Logic

@misc{carmichael1930the1,
    author = "Carmichael, R. D",
    title = "The Logic of Discovery",
    year = "1930",
    howpublished = "Chicago and London, The Open Court Publishing Company",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Carmichael, R. D., 1930, The Logic of Discovery: Chicago and London, The Open Court Publishing Company.}"
}

@misc{cohen1934an2,
    author = "Cohen, M. and Nagel, E",
    title = "An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method",
    year = "1934",
    howpublished = "New York, Harcourt Brace",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Cohen, M., and Nagel, E., 1934, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method: New York, Harcourt Brace.}"
}

@misc{evans1946the3,
    author = "Evans, B",
    title = "The Natural History of Nonsense",
    year = "1946",
    howpublished = "New York, Knopf",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Evans, B., 1946, The Natural History of Nonsense: New York, Knopf.}"
}

To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments.

@article{doi101086286983,
    author = "Hempel, Carl G. and Oppenheim, Paul",
    title = "Studies in the Logic of Explanation",
    year = "1948",
    journal = "Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1086/286983",
    doi = "10.1086/286983",
    openalex = "W1983870751",
    references = "doi1010079783709141779, doi1023072102968"
}

@misc{hempel1953the5,
    author = "Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P",
    title = "The Logic of Explanation, in Feigl, H., and Brodbeck, M., eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science",
    year = "1953",
    howpublished = "New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, p. 319-352",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Hempel, C. G., and Oppenheim, P., 1953, The Logic of Explanation, in Feigl, H., and Brodbeck, M., eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science: New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, p. 319-352.}"
}

@book{gardner1957fads4,
    author = "Gardner, M",
    title = "Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science",
    year = "1957",
    publisher = "New York, Dover Publications, 363 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Gardner, M., 1957, Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science: New York, Dover Publications, 363 p.}"
}

@article{doi101016s0016003259904077,
    title = "The logic of scientific discovery",
    year = "1959",
    journal = "Journal of the Franklin Institute",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0016-0032(59)90407-7",
    doi = "10.1016/s0016-0032(59)90407-7",
    openalex = "W2371818109"
}

When first published in 1959, this book revolutionized contemporary thinking about science and knowledge. It remains the one of the most widely read books about science to come out of the twentieth century.

@article{doi10106313060577,
    author = "Popper, Karl R. and Weiss, George H.",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "1959",
    journal = "Physics Today",
    abstract = "When first published in 1959, this book revolutionized contemporary thinking about science and knowledge. It remains the one of the most widely read books about science to come out of the twentieth century.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3060577",
    doi = "10.1063/1.3060577",
    openalex = "W3203931103"
}

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

@article{doi1023072332835,
    author = "Kendall, M. G. and Popper, Karl R.",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery.",
    year = "1959",
    journal = "Biometrika",
    abstract = "Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2332835",
    doi = "10.2307/2332835",
    openalex = "W3021587765"
}

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

@article{doi1023072550489,
    author = "Hutchison, T. W. and Popper, Karl R.",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery.",
    year = "1959",
    journal = "Economica",
    abstract = "Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2550489",
    doi = "10.2307/2550489",
    openalex = "W3127702745"
}

@misc{popper1959the10,
    author = "Popper, K",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "1959",
    howpublished = "New York; London, Basic Books; Hutchinson, 480 p.; Translation of Logik der Forschung, 1934",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery: New York; London, Basic Books; Hutchinson, 480 p.; Translation of Logik der Forschung, 1934.}"
}

@article{doi1023071907578,
    author = "Jeffrey, Richard C. and Popper, Karl R.",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "1960",
    journal = "Econometrica",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/1907578",
    doi = "10.2307/1907578",
    openalex = "W2326807719"
}

@article{doi1023072104331,
    author = "Rescher, Nicholas and Popper, Karl R. and Hanson, Norwood Russell",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery.",
    year = "1960",
    journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2104331",
    doi = "10.2307/2104331",
    openalex = "W2315803208"
}

@misc{nagel1961the9,
    author = "Nagel, E",
    title = "The Structure of Science",
    year = "1961",
    howpublished = "Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation: New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 618 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Nagel, E., 1961, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation: New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 618 p.}"
}

A good book may have the power to change the way we see the world, but a great book actually becomes part of our daily consciousness, pervading our thinking to the point that we take it for granted, and we forget how provocative and challenging its ideas once were-and still are. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is that kind of book. When it was first published in 1962, it was a landmark event in the history and philosophy of science. And fifty years later, it still has many lessons to teach. With The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn challenged long-standing linear notions of scientific progress, arguing that transformative ideas don't arise from the day-to-day, gradual process of experimentation and data accumulation, but that revolutions in those breakthrough moments that disrupt accepted thinking and offer unanticipated ideas, occur outside of normal science, as he called it. Though Kuhn was writing when physics ruled the sciences, his ideas on how scientific revolutions bring order to the anomalies that amass over time in research experiments are still instructive in our biotech age. This new edition of Kuhn's essential work in the history of science includes an insightful introductory essay by Ian Hacking that clarifies terms popularized by Kuhn, including paradigm and incommensurability, and applies Kuhn's ideas to the science of today. Usefully keyed to the separate sections of the book, Hacking's essay provides important background information as well as a contemporary context. Newly designed, with an expanded index, this edition will be eagerly welcomed by the next generation of readers seeking to understand the history of our perspectives on science.

