@book{openalexw1503368790,
    author = "Allen, Colin and Bekoff, Marc and Lauder, George",
    title = "Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology",
    year = "1998",
    abstract = "Part 1 Looking backwards - teleology as etiology: teleological explanations in evolutionary biology, Francisco J. Ayala functions, Larry Wright biological teleology -questions and explanations, Robert N. Brandon. Part 2 Don't look back - nonhistorical approaches to biological teleology the inference of function from structure in fossils, M.J.S. Rudwick adaptation and the form-function complex, Walter J. Bock and Gerd von Wahlert functional analysis, Robert Cummins teleology revisited, Ernest Nagel functions, John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter where's the good in teleology?, Mark Bedau. Part 3 Critical developments: in defense of proper functions, Ruth Garrett Millikan functions as selected effects - the conceptual analyst's defense, Karen Neander function without purpose - the uses of casual role function in evloutionary biology, Ron Amundson and George V. Lauder functions and goal directedness, Berent Enc and fred Adams function, fitness and disposition, Sandra D. Mitchell. Part 4 Synthesis or pluralism?: the concept of function, R.A. functional analysis and proper functions, Paul E. Griffiths a modern history theory and proper functions, Peter Godfrey-Smith function and design, Philip Kitcher. Part 5 Design: historical biology and the problems of design, George V. Lauder exaptation - a missing term in the science of form, Stephen Jay Gould and Elizabeth S. Vrba adaptation and the form-function relation, Carl Gans biological function, adaptation, and natural design, Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff.",
    url = "https://openalex.org/W1503368790",
    openalex = "W1503368790"
}

@misc{buller2001function,
    author = "Buller, David J",
    title = "Function and Teleology",
    year = "2001",
    booktitle = "Encyclopedia of Life Sciences",
    abstract = "The biological concept of function appears teleological, implying goal directedness or purpose. Ever since the scientific revolution, however, teleology has appeared inconsistent with fundamental scientific principles. Philosophers of biology have attempted to explicate the concept of function so as to make it simultaneously teleological and scientifically acceptable.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1038/npg.els.0003454",
    doi = "10.1038/npg.els.0003454"
}

@book{doi101017cbo9780511819018,
    author = "Grene, Marjorie and Depew, David",
    title = "The Philosophy of Biology",
    year = "2004",
    booktitle = "Cambridge University Press eBooks",
    abstract = "Is life different from the non-living? If so, how? And how, in that case, does biology as the study of living things differ from other sciences? These questions are traced through an exploration of episodes in the history of biology and philosophy. The book begins with Aristotle, then moves on to Descartes, comparing his position with that of Harvey. In the eighteenth century the authors consider Buffon and Kant. In the nineteenth century the authors examine the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate, pre-Darwinian geology and natural theology, Darwin and the transition from Darwin to the revival of Mendelism. Two chapters deal with the evolutionary synthesis and such questions as the species problem, the reducibility or otherwise of biology to physics and chemistry, and the problem of biological explanation in terms of function and teleology. The final chapters reflect on the implications of the philosophy of biology for philosophy of science in general.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511819018",
    doi = "10.1017/cbo9780511819018",
    openalex = "W4247137359"
}

@article{doi105860choice425253,
    title = "The philosophy of biology: an episodic history",
    year = "2005",
    journal = "Choice Reviews Online",
    abstract = "Is life different from the non-living? If so, how? And how, in that case, does biology as the study of living things differ from other sciences? These questions are traced through an exploration of episodes in the history of biology and philosophy. The book begins with Aristotle, then moves on to Descartes, comparing his position with that of Harvey. In the eighteenth century the authors consider Buffon and Kant. In the nineteenth century the authors examine the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate, pre-Darwinian geology and natural theology, Darwin and the transition from Darwin to the revival of Mendelism. Two chapters deal with the evolutionary synthesis and such questions as the species problem, the reducibility or otherwise of biology to physics and chemistry, and the problem of biological explanation in terms of function and teleology. The final chapters reflect on the implications of the philosophy of biology for philosophy of science in general.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-5253",
    doi = "10.5860/choice.42-5253",
    openalex = "W1502290627"
}

