Popper

@misc{popper1959the1,
    author = "Popper, K",
    title = "The Logic of Scientific Discovery",
    year = "1959",
    howpublished = "New York; London, Basic Books; Hutchinson, 480 p.; Translation of Logik der Forschung, 1934",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery: New York; London, Basic Books; Hutchinson, 480 p.; Translation of Logik der Forschung, 1934.}"
}

@article{levison1963conjectures,
    author = "Levison, A. B.",
    title = "Conjectures and Refutations. The growth of scientific knowledge. Karl R. Popper. Basic Books, New York, 1962. xii + 412 pp. Illus. $10",
    year = "1963",
    journal = "Science",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1126/science.140.3567.643",
    doi = "10.1126/science.140.3567.643",
    number = "3567",
    pages = "643-643",
    volume = "140"
}

@article{levison1963philosophy,
    author = "Levison, A. B.",
    title = "Philosophy of Science: Conjectures and Refutations. The growth of scientific knowledge. Karl R. Popper. Basic Books, New York, 1962. xii + 412 pp. Illus. $10.",
    year = "1963",
    journal = "Science",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1126/science.140.3567.643-a",
    doi = "10.1126/science.140.3567.643-a",
    number = "3567",
    pages = "643-643",
    volume = "140"
}

@misc{popper1963conjectures4,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    title = "Conjectures and Refutations",
    year = "1963",
    howpublished = "New York, Harper",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1963, Conjectures and Refutations: New York, Harper.}"
}

@article{crossref1965conjectures,
    title = "Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Karl R. Popper",
    year = "1965",
    journal = "Isis",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1086/349934",
    doi = "10.1086/349934",
    number = "1",
    pages = "88-88",
    volume = "56"
}

@misc{popper1974darwinism5,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    title = "Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme, in Schlipp, P. A., ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper",
    year = "1974",
    howpublished = "La Salle, Ill., Open Court",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1974, Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme, in Schlipp, P. A., ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper: La Salle, Ill., Open Court.}"
}

@book{popper1974scientific2,
    author = "Popper, K",
    title = "Scientific reduction and the essential incompleteness of all science, in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology",
    year = "1974",
    publisher = "Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 259-284",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K., 1974, Scientific reduction and the essential incompleteness of all science, in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 259-284.}"
}

@book{schlipp1974the9,
    author = "Schlipp, P. A",
    title = "The Philosophy of Karl Popper",
    year = "1974",
    publisher = "La Salle, Ill., Open Court Press",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Schlipp, P. A., 1974, The Philosophy of Karl Popper: La Salle, Ill., Open Court Press.}"
}

@misc{popper1976unended6,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    title = "Unended Quest",
    year = "1976",
    howpublished = "An Intelluctual Autobiography: La Salle, Ill., Open Court Publishing Co., 255 p",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1976, Unended Quest: An Intelluctual Autobiography: La Salle, Ill., Open Court Publishing Co., 255 p.}"
}

@misc{popper1978natural7,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    title = "Natural selection and the emergence of mind",
    year = "1978",
    howpublished = "Dialectica, v. 32, no. 3-4, p. 339-355",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1978, Natural selection and the emergence of mind: Dialectica, v. 32, no. 3-4, p. 339-355.}"
}

@misc{popper1980letter3,
    author = "Popper, K",
    title = "Letter to the Editor",
    year = "1980",
    howpublished = "New Scientist, v. 87, p. 611",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K., 1980, Letter to the Editor: New Scientist, v. 87, p. 611.}"
}

@incollection{popper1980science8,
    author = "Popper, K. R",
    editor = "Klemke, E. D. and Hollinger, R. and Kline, A. D.",
    title = "Science: Conjectures and refutations",
    year = "1980",
    booktitle = "Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science",
    publisher = "Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books, p. 19-34",
    note = "talkorigins\_source = {true}; raw\_reference = {Popper, K. R., 1980, Science: Conjectures and refutations, in Klemke, E. D., Hollinger, R., and Kline, A. D., eds., Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science: Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books, p. 19-34.}"
}

The element that pervades the whole of Popper's philosophy is the recognition that human designs and human schemes of thought are very often (perhaps more often than not) mistaken the safest way to proceed is to identify and learn from our mistakes...