@article{doi10106313050879,
    author = "Kühn, Thomas and Schlegel, Richard",
    title = "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions",
    year = "1963",
    journal = "Physics Today",
    abstract = "A good book may have the power to change the way we see the world, but a great book actually becomes part of our daily consciousness, pervading our thinking to the point that we take it for granted, and we forget how provocative and challenging its ideas once were-and still are. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is that kind of book. When it was first published in 1962, it was a landmark event in the history and philosophy of science. And fifty years later, it still has many lessons to teach. With The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn challenged long-standing linear notions of scientific progress, arguing that transformative ideas don't arise from the day-to-day, gradual process of experimentation and data accumulation, but that revolutions in those breakthrough moments that disrupt accepted thinking and offer unanticipated ideas, occur outside of normal science, as he called it. Though Kuhn was writing when physics ruled the sciences, his ideas on how scientific revolutions bring order to the anomalies that amass over time in research experiments are still instructive in our biotech age. This new edition of Kuhn's essential work in the history of science includes an insightful introductory essay by Ian Hacking that clarifies terms popularized by Kuhn, including paradigm and incommensurability, and applies Kuhn's ideas to the science of today. Usefully keyed to the separate sections of the book, Hacking's essay provides important background information as well as a contemporary context. Newly designed, with an expanded index, this edition will be eagerly welcomed by the next generation of readers seeking to understand the history of our perspectives on science.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3050879",
    doi = "10.1063/1.3050879",
    openalex = "W2753533763",
    references = "doi1010800022398019509712784, doi101086348480, doi10111911934065, doi10111911972915, doi1015159781438488509106, doi1023072707166, doi1023072756074, openalexw1971924284"
}

Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By Thomas S. Kuhn. International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 2. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xvi + 172. Price 22s 6d or $3.00). David Bohm David Bohm Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 57, October 1964, Pages 377–379, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217783 Published: 01 October 1964

@article{doi1023072217783,
    author = "Böhm, David and Kühn, Thomas",
    title = "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.",
    year = "1964",
    journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
    abstract = "Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By Thomas S. Kuhn. International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 2. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xvi + 172. Price 22s 6d or $3.00). David Bohm David Bohm Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 57, October 1964, Pages 377–379, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217783 Published: 01 October 1964",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2217783",
    doi = "10.2307/2217783",
    openalex = "W2752600643"
}

Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. By Karl R. Popper (London: Routledge. 1963. Pp. xiv + 412. Price 55s). Mary Hesse Mary Hesse Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 15, Issue 61, October 1965, Pages 372–374, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218271 Published: 01 October 1965

@article{doi1023072218271,
    author = "Hesse, Mary and Popper, Karl R.",
    title = "Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.",
    year = "1965",
    journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
    abstract = "Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. By Karl R. Popper (London: Routledge. 1963. Pp. xiv + 412. Price 55s). Mary Hesse Mary Hesse Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 15, Issue 61, October 1965, Pages 372–374, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218271 Published: 01 October 1965",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2218271",
    doi = "10.2307/2218271",
    openalex = "W1584053331"
}

@misc{popper1968the11,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery [3rd ed.]",
    year = "1968",
    howpublished = "London, Hutchinson",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1968, The Logic of Scientific Discovery [3rd ed.]: London, Hutchinson.}"
}

@book{mackay1970extraordinary7,
    author = "Mackay, C",
    title = "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds",
    year = "1970",
    publisher = "New York, Farrar, Straus \& Giroux; Noonday Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Mackay, C., 1970, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds: New York, Farrar, Straus \& Giroux; Noonday Press.}"
}

@misc{morillo1977the8,
    author = "Morillo, C",
    title = "The Logic of Arguments From Contingency",
    year = "1977",
    howpublished = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. XXXVII, p. 408-417",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Morillo, C., 1977, The Logic of Arguments From Contingency: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. XXXVII, p. 408-417.}"
}

Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.

@book{doi101017cbo9780511621123,
    author = "Lakatos, Imre",
    title = "The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes",
    year = "1978",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511621123",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511621123",
    openalex = "W4301407432"
}

Abstract This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.

@book{doi10109301982442740010001,
    author = "van Fraassen, Bas C.",
    title = "The Scientific Image",
    year = "1980",
    abstract = "Abstract This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/0198244274.001.0001",
    openalex = "W4210828651"
}

In this book van Fraassen develops an alternative to scientific realism by constructing and evaluating three mutually reinforcing theories.