@incollection{doi101093oso97801992380190030013,
    author = "Schiefsky, Mark",
    title = "Galen’ S Teleology And Functional Explanation",
    year = "2007",
    journal = "Oxford studies in ancient philosophy",
    abstract = "Abstract The importance of functional analysis in contemporary biology and social science is widely recognized. By functional analysis I mean an approach in which the parts of a complex system are studied in order to determine their contribution to the continued existence or operation of the system as a whole. Thus we may say that the function of the heart in an organism is to circulate the blood, and in doing so we identify the contribution of the heart to the organism’s continued existence. When we cite the function of an organ such as the heart to explain its presence or its distinctive structure we are giving a functional explanation, and such an explanation will involve teleological language.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199238019.003.0013",
    doi = "10.1093/oso/9780199238019.003.0013",
    openalex = "W1848682868"
}

@article{doi101093bjpsaxp036,
    author = "Mossio, Matteo and Alejandro, Cristián and Moreno, Álvaro",
    title = "An Organizational Account of Biological Functions",
    year = "2009",
    journal = "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
    abstract = "In this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework. 1. Introduction 2. Dispositional Approaches 3. Etiological Theories 4. Biological Self-maintenance 4.1. Closure, teleology, and normativity 4.2. Organizational differentiation 5. Functions 5.1. C1: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization 5.2. C2: Producing the functional trait 6. Implications and Objections 6.1. Functional versus useful 6.2. Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributions 6.3. Proper functions and selected effects 6.4. Reproduction 6.5. Relation with other ‘unitarian’ approaches 7. Conclusions",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp036",
    doi = "10.1093/bjps/axp036",
    openalex = "W2169108009"
}

@article{doi101007s0023901395561,
    author = "Pross, Addy",
    title = "The Evolutionary Origin of Biological Function and Complexity",
    year = "2013",
    journal = "Journal of Molecular Evolution",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00239-013-9556-1",
    doi = "10.1007/s00239-013-9556-1",
    note = "discovered\_from = {doi101098rsif20180159}",
    number = "4",
    pages = "185-191",
    volume = "76"
}

@article{doi101007s1122901713770,
    author = "Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema",
    title = "Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "Synthese",
    abstract = "I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of our mechanisms for belief production. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon, and then move to the teleological and normative accounts of belief, advertised by their proponents as able to give an explanation of it. I argue that, at the very least, both accounts face serious difficulties in this endeavour. These difficulties are a function of seeking an explanation of transparency at the agential level, either with the subject aiming at truth, or being guided by a norm of truth. I adopt a motivational account of belief, one which severs the connection between belief and truth, and supplement this with an account of actual world beliefs. My alternative explanation is found at the sub-intentional, non-agential level, secured by biology. This explanation casts transparency not as related to the nature of deliberation over what to believe, but rather as contingently characterizing the beliefs of some believers, namely those with a particular biological history. My explanation thus parts company with what has come before along two dimensions: it moves away from transparency being something related to the agent’s aims or commitments, and it understands it as a contingent phenomenon. I close by considering an objection to my view—that transparency must not be understood as a contingent phenomenon—and a nearby alternative position which avoids this consequence. I respond to this objection and give reasons not to endorse the nearby alternative. I conclude that my explanation does not face the difficulties of those offered by teleologists and normativists, and, that by moving away from agential explanations, and casting transparency as contingent, we can provide a successful explanation of it.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1377-0",
    doi = "10.1007/s11229-017-1377-0",
    openalex = "W2600616725"
}