@article{crossref1994the,
    title = "THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER",
    year = "1994",
    journal = "Pediatrics",
    abstract = "The element that pervades the whole of Popper's philosophy is the recognition that human designs and human schemes of thought are very often (perhaps more often than not) mistaken the safest way to proceed is to identify and learn from our mistakes...",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.94.1.101",
    doi = "10.1542/peds.94.1.101",
    number = "1",
    pages = "101-101",
    volume = "94"
}

Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily explained--de Queiroz and Poe fail to take account of the fact that Popper derived C(h,e,b) from absolute (logical) probability and severity of test, S(e,h,b), where critical evidence, p(e,b), is fundamental. Thus, de Queiroz and Poe's conjecture that p(e,hb) = C(h,e,b) is refuted. Falsificationism, not verificationism, remains a fair description of the parsimony method of inference used in phylogenetic systematics, not withstanding de Queiroz and Poe's mistaken understanding that "statistical" probability justifies that method. Although de Queiroz and Poe assert that maximum likelihood has the power "to explain data", they do not successfully demonstrate how causal explanation is achieved or what it is that is being explained. This is not surprising, bearing in mind that what is assumed about character evolution in the accompanying likelihood model M cannot then be explained by the results of a maximum likelihood analysis.

@article{doi10108010635150119615,
    author = "Kluge, A G",
    title = "Philosophical conjectures and their refutation.",
    year = "2001",
    journal = "Systematic biology",
    abstract = {Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily explained--de Queiroz and Poe fail to take account of the fact that Popper derived C(h,e,b) from absolute (logical) probability and severity of test, S(e,h,b), where critical evidence, p(e,b), is fundamental. Thus, de Queiroz and Poe's conjecture that p(e,hb) = C(h,e,b) is refuted. Falsificationism, not verificationism, remains a fair description of the parsimony method of inference used in phylogenetic systematics, not withstanding de Queiroz and Poe's mistaken understanding that "statistical" probability justifies that method. Although de Queiroz and Poe assert that maximum likelihood has the power "to explain data", they do not successfully demonstrate how causal explanation is achieved or what it is that is being explained. This is not surprising, bearing in mind that what is assumed about character evolution in the accompanying likelihood model M cannot then be explained by the results of a maximum likelihood analysis.},
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12116578/",
    doi = "10.1080/10635150119615",
    pmid = "12116578"
}