@book{doi1023072184804,
    author = "Demopoulos, William and van Fraassen, Bas C.",
    title = "The Scientific Image.",
    year = "1982",
    journal = "The Philosophical Review",
    abstract = "In this book van Fraassen develops an alternative to scientific realism by constructing and evaluating three mutually reinforcing theories.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/2184804",
    doi = "10.2307/2184804",
    openalex = "W2100522339"
}

@misc{machina1982basic6,
    author = "Machina, K. F",
    title = "Basic Applied Logic",
    year = "1982",
    howpublished = "Dallas, Texas, Scott Foresman and Company",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Machina, K. F., 1982, Basic Applied Logic: Dallas, Texas, Scott Foresman and Company.}"
}

A methodology for conducting the case study of a management information system (MIS) is presented. Suitable for the study of a single case, the methodology also satisfies the standards of the natural science model of scientific research. This article provides an overview of the methodological problems involved in the study of a single case, describes scientific method, presents an elucidation of how a previously published MIS case study captures the major features of scientific method, responds to the problems involved in the study of a single case, and summarizes what a scientific methodology for MIS case studies does, and does not, involve. The article also has ramifications that go beyond matters of MIS case studies alone. For MIS researchers, the article might prove interesting for addressing such fundamental issues as whether MIS research must be mathematical, statistical, or quantitative in order to be called "scientific.” For MIS practitioners, the article’s view of scientific method might prove interesting for empowering them to identify, for themselves, the point at which scientific rigor is achieved in an MIS research effort, and beyond which further rigor can be called into question, especially if pursued at the expense of professional relevance.

@article{doi102307248698,
    author = "Lee, Allen S.",
    title = "A Scientific Methodology for MIS Case Studies",
    year = "1989",
    journal = "MIS Quarterly",
    abstract = {A methodology for conducting the case study of a management information system (MIS) is presented. Suitable for the study of a single case, the methodology also satisfies the standards of the natural science model of scientific research. This article provides an overview of the methodological problems involved in the study of a single case, describes scientific method, presents an elucidation of how a previously published MIS case study captures the major features of scientific method, responds to the problems involved in the study of a single case, and summarizes what a scientific methodology for MIS case studies does, and does not, involve. The article also has ramifications that go beyond matters of MIS case studies alone. For MIS researchers, the article might prove interesting for addressing such fundamental issues as whether MIS research must be mathematical, statistical, or quantitative in order to be called "scientific.” For MIS practitioners, the article’s view of scientific method might prove interesting for empowering them to identify, for themselves, the point at which scientific rigor is achieved in an MIS research effort, and beyond which further rigor can be called into question, especially if pursued at the expense of professional relevance.},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/248698",
    doi = "10.2307/248698",
    openalex = "W1527353115",
    references = "doi103280so2022002006, doi1097839780812205503"
}

@incollection{doi101016b978008037190050019x,
    author = "FRIEDMAN, KENNETH S.",
    title = "A Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "1990",
    booktitle = "Elsevier eBooks",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-037190-0.50019-x",
    doi = "10.1016/b978-0-08-037190-0.50019-x",
    openalex = "W2896514019"
}

In this review of the published literature in English on the concept of scientific literacy, the net is cast wider than just the professional science education community, and the diverse works on scientific literacy are brought together in an interpretative synthesis of this literature. Scientific literacy is first placed in an historical context, and a number of different factors that influence interpretations of this concept are discussed thereafter. These factors include the number of different interest groups that are concerned with scientific literacy, different conceptual definitions of the term, the relative or absolute nature of scientific literacy as a concept, different purposes for advocating scientific literacy, and different ways of measuring it. The overview yields a fuller understanding of the various factors that contribute to the concept of scientific literacy, and makes clear the relationships between these factors. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Sci. Ed 84:71–94, 2000.

@article{doi101002sici1098237x20000184171aidsce630co2c,
    author = "Laugksch, R�diger C.",
    title = "Scientific literacy: A conceptual overview",
    year = "2000",
    journal = "Science Education",
    abstract = "In this review of the published literature in English on the concept of scientific literacy, the net is cast wider than just the professional science education community, and the diverse works on scientific literacy are brought together in an interpretative synthesis of this literature. Scientific literacy is first placed in an historical context, and a number of different factors that influence interpretations of this concept are discussed thereafter. These factors include the number of different interest groups that are concerned with scientific literacy, different conceptual definitions of the term, the relative or absolute nature of scientific literacy as a concept, different purposes for advocating scientific literacy, and different ways of measuring it. The overview yields a fuller understanding of the various factors that contribute to the concept of scientific literacy, and makes clear the relationships between these factors. © 2000 John Wiley \& Sons, Inc. Sci. Ed 84:71–94, 2000.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1098-237x(200001)84:1<71::aid-sce6>3.0.co;2-c",
    doi = "10.1002/(sici)1098-237x(200001)84:1<71::aid-sce6>3.0.co;2-c",
    openalex = "W2127753431",
    references = "doi101002tea3660290404"
}

Basing its arguments in current perspectives on the nature of the scientific enterprise, which see argument and argumentative practice as a core activity of scientists, this article develops the case for the inclusion and central role of argument in science education. Beginning with a review of the nature of argument, it discusses the function and purpose of dialogic argument in the social construction of scientific knowledge and the interpretation of empirical data. The case is then advanced that any education about science, rather than education in science, must give the role of argument a high priority if it is to give a fair account of the social practice of science, and develop a knowledge and understanding of the evaluative criteria used to establish scientific theories. Such knowledge is essential to enhance the public understanding of science and improve scientific literacy. The existing literature, and work that has attempted to use argument within science education, is reviewed to show that classroom practice does provide the opportunity to develop young people's ability to construct argument. Furthermore, the case is advanced that the lack of opportunities for the practice of argument within science classrooms, and lack of teacher's pedagogical skills in organizing argumentative discourse within the classroom are significant impediments to progress in the field. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Sci Ed 84:287–312, 2000.

