing arguments in the context of dilemmas in genetics. Approximately 90\% of the students were successful in formulating simple arguments. An assessment that took place following instruction supported the conclusion that integrating explicit teaching of argumentation into the teaching of dilemmas in human genetics enhances performance in both biological knowledge and argumentation. An increase was found in the frequency of students who referred to correct, specific biological knowledge in constructing arguments. Students in the experimental group scored significantly higher than students in the comparison group in a test of genetics knowledge. An increase was also found in the quality of students' argumentation. Students were able to transfer the reasoning abilities taught in the context of genetics to the context of dilemmas taken from everyday life. The effects of metacognitive thinking and of changing students' thinking dispositions by modifying what is considered valuable in the class culture are discussed. © 2002 John Wiley \& Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 39: 35–62, 2002",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/tea.10008",
    doi = "10.1002/tea.10008",
    openalex = "W1978941103",
    references = "openalexw2077988938"
}

Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like geological upheavals in a landscape, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain and prone to reversal. Are they simply, as some have claimed, animal energies or impulses with no connection to our thoughts? Or are they rather suffused with intelligence and discernment, and thus a source of deep awareness and understanding? In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but as highly discriminating responses to what is of value and importance. She explores and illuminates the structure of a wide range of emotions, in particular compassion and love, showing that there can be no adequate ethical theory without an adequate theory of the emotions. This involves understanding their cultural sources, their history in infancy and childhood, and their sometimes unpredictable and disorderly operations in our daily lives.

@book{doi101017cbo9780511840715,
    author = "Nussbaum, Martha C.",
    title = "Upheavals of Thought",
    year = "2001",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like geological upheavals in a landscape, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain and prone to reversal. Are they simply, as some have claimed, animal energies or impulses with no connection to our thoughts? Or are they rather suffused with intelligence and discernment, and thus a source of deep awareness and understanding? In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but as highly discriminating responses to what is of value and importance. She explores and illuminates the structure of a wide range of emotions, in particular compassion and love, showing that there can be no adequate ethical theory without an adequate theory of the emotions. This involves understanding their cultural sources, their history in infancy and childhood, and their sometimes unpredictable and disorderly operations in our daily lives.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511840715",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511840715",
    openalex = "W3173899014"
}

@article{doi1011110029462400349,
    author = "Rysiew, Patrick",
    title = "The Context‐Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "Noûs",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00349",
    doi = "10.1111/0029-4624.00349",
    openalex = "W2018438453"
}

Knowledge is a broad and abstract notion that has defined epistemological debate in western philosophy since the classical Greek era. In the past few years, however, there has been a growing interest in treating knowledge as a significant organizational resource. Consistent with the interest in organizational knowledge and knowledge management (KM), IS researchers have begun promoting a class of information systems, referred to as knowledge management systems (KMS). The objective of KMS is to support creation, transfer, and application of knowledge in organizations. Knowledge and knowledge management are complex and multi-faceted concepts. Thus, effective development and implementation of KMS requires a foundation in several rich literatures. To be credible, KMS research and development should preserve and build upon the significant literature that exists in different but related fields. This paper provides a review and interpretation of knowledge management literatures in different fields with an eye toward identifying the important areas for research. We present a detailed process view of organizational knowledge management with a focus on the potential role of information technology in this process. Drawing upon the literature review and analysis of knowledge management processes, we discuss several important research issues surrounding the knowledge management processes and the role of IT in support of these processes.

@article{doi1023073250961,
    author = "Alavi, Maryam and Leidner, Dorothy E.",
    title = "Review: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Management Systems: Conceptual Foundations And Research Issues1,2",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "MIS Quarterly",
    abstract = "Knowledge is a broad and abstract notion that has defined epistemological debate in western philosophy since the classical Greek era. In the past few years, however, there has been a growing interest in treating knowledge as a significant organizational resource. Consistent with the interest in organizational knowledge and knowledge management (KM), IS researchers have begun promoting a class of information systems, referred to as knowledge management systems (KMS). The objective of KMS is to support creation, transfer, and application of knowledge in organizations. Knowledge and knowledge management are complex and multi-faceted concepts. Thus, effective development and implementation of KMS requires a foundation in several rich literatures. To be credible, KMS research and development should preserve and build upon the significant literature that exists in different but related fields. This paper provides a review and interpretation of knowledge management literatures in different fields with an eye toward identifying the important areas for research. We present a detailed process view of organizational knowledge management with a focus on the potential role of information technology in this process. Drawing upon the literature review and analysis of knowledge management processes, we discuss several important research issues surrounding the knowledge management processes and the role of IT in support of these processes.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/3250961",
    doi = "10.2307/3250961",
    openalex = "W2098118776",
    references = "doi101287orsc2188, doi101287orsc5114, doi1023072184492, doi1023072232409, doi10230741165942, openalexw3124140110"
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Abstract Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims.