Kluge's (2001, Syst. Biol. 50:322-330) continued arguments that phylogenetic methods based on the statistical principle of likelihood are incompatible with the philosophy of science described by Karl Popper are based on false premises related to Kluge's misrepresentations of Popper's philosophy. Contrary to Kluge's conjectures, likelihood methods are not inherently verificationist; they do not treat every instance of a hypothesis as confirmation of that hypothesis. The historical nature of phylogeny does not preclude phylogenetic hypotheses from being evaluated using the probability of evidence. The low absolute probabilities of hypotheses are irrelevant to the correct interpretation of Popper's concept termed degree of corroboration, which is defined entirely in terms of relative probabilities. Popper did not advocate minimizing background knowledge; in any case, the background knowledge of both parsimony and likelihood methods consists of the general assumption of descent with modification and additional assumptions that are deterministic, concerning which tree is considered most highly corroborated. Although parsimony methods do not assume (in the sense of entailing) that homoplasy is rare, they do assume (in the sense of requiring to obtain a correct phylogenetic inference) certain things about patterns of homoplasy. Both parsimony and likelihood methods assume (in the sense of implying by the manner in which they operate) various things about evolutionary processes, although violation of those assumptions does not always cause the methods to yield incorrect phylogenetic inferences. Test severity is increased by sampling additional relevant characters rather than by character reanalysis, although either interpretation is compatible with the use of phylogenetic likelihood methods. Neither parsimony nor likelihood methods assess test severity (critical evidence) when used to identify a most highly corroborated tree(s) based on a single method or model and a single body of data; however, both classes of methods can be used to perform severe tests. The assumption of descent with modification is insufficient background knowledge to justify cladistic parsimony as a method for assessing degree of corroboration. Invoking equivalency between parsimony methods and likelihood models that assume no common mechanism emphasizes the necessity of additional assumptions, at least some of which are probabilistic in nature. Incongruent characters do not qualify as falsifiers of phylogenetic hypotheses except under extremely unrealistic evolutionary models; therefore, justifications of parsimony methods as falsificationist based on the idea that they minimize the ad hoc dismissal of falsifiers are questionable. Probabilistic concepts such as degree of corroboration and likelihood provide a more appropriate framework for understanding how phylogenetics conforms with Popper's philosophy of science. Likelihood ratio tests do not assume what is at issue but instead are methods for testing hypotheses according to an accepted standard of statistical significance and for incorporating considerations about test severity. These tests are fundamentally similar to Popper's degree of corroboration in being based on the relationship between the probability of the evidence e in the presence versus absence of the hypothesis h, i.e., between p(e|hb) and p(e|b), where b is the background knowledge. Both parsimony and likelihood methods are inductive in that their inferences (particular trees) contain more information than (and therefore do not follow necessarily from) the observations upon which they are based; however, both are deductive in that their conclusions (tree lengths and likelihoods) follow necessarily from their premises (particular trees, observed character state distributions, and evolutionary models). For these and other reasons, phylogenetic likelihood methods are highly compatible with Karl Popper's philosophy of science and offer several advantages over parsimony methods in this context.

@article{pmid12775524,
    author = "de Queiroz, Kevin and Poe, Steven",
    title = "Failed refutations: further comments on parsimony and likelihood methods and their relationship to Popper's degree of corroboration.",
    year = "2003",
    journal = "Systematic biology",
    abstract = "Kluge's (2001, Syst. Biol. 50:322-330) continued arguments that phylogenetic methods based on the statistical principle of likelihood are incompatible with the philosophy of science described by Karl Popper are based on false premises related to Kluge's misrepresentations of Popper's philosophy. Contrary to Kluge's conjectures, likelihood methods are not inherently verificationist; they do not treat every instance of a hypothesis as confirmation of that hypothesis. The historical nature of phylogeny does not preclude phylogenetic hypotheses from being evaluated using the probability of evidence. The low absolute probabilities of hypotheses are irrelevant to the correct interpretation of Popper's concept termed degree of corroboration, which is defined entirely in terms of relative probabilities. Popper did not advocate minimizing background knowledge; in any case, the background knowledge of both parsimony and likelihood methods consists of the general assumption of descent with modification and additional assumptions that are deterministic, concerning which tree is considered most highly corroborated. Although parsimony methods do not assume (in the sense of entailing) that homoplasy is rare, they do assume (in the sense of requiring to obtain a correct phylogenetic inference) certain things about patterns of homoplasy. Both parsimony and likelihood methods assume (in the sense of implying by the manner in which they operate) various things about evolutionary processes, although violation of those assumptions does not always cause the methods to yield incorrect phylogenetic inferences. Test severity is increased by sampling additional relevant characters rather than by character reanalysis, although either interpretation is compatible with the use of phylogenetic likelihood methods. Neither parsimony nor likelihood methods assess test severity (critical evidence) when used to identify a most highly corroborated tree(s) based on a single method or model and a single body of data; however, both classes of methods can be used to perform severe tests. The assumption of descent with modification is insufficient background knowledge to justify cladistic parsimony as a method for assessing degree of corroboration. Invoking equivalency between parsimony methods and likelihood models that assume no common mechanism emphasizes the necessity of additional assumptions, at least some of which are probabilistic in nature. Incongruent characters do not qualify as falsifiers of phylogenetic hypotheses except under extremely unrealistic evolutionary models; therefore, justifications of parsimony methods as falsificationist based on the idea that they minimize the ad hoc dismissal of falsifiers are questionable. Probabilistic concepts such as degree of corroboration and likelihood provide a more appropriate framework for understanding how phylogenetics conforms with Popper's philosophy of science. Likelihood ratio tests do not assume what is at issue but instead are methods for testing hypotheses according to an accepted standard of statistical significance and for incorporating considerations about test severity. These tests are fundamentally similar to Popper's degree of corroboration in being based on the relationship between the probability of the evidence e in the presence versus absence of the hypothesis h, i.e., between p(e|hb) and p(e|b), where b is the background knowledge. Both parsimony and likelihood methods are inductive in that their inferences (particular trees) contain more information than (and therefore do not follow necessarily from) the observations upon which they are based; however, both are deductive in that their conclusions (tree lengths and likelihoods) follow necessarily from their premises (particular trees, observed character state distributions, and evolutionary models). For these and other reasons, phylogenetic likelihood methods are highly compatible with Karl Popper's philosophy of science and offer several advantages over parsimony methods in this context.",
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12775524/",
    pmid = "12775524"
}