@article{doi101002sici1098237x200005843287aidsce130co2a,
    author = "Driver, Rosalind and Newton, Paul E. and Osborne, Jonathan",
    title = "Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms",
    year = "2000",
    journal = "Science Education",
    abstract = "Basing its arguments in current perspectives on the nature of the scientific enterprise, which see argument and argumentative practice as a core activity of scientists, this article develops the case for the inclusion and central role of argument in science education. Beginning with a review of the nature of argument, it discusses the function and purpose of dialogic argument in the social construction of scientific knowledge and the interpretation of empirical data. The case is then advanced that any education about science, rather than education in science, must give the role of argument a high priority if it is to give a fair account of the social practice of science, and develop a knowledge and understanding of the evaluative criteria used to establish scientific theories. Such knowledge is essential to enhance the public understanding of science and improve scientific literacy. The existing literature, and work that has attempted to use argument within science education, is reviewed to show that classroom practice does provide the opportunity to develop young people's ability to construct argument. Furthermore, the case is advanced that the lack of opportunities for the practice of argument within science classrooms, and lack of teacher's pedagogical skills in organizing argumentative discourse within the classroom are significant impediments to progress in the field. © 2000 John Wiley \& Sons, Inc. Sci Ed 84:287–312, 2000.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1098-237x(200005)84:3<287::aid-sce1>3.0.co;2-a",
    doi = "10.1002/(sici)1098-237x(200005)84:3<287::aid-sce1>3.0.co;2-a",
    openalex = "W2052033074",
    references = "doi101002tea3660290404"
}

Abstract This book gives a systematic formulation of critical scientific realism by surveying varieties of realism in ontology, semantics, epistemology, theory construction, and methodology. According to the standard version of scientific realism, scientific theories are attempts to give true descriptions of mind‐independent and possibly unobservable reality, where truth means correspondence between language and reality. Critical realism adds to this view four important qualifications: our access to the world is always relative to a chosen linguistic framework (conceptual pluralism); all human knowledge about reality is uncertain and corrigible (fallibilism); even the best theories in science may fail to be true, but nevertheless, successful theories typically are close to the truth (truthlikeness); a part, but only a part, of reality consists of human‐made constructions (Popper's world 3). Niiniluoto combines Tarski's semantic definition of truth with his own explication of Popper's notion of verisimilitude, and characterizes scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. He argues in detail that critical scientific realism can be successfully defended against its most important current alternatives: instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, Kantianism, pragmatism, internal realism, relativism, social constructivism, and epistemological anarchism.

@book{doi10109301992516140010001,
    author = "Niiniluoto, Ilkka",
    title = "Critical Scientific Realism",
    year = "2002",
    abstract = "Abstract This book gives a systematic formulation of critical scientific realism by surveying varieties of realism in ontology, semantics, epistemology, theory construction, and methodology. According to the standard version of scientific realism, scientific theories are attempts to give true descriptions of mind‐independent and possibly unobservable reality, where truth means correspondence between language and reality. Critical realism adds to this view four important qualifications: our access to the world is always relative to a chosen linguistic framework (conceptual pluralism); all human knowledge about reality is uncertain and corrigible (fallibilism); even the best theories in science may fail to be true, but nevertheless, successful theories typically are close to the truth (truthlikeness); a part, but only a part, of reality consists of human‐made constructions (Popper's world 3). Niiniluoto combines Tarski's semantic definition of truth with his own explication of Popper's notion of verisimilitude, and characterizes scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. He argues in detail that critical scientific realism can be successfully defended against its most important current alternatives: instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, Kantianism, pragmatism, internal realism, relativism, social constructivism, and epistemological anarchism.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/0199251614.001.0001",
    doi = "10.1093/0199251614.001.0001",
    openalex = "W1510733794",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511625404, doi101086288975, doi1023072102968"
}

Abstract Reform efforts emphasize teaching science to promote contemporary views of the nature of science (NOS) and scientific inquiry. Within the framework of situated cognition, the assertion is that engagement in inquiry activities similar to those of scientists provides a learning context conducive to developing knowledge about the methods and activities through which science progresses, and, in turn, to developing desired views of NOS. The inclusion of a scientific inquiry context to teach about NOS has intuitive appeal. Yet, whether the learners are students, teachers, or scientists, the empirical research does not generally support the claim that engaging in scientific inquiry alone enhances conceptions of NOS. We studied developments in NOS conceptions during a science research internship course for preservice secondary science teachers. In addition to the research component, the course included seminars and journal assignments. Interns' NOS views were assessed in a pre/post format using the Views of Nature of Science questionnaire, [VNOS‐C] and interviews. Results indicate most interns showed substantial developments in NOS knowledge. Three factors were identified as important for NOS developments during the internship: (1) reflection, (2) context, and (3) perspective. Reflective journal writing and seminars had the greatest impact on NOS views. The science research component provided a context for reflection. The interns' role perspective appeared to impact their abilities to effectively reflect. Interns who assumed a reflective stance were more successful in deepening their NOS conceptions. Those who maintained a scientist's identity were less successful in advancing their NOS views through reflection. In light of these results, we discuss the significance and challenges to teaching about NOS within inquiry contexts. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 88: 610–645, 2004