@book{doi10109301992463190010001,
    author = "Kornblith, Hilary�",
    title = "Knowledge and its Place in Nature",
    year = "2002",
    abstract = "Abstract Argues that conceptual analysis should be rejected in favour of a more naturalistic approach to epistemology. There is a robust natural phenomenon of knowledge; knowledge is a natural kind. An examination of the cognitive ethology literature reveals a category of knowledge that does both causal and explanatory work. It is argued that knowledge in this very sense is what philosophers have been talking about all along. Rival accounts of knowledge that are more demanding—requiring either that certain social conditions be met or that an agent engage in some sort of reflection—are discussed in detail, and it is argued that they are inadequate to the phenomenon. In addition, it is argued that the account of knowledge that emerges from the cognitive ethology literature can provide an explanation of the normative force of epistemic claims.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246319.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/0199246319.001.0001",
    openalex = "W1591428544",
    references = "doi10109301992462970010001, doi1023074086942, openalexw631493948"
}

Abstract The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of truth, belief, and other factors, such as justification. Rather, belief is a state whose successful form is knowledge, and justification is on the basis of knowledge, which is acquainted with evidence. Knowing is as much a mental state as believing, but it is world‐involving because one can know only what is true; the book extends the externalist conception of mind from the contents of mental states to the attitudes to those contents. As with other mental states, one cannot always know whether one is in the state of knowing. It is argued that this is a special case of a much more general phenomenon; no non‐trivial conditions are such that one is always in a position to know that they obtain whenever they in fact do so. This result has disturbing implications for the nature of rationality, because one is not always in a position to know what it is rational to do. Traditional arguments for scepticism fail because they assume that one is always in a position to know what one's evidence is. The speech act of assertion is also governed by a norm of knowledge. A final chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by the so‐called paradox of knowability.

@book{doi101093019925656x0010001,
    author = "Williamson, Timothy",
    title = "Knowledge and its Limits",
    year = "2002",
    abstract = "Abstract The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of truth, belief, and other factors, such as justification. Rather, belief is a state whose successful form is knowledge, and justification is on the basis of knowledge, which is acquainted with evidence. Knowing is as much a mental state as believing, but it is world‐involving because one can know only what is true; the book extends the externalist conception of mind from the contents of mental states to the attitudes to those contents. As with other mental states, one cannot always know whether one is in the state of knowing. It is argued that this is a special case of a much more general phenomenon; no non‐trivial conditions are such that one is always in a position to know that they obtain whenever they in fact do so. This result has disturbing implications for the nature of rationality, because one is not always in a position to know what it is rational to do. Traditional arguments for scepticism fail because they assume that one is always in a position to know what one's evidence is. The speech act of assertion is also governed by a norm of knowledge. A final chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by the so‐called paradox of knowability.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/019925656x.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/019925656x.001.0001",
    openalex = "W1570100281",
    references = "doi1010160165489694900051, doi101017cbo9780511625398, doi101017cbo9781139173438, doi101111j147549751979tb00374x, doi101214aos1176343654, doi1023072021419, doi1023072091314, doi107312quin92204, doi107551mitpress69880010001, doi1075919781501743726"
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Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.

@book{doi101017cbo9780511498909,
    author = "Kvanvig, Jonathan L.",
    title = "The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding",
    year = "2003",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498909",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511498909",
    openalex = "W4214626612"
}

This article simultaneously explores the constructs of potential financial reward and prior knowledge of customer problems to provide a deeper understanding of the identification of opportunities. Results suggest that while prior knowledge of customer problems leads to the identification of more opportunities and opportunities that are more innovative, it also moderates the relationship between potential financial reward and opportunity identification. We found that the less knowledgeable an individual was about customer problems, the more positive the effect that potential financial reward had on the number of opportunities identified and the innovativeness of those opportunities.