@article{doi1010800950069320171404658,
    author = "Trommler, Friederike and Gresch, Helge and Hammann, Marcus",
    title = "Students’ reasons for preferring teleological explanations",
    year = "2017",
    journal = "International Journal of Science Education",
    abstract = "The teleological bias, a major learning obstacle, involves explaining biological phenomena in terms of purposes and goals. To probe the teleological bias, researchers have used acceptance judgement tasks and preference judgement tasks. In the present study, such tasks were used with German high school students (N = 353) for 10 phenomena from human biology, that were explained both teleologically and causally. A sub-sample (n = 26) was interviewed about the reasons for their preferences. The results showed that the students favoured teleological explanations over causal explanations. Although the students explained their preference judgements etiologically (i.e. teleologically and causally), they also referred to a wide range of non-etiological criteria (i.e. familiarity, complexity, relevance and five more criteria). When elaborating on their preference for causal explanations, the students often focused not on the causality of the phenomenon, but on mechanisms whose complexity they found attractive. When explaining their preference for teleological explanations, they often focused not teleologically on purposes and goals, but rather on functions, which they found familiar and relevant. Generally, students’ preference judgements rarely allowed for making inferences about causal reasoning and teleological reasoning, an issue that is controversial in the literature. Given that students were largely unaware of causality and teleology, their attention must be directed towards distinguishing between etiological and non-etiological reasoning. Implications for educational practice as well as for future research are discussed.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1080/09500693.2017.1404658",
    doi = "10.1080/09500693.2017.1404658",
    openalex = "W2768962639"
}

@article{doi101016jcogpsych201809001,
    author = "Liquin, Emily G and Lombrozo, Tania",
    title = "Structure-function fit underlies the evaluation of teleological explanations.",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Cognitive psychology",
    abstract = {Teleological explanations, which appeal to a function or purpose (e.g., "kangaroos have long tails for balance"), seem to play a special role within the biological domain. We propose that such explanations are compelling because they are evaluated on the basis of a salient cue: structure-function fit, or the correspondence between a biological feature's form (e.g., tail length) and its function (e.g., balance). Across five studies with 852 participants in total, we find support for three predictions that follow from this proposal. First, we find that function information decreases reliance on mechanistic considerations when evaluating explanations (Experiments 1-3), indicating the presence of a salient, function-based cue. Second, we demonstrate that structure-function fit is the best candidate for this cue (Experiments 3-4). Third, we show that scientifically-unwarranted teleological explanations are more likely to be accepted under speeded and unspeeded conditions when they are high in structure-function fit (Experiment 5). Experiment 5 also finds that structure-function fit extends beyond biology to teleological explanations in other domains. Jointly, these studies provide a new account of how teleological explanations are evaluated and why they are often (but not universally) compelling.},
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30317031/",
    doi = "10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.09.001",
    pmid = "30317031"
}

@article{doi101016jcub201806072,
    author = "Wagner-Egger, Pascal and Delouvée, Sylvain and Gauvrit, Nicolas and Dieguez, Sebastian",
    title = "Creationism and conspiracism share a common teleological bias",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Current Biology",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.06.072",
    doi = "10.1016/j.cub.2018.06.072",
    note = "discovered\_from = {doi101007s1142202310187y}",
    number = "16",
    pages = "R867-R868",
    volume = "28"
}

@article{doi103390educsci8030135,
    author = "Stern, Florian and Kampourakis, Kostas and Huneault, Catherine and Silveira, Patrícia and Müller, Andréas",
    title = "Undergraduate Biology Students’ Teleological and Essentialist Misconceptions",
    year = "2018",
    journal = "Education Sciences",
    abstract = "Research in developmental psychology has shown that deeply-rooted, intuitive ways of thinking, such as design teleology and psychological essentialism, impact children’s scientific explanations about natural phenomena. Similarly, biology education researchers have found that students often hold inaccurate conceptions about natural phenomena, which often relate to these intuitions. In order to further investigate the relation between students’ conceptions and intuitions, we conducted a study with 93 first year undergraduate students in biology. They were asked to express their level of agreement or disagreement with six misconception statements and to explain their choices in a two-tier test. Results showed a tendency for students to agree with teleological and essentialist misconceptions. However, no association was found between students’ teleological and essentialist conceptions as expressed in their agreement or disagreement with the various misconception statements. Moreover, we found evidence of a variable consistency across students’ answers depending on the misconception considered, which indicates that item features and contexts may have an effect on students’ answers. All together, these findings provide evidence for considerable persistence of teleological and essentialist misconceptions among students. We suggest future directions for thinking, studying, and analyzing students’ conceptions about biological phenomena.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci8030135",
    doi = "10.3390/educsci8030135",
    openalex = "W2889238996"
}