@article{doi101002sce10128,
    author = "Schwartz, Reneé and Lederman, Norman G. and Crawford, Barbara A.",
    title = "Developing views of nature of science in an authentic context: An explicit approach to bridging the gap between nature of science and scientific inquiry",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Science Education",
    abstract = "Abstract Reform efforts emphasize teaching science to promote contemporary views of the nature of science (NOS) and scientific inquiry. Within the framework of situated cognition, the assertion is that engagement in inquiry activities similar to those of scientists provides a learning context conducive to developing knowledge about the methods and activities through which science progresses, and, in turn, to developing desired views of NOS. The inclusion of a scientific inquiry context to teach about NOS has intuitive appeal. Yet, whether the learners are students, teachers, or scientists, the empirical research does not generally support the claim that engaging in scientific inquiry alone enhances conceptions of NOS. We studied developments in NOS conceptions during a science research internship course for preservice secondary science teachers. In addition to the research component, the course included seminars and journal assignments. Interns' NOS views were assessed in a pre/post format using the Views of Nature of Science questionnaire, [VNOS‐C] and interviews. Results indicate most interns showed substantial developments in NOS knowledge. Three factors were identified as important for NOS developments during the internship: (1) reflection, (2) context, and (3) perspective. Reflective journal writing and seminars had the greatest impact on NOS views. The science research component provided a context for reflection. The interns' role perspective appeared to impact their abilities to effectively reflect. Interns who assumed a reflective stance were more successful in deepening their NOS conceptions. Those who maintained a scientist's identity were less successful in advancing their NOS views through reflection. In light of these results, we discuss the significance and challenges to teaching about NOS within inquiry contexts. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 88: 610–645, 2004",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/sce.10128",
    doi = "10.1002/sce.10128",
    openalex = "W2019135095",
    references = "doi101002sici1098237x199907834493aidsce630co2u, doi10108009500690050044044"
}

Abstract Science education reforms consistently maintain the goal that students develop an understanding of the nature of science, including both the nature of scientific knowledge and methods for making it. This paper articulates a framework for scaffolding epistemic aspects of inquiry that can help students understand inquiry processes in relation to the kinds of knowledge such processes can produce. This framework underlies the design of a technology‐supported inquiry curriculum for evolution and natural selection that focuses students on constructing and evaluating scientific explanations for natural phenomena. The design has been refined through cycles of implementation, analysis, and revision that have documented the epistemic practices students engage in during inquiry, indicate ways in which designed tools support students' work, and suggest necessary additional social scaffolds. These findings suggest that epistemic tools can play a unique role in supporting students' inquiry, and a fruitful means for studying students' scientific epistemologies. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 88: 345–372, 2004; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/.sce10130

@article{doi101002sce10130,
    author = "Sandoval, William A. and Reiser, Brian J.",
    title = "Explanation‐driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual and epistemic scaffolds for scientific inquiry",
    year = "2004",
    journal = "Science Education",
    abstract = "Abstract Science education reforms consistently maintain the goal that students develop an understanding of the nature of science, including both the nature of scientific knowledge and methods for making it. This paper articulates a framework for scaffolding epistemic aspects of inquiry that can help students understand inquiry processes in relation to the kinds of knowledge such processes can produce. This framework underlies the design of a technology‐supported inquiry curriculum for evolution and natural selection that focuses students on constructing and evaluating scientific explanations for natural phenomena. The design has been refined through cycles of implementation, analysis, and revision that have documented the epistemic practices students engage in during inquiry, indicate ways in which designed tools support students' work, and suggest necessary additional social scaffolds. These findings suggest that epistemic tools can play a unique role in supporting students' inquiry, and a fruitful means for studying students' scientific epistemologies. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 88: 345–372, 2004; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/.sce10130",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1002/sce.10130",
    doi = "10.1002/sce.10130",
    openalex = "W2122423127",
    references = "doi10108009500690050044044"
}

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

@book{doi1043249780203994627,
    author = "Popper, Karl",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "2005",
    abstract = "Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203994627",
    doi = "10.4324/9780203994627",
    openalex = "W4211209398"
}

0227557 respectively. Any opinions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent either those of the funding agency or the University of Michigan. Context-Specific vs. Generic Scaffolds A student’s success at performing a scientific inquiry practice requires both domain specific knowledge and knowledge of the general practice. In this study, we investigated whether providing students with written curricular scaffolds that focus on the content and task (context-specific) or on the practice of constructing a scientific explanation (generic) better supported middle school student in writing scientific explanation where they justified their claims with appropriate evidence and reasoning. To address this research question, we collected data with six teachers and 578 middle school students during the 2004-2005 school year. All six teachers enacted an 8-week standards-based chemistry curriculum, How can I make new stuff from old stuff?, designed to support 7 th grade students in their understanding of chemistry content and scientific inquiry practices. We created two versions of the curriculum, one with context-specific scaffolds and one with generic explanation scaffolds. We then randomly