@article{doi101111j15406520200500071x,
    author = "Shepherd, Dean A. and DeTienne, Dawn R.",
    title = "Prior Knowledge, Potential Financial Reward, and Opportunity Identification",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice",
    abstract = "This article simultaneously explores the constructs of potential financial reward and prior knowledge of customer problems to provide a deeper understanding of the identification of opportunities. Results suggest that while prior knowledge of customer problems leads to the identification of more opportunities and opportunities that are more innovative, it also moderates the relationship between potential financial reward and opportunity identification. We found that the less knowledgeable an individual was about customer problems, the more positive the effect that potential financial reward had on the number of opportunities identified and the innovativeness of those opportunities.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2005.00071.x",
    doi = "10.1111/j.1540-6520.2005.00071.x",
    openalex = "W1999884684",
    references = "doi10230741165921"
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"In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely, that knowledge is always more valuable than its subparts." "Clearly written and well argued, the book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology."--BOOK JACKET.

@article{doi105860choice414578,
    author = "Kvanvig, Jonathan L.",
    title = "The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = {"In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely, that knowledge is always more valuable than its subparts." "Clearly written and well argued, the book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology."--BOOK JACKET.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.41-4578",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.41-4578",
    openalex = "W1505518826",
    references = "doi101093019925656x0010001"
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Abstract The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.

@book{doi10109301992880380010001,
    author = "Stanley, Jason",
    title = "Knowledge and Practical Interests",
    year = "2005",
    abstract = "Abstract The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/0199288038.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/0199288038.001.0001",
    openalex = "W2094298389",
    references = "doi101093019925656x0010001"
}

@article{doi101016jleaqua200704002,
    author = "Uhl‐Bien, Mary and Marion, Russ and McKelvey, Bill",
    title = "Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "The Leadership Quarterly",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.04.002",
    doi = "10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.04.002",
    openalex = "W2130070994",
    references = "doi101007978148990718931, doi10108002580136199910878187, doi101119113295, doi1023072391875, doi1023072392088, doi1023072551048, doi102307256434, doi102307258081, doi1023072981858, doi105465amr19894308385, openalexw1999686839, openalexw2012968282, openalexw2126451342"
}

...

@article{doi103395reciisv2i2854,
    author = "Osada, Neide Mayumi and da Costa, Maria Conceição",
    title = "Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas)",
    abstract = "...",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3395/reciis.v2i2.854",
    doi = "10.3395/reciis.v2i2.854",
    openalex = "W2308561889"
}

This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.

@book{doi101093acprofoso97801995506230010001,
    author = "Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew",
    title = "Knowledge in an Uncertain World",
    year = "2009",
    booktitle = "Oxford University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001",
    openalex = "W1582170695"
}

Nonaka's paper [1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organ. Sci. 5(1) 14–37] contributed to the concepts of “tacit knowledge” and “knowledge conversion” in organization science. We present work that shaped the development of organizational knowledge creation theory and identify two premises upon which more than 15 years of extensive academic work has been conducted: (1) tacit and explicit knowledge can be conceptually distinguished along a continuum; (2) knowledge conversion explains, theoretically and empirically, the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. Recently, scholars have raised several issues regarding the understanding of tacit knowledge as well as the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge in the theory. The purpose of this article is to introduce and comment on the debate about organizational knowledge creation theory. We aim to help scholars make sense of this debate by synthesizing six fundamental questions on organizational knowledge creation theory. Next, we seek to elaborate and advance the theory by responding to questions and incorporating new research. Finally, we discuss implications of our endeavor for organization science.