Falsification was established in the philosophy of science of the 20th century by Sir Karl R. Popper. In his seminal work “Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Popper proposed falsification as a deductive method to test scientific theories as opposed to inductive methods. In short, inductivist reasoning seeks to generate theories from observations, whereas deductive reasoning begins with theories, which are then evaluated against observations. Falsification opposed epistemological strategies based upon verification of scientific theories, as advocated by representatives of logical positivism. In a broader sense, falsifiability was introduced as a framework to distinguish scientific theories from non-scientific theories, i.e., falsifiability serving as a demarcation criterion for scientific theories. Scientific progress, aligning with Popper's theory of falsification, is considered a history of conjectures and refutations. Theories could be continuously improved through repeated exposure to falsification attempts. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the logical underpinnings and practical implications of falsification, including notions of scientific progress. The roots of the problem of induction, as well as its connection to logical positivism, are briefly outlined to establish the philosophical context. Selected critics are heard, representing refinements or alternatives to falsification. These critics argued about epistemological and logical foundations of falsification (Quine, Lakatos, Bartley), identified the mismatch between falsification theory and the history of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend), or developed distinct conceptions of human understanding (Gadamer). Popper and his falsification theory were equally controversial and influential for the philosophy of science in the 20th century.

@incollection{zipser2025falsification,
    author = "Zipser, Carl Moritz",
    title = "Falsification theory and scientific progress",
    year = "2025",
    publisher = "Elsevier",
    abstract = "Falsification was established in the philosophy of science of the 20th century by Sir Karl R. Popper. In his seminal work “Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Popper proposed falsification as a deductive method to test scientific theories as opposed to inductive methods. In short, inductivist reasoning seeks to generate theories from observations, whereas deductive reasoning begins with theories, which are then evaluated against observations. Falsification opposed epistemological strategies based upon verification of scientific theories, as advocated by representatives of logical positivism. In a broader sense, falsifiability was introduced as a framework to distinguish scientific theories from non-scientific theories, i.e., falsifiability serving as a demarcation criterion for scientific theories. Scientific progress, aligning with Popper's theory of falsification, is considered a history of conjectures and refutations. Theories could be continuously improved through repeated exposure to falsification attempts. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the logical underpinnings and practical implications of falsification, including notions of scientific progress. The roots of the problem of induction, as well as its connection to logical positivism, are briefly outlined to establish the philosophical context. Selected critics are heard, representing refinements or alternatives to falsification. These critics argued about epistemological and logical foundations of falsification (Quine, Lakatos, Bartley), identified the mismatch between falsification theory and the history of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend), or developed distinct conceptions of human understanding (Gadamer). Popper and his falsification theory were equally controversial and influential for the philosophy of science in the 20th century.",
    url = "https://www.zora.uzh.ch/handle/20.500.14742/245171",
    doi = "10.5167/uzh-292142"
}