@article{doi101207s15327809jls15021,
    author = "McNeill, Katherine L. and Lizotte, David J. and Krajcik, Joseph and Marx, Ronald W.",
    title = "Supporting Students' Construction of Scientific Explanations by Fading Scaffolds in Instructional Materials",
    year = "2006",
    journal = "Journal of the Learning Sciences",
    abstract = "0227557 respectively. Any opinions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent either those of the funding agency or the University of Michigan. Context-Specific vs. Generic Scaffolds A student’s success at performing a scientific inquiry practice requires both domain specific knowledge and knowledge of the general practice. In this study, we investigated whether providing students with written curricular scaffolds that focus on the content and task (context-specific) or on the practice of constructing a scientific explanation (generic) better supported middle school student in writing scientific explanation where they justified their claims with appropriate evidence and reasoning. To address this research question, we collected data with six teachers and 578 middle school students during the 2004-2005 school year. All six teachers enacted an 8-week standards-based chemistry curriculum, How can I make new stuff from old stuff?, designed to support 7 th grade students in their understanding of chemistry content and scientific inquiry practices. We created two versions of the curriculum, one with context-specific scaffolds and one with generic explanation scaffolds. We then randomly",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327809jls1502\_1",
    doi = "10.1207/s15327809jls1502\_1",
    openalex = "W2070130938",
    references = "doi101002sce20012"
}

I focus on the role of case studies in developing causal explanations. I distinguish between the theoretical purposes of case studies and the case selection strategies or research designs used to advance those objectives. I construct a typology of case studies based on their purposes: idiographic (inductive and theory-guided), hypothesis-generating, hypothesis-testing, and plausibility probe case studies. I then examine different case study research designs, including comparable cases, most and least likely cases, deviant cases, and process tracing, with attention to their different purposes and logics of inference. I address the issue of selection bias and the “single logic” debate, and I emphasize the utility of multi-method research.

@article{doi10108007388940701860318,
    author = "Levy, Jack S.",
    title = "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "Conflict Management and Peace Science",
    abstract = "I focus on the role of case studies in developing causal explanations. I distinguish between the theoretical purposes of case studies and the case selection strategies or research designs used to advance those objectives. I construct a typology of case studies based on their purposes: idiographic (inductive and theory-guided), hypothesis-generating, hypothesis-testing, and plausibility probe case studies. I then examine different case study research designs, including comparable cases, most and least likely cases, deviant cases, and process tracing, with attention to their different purposes and logics of inference. I address the issue of selection bias and the “single logic” debate, and I emphasize the utility of multi-method research.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318",
    doi = "10.1080/07388940701860318",
    openalex = "W2096247380",
    references = "doi101007978940101863014, doi101017cbo9780511815805, doi101017cbo9781139171434009, doi101093panmpl013, doi1015159781400821211, doi1015259780520957350, doi1023071907578, doi1023072586011, doi1041359781446280119n26, openalexw1502798522, openalexw2094419105"
}

This chapter advocates the good scientific practice of systematic research syntheses in Management and Organizational Science (MOS). A research synthesis is the systematic accumulation, analysis and reflective interpretation of the full body of relevant empirical evidence related to a question. It is the critical first step in effective use of scientific evidence. Synthesis is not a conventional literature review. Literature reviews are often position papers, cherry‐picking studies to advocate a point of view. Instead, syntheses systematically identify where research findings are clear (and where they aren’t), a key first step to establishing the conclusions science supports. Syntheses are also important for identifying contested findings and productive lines for future research. Uses of MOS evidence, that is, the motives for undertaking a research synthesis include scientific discovery and explanation, improved management practice guidelines, and formulating public policy. We identify six criteria for establishing the evidentiary value of a body of primary studies in MOS. We then pinpoint the stumbling blocks currently keeping the field from making effective use of its ever‐expanding base of empirical studies. Finally, this chapter outlines (a) an approach to research synthesis suitable to the domain of MOS; and (b) supporting practices to make synthesis a collective MOS project.

@article{doi10108019416520802211651,
    author = "Rousseau, Denise M. and Manning, Joshua and Denyer, David",
    title = "11 Evidence in Management and Organizational Science: Assembling the Field’s Full Weight of Scientific Knowledge Through Syntheses",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "Academy of Management Annals",
    abstract = "This chapter advocates the good scientific practice of systematic research syntheses in Management and Organizational Science (MOS). A research synthesis is the systematic accumulation, analysis and reflective interpretation of the full body of relevant empirical evidence related to a question. It is the critical first step in effective use of scientific evidence. Synthesis is not a conventional literature review. Literature reviews are often position papers, cherry‐picking studies to advocate a point of view. Instead, syntheses systematically identify where research findings are clear (and where they aren’t), a key first step to establishing the conclusions science supports. Syntheses are also important for identifying contested findings and productive lines for future research. Uses of MOS evidence, that is, the motives for undertaking a research synthesis include scientific discovery and explanation, improved management practice guidelines, and formulating public policy. We identify six criteria for establishing the evidentiary value of a body of primary studies in MOS. We then pinpoint the stumbling blocks currently keeping the field from making effective use of its ever‐expanding base of empirical studies. Finally, this chapter outlines (a) an approach to research synthesis suitable to the domain of MOS; and (b) supporting practices to make synthesis a collective MOS project.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520802211651",
    doi = "10.1080/19416520802211651",
    openalex = "W3123506892",
    references = "doi1011770038038597031001010"
}