@article{doi101016jshpsc2019101188,
    author = "Huneman, Philippe",
    title = "Revisiting darwinian teleology: A case for inclusive fitness as design explanation.",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences",
    abstract = {This paper elaborates a general framework to make sense of teleological explanations in Darwinian evolutionary biology. It relies on an attempt to tie natural selection to a sense of optimization. First, after assessing the objections made by any attempt to view selection as a maximising process within population genetics, it understands Grafen's Formal Darwinism (FD) as a conceptual link established between population genetics and behavioral ecology's adaptationist framework (without any empirical commitments). Thus I suggest that this provides a way to make sense of teleological explanations in biology under their various modes. Then the paper criticizes two major ways of accounting for teleology: a Darwinian one, the etiological view of biological functions, and a non-Darwinian one, here labeled "intrinsic teleology" view, which covers several subtypes of accounts, including plasticity-oriented conceptions of evolution or organizational views of function. The former is centered on traits while the latter is centered on organisms; this is shown to imply that both accounts are unable to provide a systematic understanding of biological teleology. Finally the paper argues that viewing teleology as maximization of inclusive fitness along the FD lines as understood here allows one to make sense of both the design of organisms and the individual traits as adaptions. Such notion is thereby claimed to be the proper meaning of teleology in evolutionary biology, since it avoids the opposed pitfalls of etiological views and intrinsic-teleology view, while accounting for the same features as they do.},
    url = "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31326324/",
    doi = "10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101188",
    pmid = "31326324"
}

@article{doi101152ajpregu003962018,
    author = "Goldstein, David S.",
    title = "How does homeostasis happen? Integrative physiological, systems biological, and evolutionary perspectives",
    year = "2019",
    journal = "American Journal of Physiology-Regulatory, Integrative and Comparative Physiology",
    abstract = "Homeostasis is a founding principle of integrative physiology. In current systems biology, however, homeostasis seems almost invisible. Is homeostasis a key goal driving body processes, or is it an emergent mechanistic fact? In this perspective piece, I propose that the integrative physiological and systems biological viewpoints about homeostasis reflect different epistemologies, different philosophies of knowledge. Integrative physiology is concept driven. It attempts to explain biological phenomena by continuous formation of theories that experimentation or observation can test. In integrative physiology, “function” refers to goals or purposes. Systems biology is data driven. It explains biological phenomena in terms of “omics”–i.e., genomics, gene expression, epigenomics, proteomics, and metabolomics–it depicts the data in computer models of complex cascades or networks, and it makes predictions from the models. In systems biology, “function” refers more to mechanisms than to goals. The integrative physiologist emphasizes homeostasis of internal variables such as Pco 2 and blood pressure. The systems biologist views these emphases as teleological and unparsimonious in that the “regulated variable” (e.g., arterial Pco 2 and blood pressure) and the “regulator” (e.g., the “carbistat” and “barostat”) are unobservable constructs. The integrative physiologist views systems biological explanations as not really explanations but descriptions that cannot account for phenomena we humans believe exist, although they cannot be observed directly, such as feelings and, ultimately, the conscious mind. This essay reviews the history of the two epistemologies, emphasizing autonomic neuroscience. I predict rapprochement of integrative physiology with systems biology. The resolution will avoid teleological purposiveness, transcend pure mechanism, and incorporate adaptiveness in evolution, i.e., “Darwinian medicine.”",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1152/ajpregu.00396.2018",
    doi = "10.1152/ajpregu.00396.2018",
    openalex = "W2910915966"
}