@article{doi101287orsc10800412,
    author = "Nonaka, Ikujiro and von Krogh, Georg",
    title = "Perspective—Tacit Knowledge and Knowledge Conversion: Controversy and Advancement in Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "Organization Science",
    abstract = "Nonaka's paper [1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organ. Sci. 5(1) 14–37] contributed to the concepts of “tacit knowledge” and “knowledge conversion” in organization science. We present work that shaped the development of organizational knowledge creation theory and identify two premises upon which more than 15 years of extensive academic work has been conducted: (1) tacit and explicit knowledge can be conceptually distinguished along a continuum; (2) knowledge conversion explains, theoretically and empirically, the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. Recently, scholars have raised several issues regarding the understanding of tacit knowledge as well as the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge in the theory. The purpose of this article is to introduce and comment on the debate about organizational knowledge creation theory. We aim to help scholars make sense of this debate by synthesizing six fundamental questions on organizational knowledge creation theory. Next, we seek to elaborate and advance the theory by responding to questions and incorporating new research. Finally, we discuss implications of our endeavor for organization science.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1080.0412",
    doi = "10.1287/orsc.1080.0412",
    openalex = "W2165040403",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511625398, doi10230741165942, doi1029173cmplct8773, doi107551mitpress28340030047, openalexw1500910854, openalexw2398143670"
}

Organizational learning has been an important topic for the journal Organization Science and for the field. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing organizational learning. According to the framework, organizational experience interacts with the context to create knowledge. The context is conceived as having both a latent component and an active component through which learning occurs. We also discuss current and emerging research themes related to components of our framework. Promising future research directions are identified. We hope that our perspective will stimulate future work on organizational learning and knowledge.

@article{doi101287orsc11000621,
    author = "Argote, Linda and Miron‐Spektor, Ella",
    title = "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge",
    year = "2011",
    journal = "Organization Science",
    abstract = "Organizational learning has been an important topic for the journal Organization Science and for the field. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing organizational learning. According to the framework, organizational experience interacts with the context to create knowledge. The context is conceived as having both a latent component and an active component through which learning occurs. We also discuss current and emerging research themes related to components of our framework. Promising future research directions are identified. We hope that our perspective will stimulate future work on organizational learning and knowledge.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0621",
    doi = "10.1287/orsc.1100.0621",
    openalex = "W2169521630",
    references = "doi102189asqu2005503367, doi10230741165921"
}

The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

@book{doi101017cbo9781139795401,
    author = "Fumerton, Richard",
    title = "Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism",
    year = "2013",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton\'s primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139795401",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9781139795401",
    openalex = "W2128619559",
    references = "doi1010079781349008438, doi10100797894010255779, doi101017cbo9780511620409040, doi101017cbo9780511625398, doi10109301992462970010001, doi101093019925656x0010001, doi101093oseoinstance00046349, doi1023072184492, openalexw1556837482, openalexw1996270497"
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This best-selling textbook, written by award-winning educator and past president of the American Psychological Association, Diane F. Halpern, applies theory and research from the learning sciences to teach students the thinking skills they need to succeed in today's world. This new edition retains features from earlier editions that have helped its readers become better thinkers. A rigorous academic grounding based in cognitive psychology is presented in a clear writing style with a humorous tone and supported by numerous practical examples and anecdotes. Thought and Knowledge, Fifth Edition has been revised to help students meet the challenges of a global neighborhood and make meaningful conclusions from the overwhelming quantity of information now available at the click of a mouse. The skills learned with this text will help students learn more efficiently, research more productively, and present logical, informed arguments. Thought and Knowledge, Fifth Edition is appropriate for use as a textbook in critical thinking courses offered in departments of psychology, philosophy, English, humanities, or as a supplement in any course where critical thinking is emphasized.

@book{doi1043249781315885278,
    author = "Halpern, Diane F.",
    title = "Thought and Knowledge",
    year = "2013",
    booktitle = "Psychology Press eBooks",
    abstract = "This best-selling textbook, written by award-winning educator and past president of the American Psychological Association, Diane F. Halpern, applies theory and research from the learning sciences to teach students the thinking skills they need to succeed in today's world. This new edition retains features from earlier editions that have helped its readers become better thinkers. A rigorous academic grounding based in cognitive psychology is presented in a clear writing style with a humorous tone and supported by numerous practical examples and anecdotes. Thought and Knowledge, Fifth Edition has been revised to help students meet the challenges of a global neighborhood and make meaningful conclusions from the overwhelming quantity of information now available at the click of a mouse. The skills learned with this text will help students learn more efficiently, research more productively, and present logical, informed arguments. Thought and Knowledge, Fifth Edition is appropriate for use as a textbook in critical thinking courses offered in departments of psychology, philosophy, English, humanities, or as a supplement in any course where critical thinking is emphasized.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315885278",
    doi = "10.4324/9781315885278",
    openalex = "W4252560008"
}