This chapter advocates the good scientific practice of systematic research syntheses in Management and Organizational Science (MOS). A research synthesis is the systematic accumulation, analysis and reflective interpretation of the full body of relevant empirical evidence related to a question. It is the critical first step in effective use of scientific evidence. Synthesis is not a conventional literature review. Literature reviews are often position papers, cherry‐picking studies to advocate a point of view. Instead, syntheses systematically identify where research findings are clear (and where they aren’t), a key first step to establishing the conclusions science supports. Syntheses are also important for identifying contested findings and productive lines for future research. Uses of MOS evidence, that is, the motives for undertaking a research synthesis include scientific discovery and explanation, improved management practice guidelines, and formulating public policy. We identify six criteria for establishing the evidentiary value of a body of primary studies in MOS. We then pinpoint the stumbling blocks currently keeping the field from making effective use of its ever‐expanding base of empirical studies. Finally, this chapter outlines (a) an approach to research synthesis suitable to the domain of MOS; and (b) supporting practices to make synthesis a collective MOS project.

@article{doi10546519416520802211651,
    author = "Rousseau, Denise M. and Manning, Joshua and Denyer, David",
    title = "11 Evidence in Management and Organizational Science: Assembling the Field’s Full Weight of Scientific Knowledge Through Syntheses",
    year = "2008",
    journal = "Academy of Management Annals",
    abstract = "This chapter advocates the good scientific practice of systematic research syntheses in Management and Organizational Science (MOS). A research synthesis is the systematic accumulation, analysis and reflective interpretation of the full body of relevant empirical evidence related to a question. It is the critical first step in effective use of scientific evidence. Synthesis is not a conventional literature review. Literature reviews are often position papers, cherry‐picking studies to advocate a point of view. Instead, syntheses systematically identify where research findings are clear (and where they aren’t), a key first step to establishing the conclusions science supports. Syntheses are also important for identifying contested findings and productive lines for future research. Uses of MOS evidence, that is, the motives for undertaking a research synthesis include scientific discovery and explanation, improved management practice guidelines, and formulating public policy. We identify six criteria for establishing the evidentiary value of a body of primary studies in MOS. We then pinpoint the stumbling blocks currently keeping the field from making effective use of its ever‐expanding base of empirical studies. Finally, this chapter outlines (a) an approach to research synthesis suitable to the domain of MOS; and (b) supporting practices to make synthesis a collective MOS project.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520802211651",
    doi = "10.5465/19416520802211651",
    openalex = "W4231299816",
    references = "doi1011770038038597031001010"
}

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

@article{doi1041359781412961288n223,
    title = "Logic of Scientific Discovery, The",
    year = "2010",
    journal = "Encyclopedia of Research Design",
    abstract = "Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412961288.n223",
    doi = "10.4135/9781412961288.n223",
    openalex = "W3130801722"
}

The period between Kant and Frege is widely held to be an inactive time in the history of logic, especially when compared to the periods that preceded and succeeded it. By the late eighteenth century, the rich and suggestive exploratory work of Leibniz had led to writings in symbolic logic by Lambert and Ploucquet. But after Lambert this tradition effectively ended, and some of its innovations had to be rediscovered independently later in the century. Venn characterized the period between Lambert and Boole as "almost a blank in the history of the subject" and confessed an "uneasy suspicion" that a chief cause was the "disastrous effect on logical method" wrought by Kant's philosophy. De Morgan began his work in symbolic logic "facing Kant's assertion that logic neither has improved since the time of Aristotle, nor of its own nature can improve."

@incollection{doi101017cho9780511975257008,
    author = "Heis, Jeremy",
    title = "Attempts to Rethink Logic",
    year = "2012",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = {The period between Kant and Frege is widely held to be an inactive time in the history of logic, especially when compared to the periods that preceded and succeeded it. By the late eighteenth century, the rich and suggestive exploratory work of Leibniz had led to writings in symbolic logic by Lambert and Ploucquet. But after Lambert this tradition effectively ended, and some of its innovations had to be rediscovered independently later in the century. Venn characterized the period between Lambert and Boole as "almost a blank in the history of the subject" and confessed an "uneasy suspicion" that a chief cause was the "disastrous effect on logical method" wrought by Kant's philosophy. De Morgan began his work in symbolic logic "facing Kant's assertion that logic neither has improved since the time of Aristotle, nor of its own nature can improve."},
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cho9780511975257.008",
    doi = "10.1017/cho9780511975257.008",
    openalex = "W2506279136",
    references = "doi101017chol9780521591041, doi101017chol9780521591041057"
}

An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in the literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation. Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. For example, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishable reports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. The persistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive-getting it right-competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive-getting it published. This article develops strategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation that account for ordinary human motivations and biases.