@article{doi101186s12052020001200,
    author = "Galli, Leonardo González and Pérez, Gastón and Galindo, Alma Adrianna Gómez",
    title = "The self-regulation of teleological thinking in natural selection learning",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Evolution Education and Outreach",
    abstract = "Abstract Background Teleology is one of the critical aspects of students’ intuitive concepts about living beings and, specifically, their evolution. This cognitive bias imposes a substantial restriction on the process of learning such content. In this work, we rely on epistemological, psychological and pedagogical analyses to substantiate an educational proposal centered on the concepts of epistemological obstacles and metacognitive vigilance. Results Based on Michael Ruse’s epistemological analysis, according to which teleology in biology persists because the scientific explanation of adaptation necessarily involves appeal to the metaphor of design, and on research in cognitive psychology, especially in relation to metacognition and self-regulated learning, we argue that the primary educational aim must be to encourage students to develop metacognitive skills to regulate the use of teleological reasoning. We develop our instructional proposal based on the didactic concepts of epistemological obstacles and metacognitive vigilance (consistent with epistemological and psychological analyses). Conclusion We briefly discuss the instructional implications of our analysis and some possible relationships between our proposal and other lines of research in psychology and science education.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1186/s12052-020-00120-0",
    doi = "10.1186/s12052-020-00120-0",
    openalex = "W3029758912"
}

@article{doi101186s1205202000122y,
    author = "Trommler, Friederike and Hammann, Marcus",
    title = "The relationship between biological function and teleology: Implications for biology education",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Evolution Education and Outreach",
    abstract = "Abstract This paper explicates the relationship between biological function and teleology by focusing not only on difference but also on conceptual overlap. By doing so, this paper is meant to increase awareness of the misleading potential of biological function and the educational necessity to explicate the meaning of biological function to biology students to prevent them from drawing inadequate teleological conclusions about biological phenomena. The conceptual overlap between teleology and biological function lies in the notion of telos (end, goal). Biologically inadequate teleology assumes that teloi (ends, goals) exist in nature and that natural mechanisms are directed towards teloi. Such inadequate teleological assumptions have been documented in students’ reasoning about biological phenomena. Biological function, however, does not involve the assumption that teloi exist in nature. Rather, biologists use the notion of telos as an epistemological tool whenever they consider a structure or mechanism functional because they view this structure or mechanism as a means to an end (telos). Whereas for biologists such means-ends conceptualizations represent a productive tool for identifying biological phenomena functionally, for students, such means-ends considerations can be misleading. Therefore, this paper explicates how far the concept of biological function involves reference to ends (teloi) and how it relates to biological mechanisms. The paper draws implications on how to prevent students from slipping from functional reasoning into inadequate teleological reasoning.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1186/s12052-020-00122-y",
    doi = "10.1186/s12052-020-00122-y",
    openalex = "W3028858449"
}

@article{trommler2020the,
    author = "Trommler, Friederike and Hammann, Marcus",
    title = "The relationship between biological function and teleology: Implications for biology education",
    year = "2020",
    journal = "Evolution: Education and Outreach",
    abstract = "This paper explicates the relationship between biological function and teleology by focusing not only on difference but also on conceptual overlap. By doing so, this paper is meant to increase awareness of the misleading potential of biological function and the educational necessity to explicate the meaning of biological function to biology students to prevent them from drawing inadequate teleological conclusions about biological phenomena. The conceptual overlap between teleology and biological function lies in the notion of telos (end, goal). Biologically inadequate teleology assumes that teloi (ends, goals) exist in nature and that natural mechanisms are directed towards teloi. Such inadequate teleological assumptions have been documented in students’ reasoning about biological phenomena. Biological function, however, does not involve the assumption that teloi exist in nature. Rather, biologists use the notion of telos as an epistemological tool whenever they consider a structure or mechanism functional because they view this structure or mechanism as a means to an end (telos). Whereas for biologists such means-ends conceptualizations represent a productive tool for identifying biological phenomena functionally, for students, such means-ends considerations can be misleading. Therefore, this paper explicates how far the concept of biological function involves reference to ends (teloi) and how it relates to biological mechanisms. The paper draws implications on how to prevent students from slipping from functional reasoning into inadequate teleological reasoning.",
    url = "https://doi.org/10.1186/s12052-020-00122-y",
    doi = "10.1186/s12052-020-00122-y",
    number = "1",
    volume = "13"
}