Knowledge hiding prevents colleagues from generating creative ideas, but it may also have negative consequences for the creativity of a knowledge hider. Drawing on social exchange theory, we propose that when employees hide knowledge, they trigger a reciprocal distrust loop in which coworkers are unwilling to share knowledge with them. We further suggest that these effects are contingent on motivational climate, in such a way that the negative effects of an individual's hiding knowledge on his/her own creativity are enhanced in a performance climate and attenuated in a mastery climate. A field study of 240 employees nested in 34 groups revealed a negative relationship between knowledge hiding and knowledge hiders' creativity as well as a moderating role of a mastery climate. Study 2 replicated these findings in an experimental study of 132 undergraduate students, testing a reciprocal distrust loop and comparing it with an alternative intrapsychic explanatory process based on situational regulatory focus. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.

@article{doi105465amj20120122,
    author = "Černe, Matej and Nerstad, Christina G. L. and Dysvik, Anders and Škerlavaj, Miha",
    title = "What Goes Around Comes Around: Knowledge Hiding, Perceived Motivational Climate, and Creativity",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "Academy of Management Journal",
    abstract = "Knowledge hiding prevents colleagues from generating creative ideas, but it may also have negative consequences for the creativity of a knowledge hider. Drawing on social exchange theory, we propose that when employees hide knowledge, they trigger a reciprocal distrust loop in which coworkers are unwilling to share knowledge with them. We further suggest that these effects are contingent on motivational climate, in such a way that the negative effects of an individual's hiding knowledge on his/her own creativity are enhanced in a performance climate and attenuated in a mastery climate. A field study of 240 employees nested in 34 groups revealed a negative relationship between knowledge hiding and knowledge hiders' creativity as well as a moderating role of a mastery climate. Study 2 replicated these findings in an experimental study of 132 undergraduate students, testing a reciprocal distrust loop and comparing it with an alternative intrapsychic explanatory process based on situational regulatory focus. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0122",
    doi = "10.5465/amj.2012.0122",
    openalex = "W2132972847",
    references = "doi10230741165921, doi105465amj201159215085"
}

@article{doi101016jjbusres201707018,
    author = "Kianto, Aino and Sáenz, Josune and Aramburu, Nekane",
    title = "Knowledge-based human resource management practices, intellectual capital and innovation",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Journal of Business Research",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.07.018",
    doi = "10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.07.018",
    openalex = "W2742618045",
    references = "doi10230741165921"
}

Abstract This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

@article{doi101007s1122902103251z,
    author = "Simion, Mona",
    title = "Knowledge and reasoning",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Synthese",
    abstract = "Abstract This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z",
    doi = "10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z",
    openalex = "W3174376471",
    references = "doi1010179781009036818"
}

@article{doi101007s13164021005901,
    author = "Duncan, Matt",
    title = "How You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things",
    year = "2021",
    journal = "Review of Philosophy and Psychology",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00590-1",
    doi = "10.1007/s13164-021-00590-1",
    openalex = "W3207606234",
    references = "doi101111phc312727"
}

Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that supports a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speaker and the hearer side and investigates ramifications of this view for other questions about assertion

@book{doi1010179781009036818,
    author = "Kelp, Christoph and Simion, Mona",
    title = "Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion",
    year = "2021",
    abstract = "Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that supports a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speaker and the hearer side and investigates ramifications of this view for other questions about assertion",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818",
    doi = "10.1017/9781009036818",
    openalex = "W3137212509",
    references = "doi101017cbo9781139795401, doi10108000048409112344881, doi101086289610, doi101093acprofoso97801992191620010001, doi101093acprofoso97801992470660030002, doi101093analys17233, doi1023072023833, doi1023072216063, doi1023072998423, doi105860choice414578, doi107551mitpress70720010001"
}