@article{doi1011771745691612459058,
    author = "Nosek, Brian A. and Spies, Jeffrey R. and Motyl, Matt",
    title = "Scientific Utopia",
    year = "2012",
    journal = "Perspectives on Psychological Science",
    abstract = "An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in the literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation. Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. For example, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishable reports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. The persistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive-getting it right-competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive-getting it published. This article develops strategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation that account for ordinary human motivations and biases.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612459058",
    doi = "10.1177/1745691612459058",
    openalex = "W3124333825",
    references = "doi101017cbo9780511621123, doi101037a0015108, doi101207s15327957pspr02034"
}

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

@incollection{doi10432497802030907329,
    author = "Popper, Karl Raimund",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "2013",
    abstract = "Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203090732-9",
    doi = "10.4324/9780203090732-9",
    openalex = "W1565693361"
}

Abstract Since the seminal article by Eisenhardt (1989), scholarly interest in case research has mushroomed in operations management and organization sciences. Volumes of methodological texts are matched with a massive amount of empirical research that seeks to apply and further develop case research as a scientific method. What is missing from this literature is a treatment of the methodological diversity of case research. In this paper, we seek to unveil this heterogeneity by describing three distinct methodological accounts of case study: theory generation, theory testing, and theory elaboration. Each approach has its own idiosyncrasies, in particular when it comes to the interplay between theory and empirics. A typical case research incorporates both existing theories and empirical data to varying degrees. In light of this heterogeneity, we re‐interpret key aspects of extant contributions and discuss guidelines for future case research. We propose that ultimately, case research rigor is determined by attention to idiosyncrasy and transparency of reasoning. We conclude by arguing that we have witnessed in the past 25 years in organization research what amounts to the Renaissance of case research.

@article{doi101016jjom201403004,
    author = "Ketokivi, Mikko and Choi, Thomas Y.",
    title = "Renaissance of case research as a scientific method",
    year = "2014",
    journal = "Journal of Operations Management",
    abstract = "Abstract Since the seminal article by Eisenhardt (1989), scholarly interest in case research has mushroomed in operations management and organization sciences. Volumes of methodological texts are matched with a massive amount of empirical research that seeks to apply and further develop case research as a scientific method. What is missing from this literature is a treatment of the methodological diversity of case research. In this paper, we seek to unveil this heterogeneity by describing three distinct methodological accounts of case study: theory generation, theory testing, and theory elaboration. Each approach has its own idiosyncrasies, in particular when it comes to the interplay between theory and empirics. A typical case research incorporates both existing theories and empirical data to varying degrees. In light of this heterogeneity, we re‐interpret key aspects of extant contributions and discuss guidelines for future case research. We propose that ultimately, case research rigor is determined by attention to idiosyncrasy and transparency of reasoning. We conclude by arguing that we have witnessed in the past 25 years in organization research what amounts to the Renaissance of case research.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2014.03.004",
    doi = "10.1016/j.jom.2014.03.004",
    openalex = "W1963774948",
    references = "doi1011771094428106292900"
}

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the reviewed view of scientific explanation (that explanations are arguments) to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts.

@book{doi102307jctv173f2gh,
    author = "Salmon, Wesley C.",
    title = "Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World",
    year = "2020",
    booktitle = "Princeton University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the reviewed view of scientific explanation (that explanations are arguments) to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh",
    doi = "10.2307/j.ctv173f2gh",
    openalex = "W2017660912"
}

This article describes the deficiencies of positivist science for generating knowledge for use in solving problems that members of organizations face. Action research is introduced as a method for correcting these deficiencies. When action research is tested against the criteria of positivist science, action research is found not to meet its critical tests. The appropriateness of positivist science is questioned as a basis for judging the scientific merits of action research. Action research can base its legitimacy as science in philosophical traditions that are different from those which legitimate positivist science. Criteria and methods of science appropriate to action research are offered.

@article{doi103280so2022002006,
    author = "Susman, Gerald I. and Evered, Roger",
    title = "An assessment of the scientific merits of action research",
    year = "2023",
    journal = "STUDI ORGANIZZATIVI",
    abstract = "This article describes the deficiencies of positivist science for generating knowledge for use in solving problems that members of organizations face. Action research is introduced as a method for correcting these deficiencies. When action research is tested against the criteria of positivist science, action research is found not to meet its critical tests. The appropriateness of positivist science is questioned as a basis for judging the scientific merits of action research. Action research can base its legitimacy as science in philosophical traditions that are different from those which legitimate positivist science. Criteria and methods of science appropriate to action research are offered.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3280/so2022-002006",
    doi = "10.3280/so2022-002006",
    openalex = "W4320009379",
    references = "doi101037h0053515, doi10106313060577, doi101086286432, doi101111j154045601946tb02295x, doi101177001872677002300601, doi101177001872677703000301, doi1023072088418, doi1023072391134, doi105962bhltitle166289, openalexw3131613368"
}