@article{doi101007s11229022035781,
    author = "Giustina, Anna",
    title = "Introspective knowledge by acquaintance",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "Synthese",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03578-1",
    doi = "10.1007/s11229-022-03578-1",
    openalex = "W4223535785",
    references = "doi101111phc312727"
}

When we experience the world – see, hear, feel, taste, or smell things – we gain all sorts of knowledge about the things around us. And this knowledge figures heavily in our reasoning about the world – about what to think and do in response to it. But what is the nature of this knowledge? On one commonly held view, all knowledge is constituted by beliefs in propositions. But in this paper I argue against this view. I argue that some knowledge is constituted, not by beliefs in propositions, but by awareness of properties and objects. To make my case, I focus on the role of visual perception in reasoning. I start by introducing a principle about the relationship between knowledge and reasoning, which says that to learn something new by reasoning, one must know the bases of one’s reasoning. Then I argue that in some cases of genuine, knowledge-conferring reasoning, the bases of our reasoning are not propositions that we believe; rather, they’re properties or objects that we see. Thus, I conclude that some such knowledge is non-propositional and is rather what some call “knowledge of things”.

@article{doi1010800951508920222042506,
    author = "Duncan, Matt",
    title = "Reasoning with knowledge of things",
    year = "2022",
    journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
    abstract = "When we experience the world – see, hear, feel, taste, or smell things – we gain all sorts of knowledge about the things around us. And this knowledge figures heavily in our reasoning about the world – about what to think and do in response to it. But what is the nature of this knowledge? On one commonly held view, all knowledge is constituted by beliefs in propositions. But in this paper I argue against this view. I argue that some knowledge is constituted, not by beliefs in propositions, but by awareness of properties and objects. To make my case, I focus on the role of visual perception in reasoning. I start by introducing a principle about the relationship between knowledge and reasoning, which says that to learn something new by reasoning, one must know the bases of one’s reasoning. Then I argue that in some cases of genuine, knowledge-conferring reasoning, the bases of our reasoning are not propositions that we believe; rather, they’re properties or objects that we see. Thus, I conclude that some such knowledge is non-propositional and is rather what some call “knowledge of things”.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2042506",
    doi = "10.1080/09515089.2022.2042506",
    openalex = "W4213196821",
    references = "doi101093acprofoso97801992774210010001, doi101111phc312727"
}

Many philosophers believe that aesthetic testimony can provide aesthetic knowledge. This leaves us with the question: why does getting aesthetic knowledge by experience – by seeing a painting up close, or witnessing a performance first-hand – nevertheless seem superior to aesthetic testimony? I argue that it is due to differences in their epistemic value; in the diversity of epistemic goods each one provides. Aesthetic experience, or the experience of art or other aesthetic objects, affords multiple, distinctive epistemic goods whereas aesthetic testimony affords less. In particular, it provides aesthetic knowledge of truths, a kind of propositional knowledge, as well as aesthetic knowledge of things, a kind of non-propositional knowledge. Although aesthetic experience is superior because it has more epistemic value, this doesn’t mean that aesthetic testimony provides weaker justification for aesthetic belief than aesthetic experience; the difference is evaluative, not normative. In this way, we can explain a key pessimistic intuition about aesthetic testimony – that it is inferior to aesthetic experience – whilst preserving the optimistic view that aesthetic testimony makes aesthetic knowledge available to others. The superior epistemic value of first-hand aesthetic experience is compatible with a number of important observations about aesthetic testimony, including the importance of aesthetic trust.

@article{doi1010800020174x20232177339,
    author = "Ranalli, Chris",
    title = "Knowledge of things and aesthetic testimony",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "Inquiry",
    abstract = "Many philosophers believe that aesthetic testimony can provide aesthetic knowledge. This leaves us with the question: why does getting aesthetic knowledge by experience – by seeing a painting up close, or witnessing a performance first-hand – nevertheless seem superior to aesthetic testimony? I argue that it is due to differences in their epistemic value; in the diversity of epistemic goods each one provides. Aesthetic experience, or the experience of art or other aesthetic objects, affords multiple, distinctive epistemic goods whereas aesthetic testimony affords less. In particular, it provides aesthetic knowledge of truths, a kind of propositional knowledge, as well as aesthetic knowledge of things, a kind of non-propositional knowledge. Although aesthetic experience is superior because it has more epistemic value, this doesn’t mean that aesthetic testimony provides weaker justification for aesthetic belief than aesthetic experience; the difference is evaluative, not normative. In this way, we can explain a key pessimistic intuition about aesthetic testimony – that it is inferior to aesthetic experience – whilst preserving the optimistic view that aesthetic testimony makes aesthetic knowledge available to others. The superior epistemic value of first-hand aesthetic experience is compatible with a number of important observations about aesthetic testimony, including the importance of aesthetic trust.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2177339",
    doi = "10.1080/0020174x.2023.2177339",
    openalex = "W4322767006",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511498909, doi101017cbo9781139795401, doi101093019928038x0010001, doi101093acprofoso97801987970810010001, doi101093acprofoso97801992602560010001, doi101093aristotelian111108, doi1023072108338, doi1023072960077, doi105840jphil20081051025, openalexw3127507699"
}

@article{doi101007s11229024048226,
    author = "Markunas, Michael Ernest",
    title = "Acquaintance, knowledge, and luck",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Synthese",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04822-6",
    doi = "10.1007/s11229-024-04822-6",
    openalex = "W4405196412",
    references = "doi101111phc312727"
}

Abstract Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p ”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration.

@article{doi101111phpr13051,
    author = "Kriegel, Uriah",
    title = "Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
    abstract = "Abstract Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p ”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13051",
    doi = "10.1111/phpr.13051",
    openalex = "W4392197019",
    references = "doi1010800020174x20232177339"
}

A number of philosophers hold that some types of mental states are composed of two or more mental states. It is commonly thought, for instance, that hoping involves the desire for some outcome to occur and the belief that such an outcome is possible (but has yet to occur). Although the existence of combinatory states (CS’s) is widely accepted, one issue that has not been thoroughly discussed is how we know we token a given combinatory state. This paper aims to fill this lacuna. I do so by first discussing one way of knowing our CS’s—namely, by knowing we token the relevant constituting states, and then inferring that we have the relevant CS from such a knowledge-base. I argue that while anti-skeptics of self-knowledge should embrace the view that we can know our CS’s in this manner, this way of knowing we possess such states is quite demanding. Given the latter, I proceed to examine whether there are alternative ways we can know our CS’s. I defend the view that given the tenability of particular accounts of self-knowledge for non-CS's, we can avoid the view that we only know our CS’s by in part knowing the constituents of such states.

@article{doi103998ergo6161,
    author = "Peterson, Jared",
    title = "The Self-Knowledge of Combinatory States",
    year = "2024",
    journal = "Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy",
    abstract = "A number of philosophers hold that some types of mental states are composed of two or more mental states. It is commonly thought, for instance, that hoping involves the desire for some outcome to occur and the belief that such an outcome is possible (but has yet to occur). Although the existence of combinatory states (CS’s) is widely accepted, one issue that has not been thoroughly discussed is how we know we token a given combinatory state. This paper aims to fill this lacuna. I do so by first discussing one way of knowing our CS’s—namely, by knowing we token the relevant constituting states, and then inferring that we have the relevant CS from such a knowledge-base. I argue that while anti-skeptics of self-knowledge should embrace the view that we can know our CS’s in this manner, this way of knowing we possess such states is quite demanding. Given the latter, I proceed to examine whether there are alternative ways we can know our CS’s. I defend the view that given the tenability of particular accounts of self-knowledge for non-CS's, we can avoid the view that we only know our CS’s by in part knowing the constituents of such states.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.6161",
    doi = "10.3998/ergo.6161",
    openalex = "W4400768629",
    references = "doi101007s1109801709746"
}

@article{doi101007s11229025049985,
    author = "Pallagrosi, Jacopo",
    title = "The normativity of introspective acquaintance knowledge",
    year = "2025",
    journal = "Synthese",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-04998-5",
    doi = "10.1007/s11229-025-04998-5",
    openalex = "W4409055367",
    references = "doi1010800020174x20232177339"
}

Abstract Russell famously posited a type of knowledge distinct from and irreducible to propositional knowledge, which he called knowledge by acquaintance. In recent years, several epistemologists have reignited interest in knowledge by acquaintance, pointing out an array of theoretical jobs it is serviceable in performing. Nonetheless knowledge by acquaintance continues to be met with resistance and disregard. I surmise that this has partly to do with the specific conception of knowledge by acquaintance propounded by Russell and many of his followers – what I will call here the “classical conception” of knowledge by acquaintance. At the heart of this conception are two theses, which I will label relationalism and infallibilism and try to articulate more fully in what follows. The main aim of this paper, however, is to construct an alternative notion of knowledge by acquaintance – fallibilist and non‐relationalist – and argue that this alternative conception is just as fit to perform the theoretical jobs identified by proponents of knowledge by acquaintance. The hope is to thereby rescue knowledge by acquaintance from its relationalist and infallibilist associations, the better to foster its wider acceptance.

@article{doi101111nous12550,
    author = "Kriegel, Uriah",
    title = "What is knowledge by acquaintance?",
    year = "2025",
    journal = "Noûs",
    abstract = "Abstract Russell famously posited a type of knowledge distinct from and irreducible to propositional knowledge, which he called knowledge by acquaintance. In recent years, several epistemologists have reignited interest in knowledge by acquaintance, pointing out an array of theoretical jobs it is serviceable in performing. Nonetheless knowledge by acquaintance continues to be met with resistance and disregard. I surmise that this has partly to do with the specific conception of knowledge by acquaintance propounded by Russell and many of his followers – what I will call here the “classical conception” of knowledge by acquaintance. At the heart of this conception are two theses, which I will label relationalism and infallibilism and try to articulate more fully in what follows. The main aim of this paper, however, is to construct an alternative notion of knowledge by acquaintance – fallibilist and non‐relationalist – and argue that this alternative conception is just as fit to perform the theoretical jobs identified by proponents of knowledge by acquaintance. The hope is to thereby rescue knowledge by acquaintance from its relationalist and infallibilist associations, the better to foster its wider acceptance.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12550",
    doi = "10.1111/nous.12550",
    openalex = "W4409489856",
    references = "doi1010800020174x20232177339"
}

ABSTRACT Many philosophers have found it plausible that sense experience affords a species of nonpropositional awareness and knowledge, what Russell termed “knowledge by acquaintance.” At the same time, a prominent strand in epistemology maintains that knowledge has a distinctive normative profile: it is embedded in justificatory relations, serves as a standard of success for underlying attitudes, grounds regulative norms, and qualifies as a cognitive achievement. Yet it remains unclear how a nonpropositional state of acquaintance, formed without evidential basis and beyond rational control, could fit within this normative structure. I trace the connections between different formulations of what I call “the normativity objection” to Russell's view and offer a unified response. The objection, I argue, rests on an overly passive conception of acquaintance. Once acquaintance is seen as partly constituted by attention—a subject‐level, reasons‐responsive activity—it can satisfy knowledge's normative role by serving as the success condition of a norm‐governed performance. This not only strengthens the Russellian program but also reveals a striking convergence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of epistemic normativity.

@article{doi101111phpr70108,
    author = "Atiq, Emad H.",
    title = "The Normative Profile of Knowledge by Acquaintance",
    year = "2026",
    journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
    abstract = "ABSTRACT Many philosophers have found it plausible that sense experience affords a species of nonpropositional awareness and knowledge, what Russell termed “knowledge by acquaintance.” At the same time, a prominent strand in epistemology maintains that knowledge has a distinctive normative profile: it is embedded in justificatory relations, serves as a standard of success for underlying attitudes, grounds regulative norms, and qualifies as a cognitive achievement. Yet it remains unclear how a nonpropositional state of acquaintance, formed without evidential basis and beyond rational control, could fit within this normative structure. I trace the connections between different formulations of what I call “the normativity objection” to Russell's view and offer a unified response. The objection, I argue, rests on an overly passive conception of acquaintance. Once acquaintance is seen as partly constituted by attention—a subject‐level, reasons‐responsive activity—it can satisfy knowledge's normative role by serving as the success condition of a norm‐governed performance. This not only strengthens the Russellian program but also reveals a striking convergence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of epistemic normativity.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70108",
    doi = "10.1111/phpr.70108",
    openalex = "W7147234492",
    references = "doi1010800020174x20232177339"
}